Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403 (2020)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Criminal Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 153.

Case Notes

In General.

There is no distinction between the criminal liability of an accomplice and the person who actually commits the offense. Riggins v. State, 317 Ark. 636, 882 S.W.2d 664 (1994).

Subsection (a) applies in the felony-murder context when an accomplice has the purpose of promoting or facilitating the underlying felony that results in death, whereas subsection (b) applies when the issue is whether the accomplice intended the results of his actions with criminal culpability, that is, intended the death itself. Jones v. State, 336 Ark. 191, 984 S.W.2d 432 (1999), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2000 Ark. LEXIS 148 (Mar. 16, 2000).

Accessories.

The former distinction between principals and accessories was abolished. Fleeman v. State, 204 Ark. 772, 165 S.W.2d 62 (1942); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948); Trotter v. State, 237 Ark. 820, 377 S.W.2d 14 (1964), cert. denied, Trotter v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 890, 85 S. Ct. 164 (1964); Ballew v. State, 246 Ark. 1191, 441 S.W.2d 453 (1969); Miller v. State, 253 Ark. 1060, 490 S.W.2d 445 (1973) (preceding decisions under prior law).

An accessory before the fact is an accomplice. Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W.2d 328 (1979).

The present criminal code treats the concept of accessories differently from the common law and is consistent with the weight of authority. Under present law an accessory before the fact is an accomplice, and one who was formerly an accessory after the fact is now guilty of a separate crime, i.e., hindering apprehension and prosecution. Ritchie v. State, 31 Ark. App. 177, 790 S.W.2d 919 (1990).

An accessory before the fact is now referred to as an accomplice, and one who was formerly an accessory after the fact is now guilty of a separate crime under § 5-54-105 — hindering apprehension and prosecution. Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993).

Trial court properly terminated the parental rights of the mother and father under § 9-27-341 and found that each parent, either as the offender or as the accomplice, had committed a felony battery against a grandson of the mother because the mother's story that she was not involved was implausible considering the medical testimony; termination was in the child's best interests under § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) given that the child was a dependent-neglected child under § 9-27-303(15)(A) and one purpose of § 9-27-302(2)(B) was to protect a juvenile's safety. Todd v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 174, 151 S.W.3d 315 (2004).

Accomplice Testimony.

Where defendant's friend testified that defendant tried to rob the victim in his truck and shot him when he resisted, defendant's fingerprints were found on the truck and the blood on the gun matched defendant's DNA. Even if the friend was deemed an accomplice for purposes of this section, the evidence was sufficient to connect defendant to the offense. Bush v. State, 374 Ark. 506, 288 S.W.3d 658 (2008).

Evidence to corroborate a witness's testimony was not required because defendant failed to demonstrate that the witness was an accomplice; first, the witness testified that he was merely present in the vehicle and this testimony was unrefuted, second, the circuit court did not find him to be an accomplice at law, and finally, the appellate court had no knowledge of whether the jury decided if the witness was an accomplice. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 331 (2019).

Even assuming the witness was an accomplice, there was independent evidence tending to connect defendant with attempted capital murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing, as his letters and call to the witness were consistent with testimony that defendant was the shooter, and the jury could have found that defendant's alleged actions in firing the assault rifle at the officer and telling the driver to go aided and encouraged the driver in fleeing from the officer. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 331 (2019).

Burden of Proof.

A person must first be found to be an accomplice under this section for the requirement of corroborative evidence to come into play under § 16-89-111(e)(1); it is the burden of the defendant to prove that a witness is an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. Rockett v. State, 319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366 (1995).

Buyer of Illicit Drugs.

A buyer of illicit drugs is not an accomplice of the seller. Talley v. State, 312 Ark. 271, 849 S.W.2d 493 (1993).

Culpable Activities.

Where persons combined to do an unlawful thing, if the act of one proceeding according to the common plan terminated in a criminal result, even though not the particular result intended, all were liable. Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99 (1884); Dorsey v. State, 219 Ark. 101, 240 S.W.2d 30 (1951), cert. denied, Dorsey v. Arkansas, 342 U.S. 851, 72 S. Ct. 80 (1951) (preceding decisions under prior law).

All who procured, participated in, or assented to the commission of a misdemeanor, were punishable as principals. Foster v. State, 45 Ark. 361 (1885); Fortenbury v. State, 47 Ark. 188, 1 S.W. 58 (1886); Crocker v. State, 49 Ark. 60, 4 S.W. 197 (1887). See also Miller v. State, 55 Ark. 188, 17 S.W. 719 (1891) (preceding decisions under prior law).

One who was present and aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime could be indicted for that crime, though he did not do the act necessary to commit the crime, nor attempt to do so. Hunter v. State, 104 Ark. 245, 149 S.W. 99 (1912) (decision under prior law).

One who counseled and procured the commission of an offense though absent at time act was committed, could be charged in the indictment with doing the act. McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (1948) (decision under prior law).

A defendant could be convicted of being an accessory before the fact for involuntary manslaughter, if he sat in a car and allowed the driver to drive the car in a drunken and reckless manner, which resulted in death to another individual. Lewis v. State, 220 Ark. 914, 251 S.W.2d 490 (1952), superseded by statute as stated in, Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993) (decision under prior law).

All of the participants in a crime which resulted in a second crime were equally guilty of the second crime. Stewart v. State, 257 Ark. 753, 519 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859, 96 S. Ct. 113, 46 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Where there was substantial evidence to show that the defendant not only stood by, but aided, abetted and assisted in the commission of an offense, he could not defend on the ground that he was a mere bystander. Fant v. State, 258 Ark. 1015, 530 S.W.2d 364 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Where the defendant accompanied those who actually committed the offense, supplied them with an instrument used to commit the offense, and aware of the likelihood of the commission of a crime, she brought herself within the terms of § 5-2-402 and this section, she was properly convicted. Hallman v. State, 264 Ark. 900, 575 S.W.2d 688 (1979).

Defendant who helped others commit a crime was not an accomplice to crime where he had no knowledge that the activities constituted a crime. Martinez v. State, 269 Ark. 231, 601 S.W.2d 576 (1980).

Defendant's conduct in helping to plan crime and disposing of incriminating evidence made her an accomplice as a matter of law under this section. Roleson v. State, 272 Ark. 346, 614 S.W.2d 656 (1981).

This section does not contemplate that a person is an accomplice only if he is present at the scene of the crime; no such construction can be placed on the statute's plain language; therefore, a defendant is not precluded from being charged as an accomplice to crime merely because she was not present when the crime took place. Roleson v. State, 277 Ark. 148, 640 S.W.2d 113 (1982).

Where the evidence at most indicated that the witness may have had reason to suspect that the defendants were up to no good, the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the witness should be held to be an accomplice, since suspicion alone is not enough to make a witness an accomplice as a matter of law. Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 642 S.W.2d 865 (1982).

A person need not take an active part in an offense to be convicted of such if the person accompanied the person or persons who actually committed the offense and assisted in such commission. Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 647 S.W.2d 419 (1983), cert. denied, Henry v. Arkansas, 464 U.S. 835, 104 S. Ct. 121 (1983).

One who merely introduces a buyer to a seller cannot be convicted of delivery of the article to be sold, or of possession with intent to deliver; however, where the defendant was an active participant in the transaction, he was an accomplice and was liable for the criminal conduct of the other participants. Yent v. State, 9 Ark. App. 356, 660 S.W.2d 178 (1983).

The term “accomplice” does not embrace one who had guilty knowledge or who is morally delinquent; mere presence, acquiescence, silence or knowledge that a crime is being committed, in the absence of some legal duty to act, concealment or knowledge or failure to inform officers of the law, is not sufficient to make an accomplice. Robinson v. State, 11 Ark. App. 18, 665 S.W.2d 890 (1984).

Presence of an accused in the proximity of a crime, opportunity, and association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation are relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice with the crime. Ashley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 73, 732 S.W.2d 872 (1987); Alford v. State, 33 Ark. App. 179, 804 S.W.2d 370 (1991).

Mere presence, acquiescence, silence, or knowledge that crime is being committed, in absence of legal duty to act, or failure to inform officers of law is not sufficient to make one an accomplice. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 227, 742 S.W.2d 877 (1988).

Mere presence at the scene of the crime or failure to inform law enforcement officers of a crime does not make one an accomplice as a matter of law. Pilcher v. State, 303 Ark. 335, 796 S.W.2d 845 (1990).

A defendant can be an accomplice to murder even though the defendant's participation in the murder is, compared to that of the principal, relatively passive. Thomas v. State, 312 Ark. 158, 847 S.W.2d 695 (1993).

No accomplice criminal responsibility results from supplying an intoxicant to one allegedly responsible as a principal for violations of § 5-10-104(a)(1), § 5-13-204(a), or § 27-53-101(a)(1). Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993).

A person need not take an active part in an offense to be convicted in violation of this section if the person accompanied the person or persons who actually committed the offense and assisted in such commission. Gibson v. State, 316 Ark. 705, 875 S.W.2d 58 (1994).

Given defendant's presence and his willingness to make change and comment on the quality of the drugs being purchased, it is apparent he was aiding or attempting to aid in the consummation of the sales; the evidence thus was sufficient to show he was an accomplice. Jacobs v. State, 317 Ark. 454, 878 S.W.2d 734 (1994).

Stolen goods recovered from a dwelling shared by an accomplice is not sufficient corroboration standing alone of accomplice liability; however, possession of stolen property by the accused is a proper circumstance to consider in determining whether there was evidence tending to connect him with the crimes of burglary and grand larceny; the presence of an accused in the proximity of a crime, opportunity, and association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation are relevant facts in determining the connection of an accomplice with the crime; a person's flight to avoid arrest may be considered as corroboration of evidence tending to establish his guilt. Passley v. State, 323 Ark. 301, 915 S.W.2d 248 (1996).

Relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice to a crime are the presence of the accused in proximity of the crime, the opportunity to commit the crime, and an association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation. Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 249, 921 S.W.2d 583 (1996).

Where more than one weapon was fired and the State presented evidence by which the jury could conclude that defendant aided in the commission of the murder and battery, the defendant's culpability was not affected by which bullets actually killed one victim and wounded another. Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 249, 921 S.W.2d 583 (1996).

Defendant, as an accomplice to arson, did not have to have a “conscious object” to commit arson. Reed v. State, 326 Ark. 27, 929 S.W.2d 703 (1996).

Even though “mere presence” does not make one an accomplice, there can be enough presence to constitute probable cause to arrest. State v. Bell, 329 Ark. 422, 948 S.W.2d 557 (1997).

Under principles of accomplice liability, defendant's culpability was not diminished by the fact that the accomplice was not also in possession of a weapon. Releford v. State, 59 Ark. App. 136, 954 S.W.2d 295 (1997).

Duress.

The trial court did not err by refusing to declare witness an accomplice as a matter of law; the evidence was such that it was appropriate for the jury to decide whether his participation was under duress under § 5-2-208 and thus that it was not his purpose to aid in the commission of the crime. Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 8, 913 S.W.2d 255 (1996).

Employment Relationship.

Where an employee killed his employer's neighbor when the neighbor pointed a gun at the employer, the employee was liable for manslaughter and his employer was an accomplice to that manslaughter. Costner v. Adams, 82 Ark. App. 148, 121 S.W.3d 164 (2003).

Evidence.

The fact that a witness was suspected, arrested and bound over to await the action of the grand jury did not show that she was an accomplice in the commission of the crime where she was never indicted for the offense and there was nothing in the evidence to warrant an indictment against her. Rogers v. State, 136 Ark. 161, 206 S.W. 152 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of accessory. Warford v. State, 214 Ark. 423, 216 S.W.2d 781 (1949); Kurck v. State, 242 Ark. 742, 415 S.W.2d 61 (1967) (preceding decisions under prior law) Ashley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 73, 732 S.W.2d 872 (1987); Cassell v. Lockhart, 886 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S. Ct. 1164 (1990); Hooks v. State, 303 Ark. 236, 795 S.W.2d 56 (1990); Standridge v. Standridge, 304 Ark. 364, 803 S.W.2d 496 (1991); Williams v. State, 329 Ark. 8, 946 S.W.2d 678 (1997).

Evidence was sufficient to prove intent requisite for conviction. Murrah v. State, 253 Ark. 432, 486 S.W.2d 897 (1972), overruled in part, Waters v. State, 271 Ark. 33, 607 S.W.2d 336 (Ark. 1980) (decision under prior law).

Question as to whether the defendant was an accomplice was properly submitted to the jury. Wilson v. State, 261 Ark. 820, 552 S.W.2d 223 (1977); Pilcher v. State, 303 Ark. 335, 796 S.W.2d 845 (1990).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction as accomplice on one count but not for the other since there was no evidence showing that he was aware that a crime was being committed. Martinez v. State, 269 Ark. 231, 601 S.W.2d 576 (1980).

Concerted action to commit an unlawful act may be shown by circumstantial evidence, without direct proof of a conspiracy by prior agreement; hence, defendant could properly be found guilty of offense not only by her own conduct but also by that of her two accomplices. King v. State, 271 Ark. 417, 609 S.W.2d 32 (1980).

There was sufficient evidence to support conviction. Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981); Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 647 S.W.2d 419 (1983), cert. denied, Henry v. Arkansas, 464 U.S. 835, 104 S. Ct. 121 (1983); Bell v. State, 334 Ark. 285, 973 S.W.2d 806 (1998).

Where evidence concerning the defendant showed only that he was present at the scene of crime and that he had on previous occasions heard his brother discuss his intentions to commit crime, the trial court's finding that the defendant knowingly participated in the crime was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Estate of Sargent v. Benton State Bank, 279 Ark. 402, 652 S.W.2d 10 (1983).

Defendant has burden of proving witness is an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. Scherrer v. State, 294 Ark. 227, 742 S.W.2d 877 (1988); Pilcher v. State, 303 Ark. 335, 796 S.W.2d 845 (1990); Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64, 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993).

Defendant's presence at the crime scene and knowledge of the crime was shown, but such was insufficient to make him an accomplice. Nelson v. State, 306 Ark. 456, 816 S.W.2d 159 (1991).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction for first degree murder based on accomplice liability. Riggins v. State, 317 Ark. 636, 882 S.W.2d 664 (1994); Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001).

Evidence of shooting held sufficient to support first degree murder conviction. Robinson v. State, 318 Ark. 33, 883 S.W.2d 469 (1994).

Where defendant's incriminating statement allegedly was uttered after a shooting murder occurred, it was not “in furtherance” of a crime, and was admissible because it tended to show the effect on the listener, i.e., instigating defendant's immediate response showing his approval of the shooting and tending to prove defendant's status as an accomplice. Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 8, 913 S.W.2d 255 (1996).

Evidence held sufficient to establish the joint nature of appellant's activities with the co-defendants. Passley v. State, 323 Ark. 301, 915 S.W.2d 248 (1996).

Where witness lured murder victim to the murder site, but there was no evidence that witness had knowledge of the crime that was going to occur, the facts did not show conclusively that witness was an accomplice as a matter of law. King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction for capital murder based on accomplice liability. Allen v. State, 324 Ark. 1, 918 S.W.2d 699 (1996).

Evidence determining defendant's liability for crime as an accomplice need only be sufficient to show he encouraged or aided in the commission of the crime. Cooper v. State, 324 Ark. 135, 919 S.W.2d 205 (1996), overruled, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), overruled in part, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).

Evidence of first-degree murder held sufficient where an accomplice carried a .38-caliber handgun on the night of the murder, and expert testimony indicated that the bullets recovered from the victim were fired from such a weapon. Matthews v. State, 56 Ark. App. 141, 940 S.W.2d 498 (1997).

The evidence was sufficient to show that defendant possessed the requisite knowledge and intent and was an accomplice in three murders. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 954 S.W.2d 255 (1997).

Evidence was insufficient to establish the defendant's accomplice liability for delivery of a counterfeit substance where a police officer testified that (1) he was working undercover with two other individuals, purchasing illegal drugs, and they drove up to defendant, who was standing on a street corner, and asked if he had a twenty-dollar rock of cocaine that he would sell to them, (2) the defendant answered, “No” and then looked over to three individuals seated on a park bench and asked if they had any drugs to sell, (3) one of those individuals stood up, approached the car and handed the officer three wrapped rocks of what appeared to be rock cocaine, and (4) when the officer returned to the police station and unwrapped the rocks, he found they were only gravel. Heard v. State, 71 Ark. App. 377, 32 S.W.3d 30 (2000).

In a murder prosecution, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the basis that the only witness against him was an accomplice to the crime and that his testimony was not corroborated by additional evidence as there was no uncontroverted evidence that the witness aided, agreed to aid, or attempted to aid in planning or engaging in the conduct that resulted in the victim's death, the witness had no legal duty to prevent the defendant's conduct which resulted in the victim's death, and, therefore, the trial court properly submitted the issue to the jury. Raynor v. State, 343 Ark. 575, 36 S.W.3d 315 (2001).

In accord with Riggins v. State, 317 Ark. 636, 882 S.W.2d 664 (1994). See Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001).

Defendant could not be convicted of being an accomplice to the manufacture of methamphetamine, based on her possession and sale of some of its ingredients, when there was no evidence that methamphetamine had been manufactured. Ford v. State, 75 Ark. App. 126, 55 S.W.3d 315 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for capital murder based on accomplice liability where it was shown that defendant was involved in the planning of the murder, that he helped the killer set up his alibi, and that he selected the grave site and helped dig the grave where the victim's body was to be buried. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002).

There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine based on accomplice liability where the evidence showed that drug manufacturing was taking place on defendant's property, defendant admitted knowledge of the operation, and a co-defendant also testified regarding defendant's knowledge of the operation. George v. State, 356 Ark. 345, 151 S.W.3d 770 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict finding the first defendant guilty of first-degree murder where (1) the first defendant gave two recorded statements in which she admitted to being at the crime scene, (2) in one of her statements, the first defendant told the police that she intended to kill the victim but was unable to muster the strength and that she handed the murder weapon to the second defendant after he stated that he would kill the victim, thus, confessing to either murdering or aiding in the murder of the victim, and (3) the victim died as a result of a homicide. Woolbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 160 S.W.3d 315 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted capital murder where there was substantial evidence that defendant was not merely engaged in the “act of driving”; the victim, a police officer, testified that the driver attempted to run him over, he observed a flash from the passenger side window, he realized that he had heard a gunshot, and an officer identified defendant as the driver of the vehicle. Clark v. State, 358 Ark. 469, 192 S.W.3d 248 (2004).

Although the state conceded that it was the principal, and not defendant, who fired the fatal shot, evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense and that he aided, agreed to aid, or attempted to aid the principal in the commission of the murder. Woods v. State, 363 Ark. 272, 213 S.W.3d 627 (2005).

Court did not err in denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict because defendant's silence, knowledge, concealment, and failure to inform law enforcement officers of the sexual assaults committed against her daughter by two men who had resided with defendant made her an accomplice to those assaults under subdivision (a)(1) of this section; there was no doubt that defendant was aware that the men were raping her daughter at various times when the girl was between eight or nine and 15 years of age. Hutcheson v. State, 92 Ark. App. 307, 213 S.W.3d 25 (2005).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving was proper as the evidence established that his companion was in the store where the victim worked around the time that her credit card was stolen, defendant presented that credit card at a gas station a short time later, and defendant and his companion tried to purchase over $100 in merchandise; the state provided sufficient evidence to prove that defendant was at least an accomplice in the crime. Henson v. State, 94 Ark. App. 163, 227 S.W.3d 450 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder and theft where, in addition to the testimony of defendant's wife, who was an accomplice, defendant's own statements to the police, his conduct before and after the crime, and statements of the victim's friends regarding her fear of defendant tended to connect him to the crimes; further, although there was no evidence that defendant ever drove victim's Cadillac or had the vehicle in his possession, the jury might have determined that defendant facilitated the theft by leaving the accomplice without a vehicle at the victim's house, and there was evidence that the theft of the Cadillac was part of the plan to murder the victim. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for capital murder was supported by substantial evidence where he served as an accomplice to the murder by directing his brother to “come on down” from the attic because the victim moved, suggesting that his brother needed to finish killing the victim, which he did while defendant watched. Wilson v. State, 365 Ark. 664, 232 S.W.3d 455 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support a residential burglary conviction under § 5-39-201 based on defendant's act of helping to remove, transport, and sell stolen items, even though he did not enter a residence himself. Therefore, a motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. Hickman v. State, 99 Ark. App. 363, 260 S.W.3d 747 (2007), rev'd, 372 Ark. 438, 277 S.W.3d 217 (2008).

Pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the state presented sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation: the evidence presented at trial showed that defendant was aware that several individuals desired that the victim be killed; that the killer who stabbed the victim approached defendant on at least three occasions about joining him in committing the killing; that despite his close relationship with the victim, defendant never warned her of any danger; that on the day of the murder, the killer announced to defendant they were going to “make this money”; that defendant rode with the killer and two other individuals to the victim's home; that defendant gained entry to the victim's home; and that defendant was present in the bedroom where the victim's body was found. In addition, defendant fled to Cleveland, Ohio after the crime. Lawshea v. State, 2009 Ark. 600, 357 S.W.3d 901 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault, theft of property, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing because while the state did not prove that defendant actually entered a bank, it did provide substantial evidence that he was the driver of the getaway car and thus was an accomplice of the two men who committed the aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and theft of property; while defendant did not personally shoot at an officer's vehicle, his conduct of driving the fleeing vehicle while another person in the car fired the shots sufficiently implicated him as an accomplice to unlawfully discharging a firearm from a vehicle. Barber v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 210, 374 S.W.3d 709 (2010).

State presented sufficient evidence to show that defendant was an accomplice to his traveling companion's crime of robbing a bank because defendant was in proximity of the crime, he had the opportunity to help the companion get away from the bank, and he associated with the companion both immediately before and immediately after the companion robbed the bank; defendant and the companion were traveling together for at least three weeks before the bank robbery, they arrived at the bank separately, defendant left the parking lot as the companion exited the vehicle to rob the bank, and he picked the companion up off the premises. Grissom v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 504 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for breaking or entering, in violation of § 5-39-202(1), and theft of property, in violation of § 5-36-103(a)(1), were supported by the evidence because defendant's unlawful presence near a storage shed, flight from the victim, and association with persons involved in the crimes suggested that defendant jointly participated in the crimes under subdivision (b)(2) of this section. Goforth v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 735 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions as an accomplice, as defined in this section, to aggravated robbery and theft of property because defendant was present during the crime, the state established a substantial association between defendant and codefendant, and, based on those linking facts, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant assisted her codefendant by finding the victim, setting up a meeting, leading the victim to a remote location, assuring the victim would have a substantial amount of cash, moving to the backseat of the car during the robbery, and by encouraging the victim to give codefendant the cash. Ramsey v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 836, 378 S.W.3d 797 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict during a trial for first-degree murder as an accomplice, in violation of § 5-10-102(a)(2) and subdivision (a)(1) of this section, because a codefendant testified that defendant hired the codefendant to murder his wife; the state presented the testimony of five witnesses concerning the fear of defendant's wife that he would kill her. Camp v. State, 2011 Ark. 155, 381 S.W.3d 11 (2011).

Judgment finding that appellant was an accomplice to misdemeanor theft of property was affirmed because appellant and the thief stood outside the off-limits locker room together, looked down the hall, went into the locker room together, looked out of and reentered the locker room more than once, and then left the locker room together. T.D. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 140 (2012).

Substantial evidence supported a juvenile's second-degree battery disposition based on accomplice liability under subdivisions (a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(2) of this section because a codefendant testified that the juvenile solicited and encouraged the plan to beat her boyfriend, who she suspected of cheating; the juvenile could be found guilty of the conduct of her accomplices who threw the punches. L.C. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 666, 424 S.W.3d 887 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of aggravated robbery, theft of property, aggravated assault, and an enhancement due to the use of a firearm because the victim identified appellant as the principal involved in several crimes and the accomplice under subsection (a) of this sectionas to the theft. The jury did not have to believe testimony from the other participant about appellant's involvement, and there were other factors linking appellant to the crimes; both appellant and the other participant fled the scene, they were both found hiding in the same apartment, and they were both in proximity to a loaded gun and the victim's pants. Bass v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 55 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of aggravated robbery, theft of property, aggravated assault, and an enhancement due to the use of a firearm because the victim identified appellant as the principal involved in several crimes and the accomplice under subsection (a) of this sectionas to the theft. The jury did not have to believe testimony from the other participant about appellant's involvement, and there were other factors linking appellant to the crimes; both appellant and the other participant fled the scene, they were both found hiding in the same apartment, and they were both in proximity to a loaded gun and the victim's pants. Bass v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 55 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for capital murder and aggravated robbery because a witness's testimony corroborated that defendant was an accomplice to the aggravated robbery, defendant knew there was a large amount of marijuana at the home, a gun was used during the robbery, and the victim's death occurred during the robbery under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Bradley v. State, 2013 Ark. 58, 426 S.W.3d 363 (2013).

There was substantial evidence to support convictions for two aggravated-robbery counts based on accomplice liability where defendant was in a car moving away from the robbery scene, he was found with roughly the same amount of money that was stolen in the robbery, and he used a false name. Moreover, one of the vehicle's passengers was wearing clothing that matched the description of the perpetrator. Davis v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 658, 430 S.W.3d 190 (2013).

Appellant, a juvenile, was improperly adjudicated delinquent of the crime of accomplice to theft of property; there was no direct evidence that appellant took a phone, and circumstantial evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. There was no evidence that he solicited, advised, encouraged, or coerced anyone to take the phone, or that he aided, agreed to aid, or attempted to aid another person in planning or committing a theft, and the possibility that someone else took the phone remained. J.J. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 267 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of eight counts of theft for stealing horses, a horse trailer, and tack from a university and to deny her motion for directed verdict because several witnesses testified that defendant planned the thefts, gave a map of the stables to her boyfriend and his friend, provided the use of her truck for the thefts, assisted her boyfriend and his friend in hiding the trailer at her aunt and uncle's home, directed her boyfriend to kill one horse and hide the remaining four horses, and secured a place for her boyfriend and his friend to hide at her daughter's house. Cox v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 321 (2014).

Trial court properly found defendant guilty as an accomplice to the crime of kidnapping because defendant not only accompanied her son to the victim's apartment, she also assisted him in beating her, encouraged him to “get” her, he forcibly exposed the victim to defendant, choked her, and then forced her down the hallway into a bedroom where he raped her orally and vaginally. Singleton-Harris v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 436, 439 S.W.3d 720 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft as an accomplice because defendant asked the complainant to give the back-seat passenger a ride; the back-seat passenger took the complainant's wallet and the $3700 it contained while defendant struggled with the complainant to take her cell phone; it was up to the circuit court to decide whether defendant and the back-seat passenger acted in concert to divert the complainant's attention and steal her money; defendant's account of events differed so significantly from the testimony of other witnesses that the trial court, as the trier of fact, could readily discount her entire testimony; and her attempt to flee from the crime scene was relevant to the issue of guilt. Cosey v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 441, 439 S.W.3d 731 (2014).

Defendant juvenile attempted to aid her boyfriend by shielding his actions and then looking around, she knew he was going to steal, and her actions aided the commission of the theft; the court affirmed defendant's delinquency adjudication for being an accomplice to theft of property based on the sufficient evidence. H.V. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 607, 447 S.W.3d 619 (2014).

While no witness directly identified defendant as being the actual robber, a person was criminally liable for the conduct of another when he was an accomplice; defendant's car was stopped driving away from a robbery, he had two passengers with him, inside the car was the same amount of money that had been stolen, and the clothing in the car matched the description of what the robber wore, and the jury was permitted to weigh the evidence in reaching its guilty verdict. Richardson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 679, 449 S.W.3d 718 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated robbery and capital murder because defendant's intent was inferred from the actions of his accomplice; defendant's statement to police provided direct evidence of the accomplice's intent to commit an aggravated robbery, and his account of how the accomplice murdered the victim by shooting her in the forehead was substantial evidence of causing the death of a person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. There was ample proof of defendant's participation as he accompanied others to the victim's residence, persuaded her to open the door, helped search the residence, and collected and kept his own share of the property that was stolen. Conway v. State, 2016 Ark. 7, 479 S.W.3d 1 (2016).

Evidence Sufficient.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated residential burglary because defendant was an accomplice in the aggravated residential burglary, and, thus, it was irrelevant whether defendant entered the house or not as her accomplice clearly entered the house; defendant was in the vicinity of the crime, she was holding a knife, and, according to the victim's testimony, she ran toward the victim with the knife after the victim chased the accomplice out of his house; and the trial court was not required to believe defendant's version of events that the accomplice never asked defendant to assist with the crime, and her testimony that she would never use a knife in a violent manner. Wilson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 218, 489 S.W.3d 716 (2016).

There was sufficient evidence that defendant was an accomplice to the crimes of aggravated robbery and capital murder as defendant admitted that he and the codefendants sat in a car planning the theft of beer from a gas station and convenience store and surveillance videos showed that defendant and a codefendant rushed into the store together, that codefendant shot the store clerk, and that defendant attempted to open the cash register, appeared to look around for something to steal, and searched the victim's pockets before fleeing. Williams v. State, 2017 Ark. 287, 528 S.W.3d 839 (2017).

In a case where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, there was sufficient evidence presented to corroborate the accomplice's testimony because defendant told a detective he was at the store on the date of the robbery; surveillance tapes showed defendant, co-defendant, and the accomplice in the store at the same time as the victim, leaving the store immediately after the victim, and leaving the parking lot right behind the victim; defendant's mother testified that the vehicle police were searching for in connection with the aggravated robberies belonged to defendant; and, at trial, the victim's sister identified defendant as the person who committed the aggravated robberies with co-defendant. Foster v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 63, 510 S.W.3d 782 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict under § 5-14-103 where the victim testified that the juvenile and codefendant had forced her into a fieldhouse and that codefendant had touched her on the inside with his finger while the juvenile restrained her by the waist and grabbed her hands, and there was nothing inherently improbable or physically impossible about the testimony. K.B. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 478, 531 S.W.3d 420 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions as an accomplice to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery as defendant was in the proximity of the crime, a video put defendant inside the victim's home shortly before the video tended to establish the victim had been killed, and he had the opportunity to aid in the commission of the crime. Jackson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 330, 552 S.W.3d 55 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery either as a principal or as an accomplice because defendant's boyfriend told her they were going to pick up the victim and that he intended to beat him up and take anything that the victim had on him; despite knowing the boyfriend's purpose, defendant still agreed to drive him; substantial corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the crime included two interviews she gave to the police and her written statement, which were admitted at trial; and the victim's death made the offense an aggravated robbery regardless of her knowledge of whether a gun might be used. Vaughan v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 439, 555 S.W.3d 922 (2018).

Grant of Immunity.

A grant of immunity alone does not cause a witness to be an accomplice as a matter of law. Pilcher v. State, 303 Ark. 335, 796 S.W.2d 845 (1990).

Hindering Apprehension and Prosecution.

Hindering apprehension or prosecution is not a lesser included offense of the offense of being an accomplice. Ritchie v. State, 31 Ark. App. 177, 790 S.W.2d 919 (1990).

Information.

Trial court had not erred when it allowed the State to go forward with an accomplice theory even though the information failed to allege such where the information in fact named the offense and the party to be charged, it contained the elements of the offense intended to be charged and it apprised appellant of what he had to be prepared to meet. Polk v. State, 82 Ark. App. 210, 105 S.W.3d 797 (2003).

Instructions.

In prosecution for manslaughter instruction that unless jury believed that defendant was driving the truck at the time of the collision which resulted in death, defendant should be acquitted was properly refused. Fitzhugh v. State, 207 Ark. 117, 179 S.W.2d 173 (1944), superseded by statute as stated in, Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993) (decision under prior law).

Jury instruction that, if defendant was found to have aided, abetted or assisted in the perpetration of the crime, his punishment was to be assessed as if he were a principal was erroneous as it equated guilt with punishment. Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455 (8th Cir. 1983).

Evidence insufficient to find that defendant was entitled to an instruction that witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law; however, their status as accomplices was in dispute and the court should have given instructions on accomplices. Robinson v. State, 11 Ark. App. 18, 665 S.W.2d 890 (1984).

There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to give an accomplice instruction, where the alleged accomplice testified that she was at work during the time of the break-in, there was no testimony contradicting this, and she denied that she knew anything about the burglary and theft before the fact, but she lied to the police initially. Hopes v. State, 306 Ark. 492, 816 S.W.2d 167 (1991).

Instruction that a person is criminally responsible for the conduct of another person when he is an accomplice in the commission of an offense and stating that an accomplice is one who directly participates in the commission of an offense or who with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense agrees to aid, aids, or attempts to aid the other person or persons in the planning or committing the offense was consistent with Arkansas Model Criminal Instruction 401 and this section. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702.

According to the evidence presented at trial, there was a plan between defendant and the accomplice to kill a drug dealer during the drug transaction, defendant admitted to driving the truck to a remote location, there was also some evidence that defendant was in a scheme to murder the victim for a fee, defendant lied about the victim's whereabouts, and defendant fled from the scene; thus, there was ample evidence to rationally support the giving of an instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003).

Although there was sufficient evidence to support a burglary conviction, a trial court committed reversible error when it failed to give a disputed accomplice jury instruction; the evidence showed that a witness in the case did more than just acquiesce to the burglary and fail to notify police. Specifically, the witness accompanied defendant and an associate when they left the scene of the crime; the witness knew that the stolen merchandise was transported in defendant's van; the witness accepted a stolen check from the associate; he was present when the stolen merchandise was sold; and he did not reveal the information to authorities until he was arrested for using the stolen check. Hickman v. State, 99 Ark. App. 363, 260 S.W.3d 747 (2007), rev'd, 372 Ark. 438, 277 S.W.3d 217 (2008).

During defendant's trial for aggravated robbery, theft, and battery, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on accomplice liability under subsection (a) of this section; the jury could have considered defendant a principal or an accomplice to the persons involved in a “drug deal gone bad.” Taylor v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 146 (2013).

Trial court did not err in instructing the jury on accomplice liability during defendant's murder and kidnapping trial because testimony from five witnesses supported the theory that he was either a principal or an accomplice with his son; defendant's cell mate testified that defendant confessed to killing one victim and concealing the other three homicides from law enforcement. Green v. State, 2013 Ark. 497, 430 S.W.3d 729 (2013).

Intent.

Defendant, as an accomplice to arson, did not have to have a “conscious object” to commit arson. Reed v. State, 326 Ark. 27, 929 S.W.2d 703 (1996).

Liability.

One need not actually take an active part in an offense to be convicted of that charge. Hallman v. State, 264 Ark. 900, 575 S.W.2d 688 (1979).

When two or more persons assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable for the conduct of both. Parker v. State, 265 Ark. 315, 578 S.W.2d 206 (1979).

Each participant in a crime is liable for his own conduct but he cannot disclaim responsibility for all of the conduct in a particular episode because he did not personally take part in every act which it took to accomplish the crime. Parker v. State, 265 Ark. 315, 578 S.W.2d 206 (1979); Ruiz v. State, 265 Ark. 875, 582 S.W.2d 915 (1979); Alford v. State, 33 Ark. App. 179, 804 S.W.2d 370 (1991).

There is no distinction between the criminal responsibility of an accomplice and the person who actually commits the offense. Redman v. State, 265 Ark. 774, 580 S.W.2d 945 (1979); Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981).

An accomplice's liability does not attach until the state proves that the substantive crime was completed; therefore, where defendant was charged as an accomplice to an offense, he could only be convicted if the state proved the crime was committed. Savannah v. State, 7 Ark. App. 161, 645 S.W.2d 694 (1983).

When two or more persons assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and is criminally liable for the conduct of both, and a participant cannot disclaim responsibility because he did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Booker v. State, 32 Ark. App. 94, 796 S.W.2d 854 (1990).

Although defendant never actually possessed the gun, he was liable as an accomplice because he assisted and actively participated in the crime. Crutchfield v. State, 306 Ark. 97, 812 S.W.2d 459 (1991).

As the proof at trial was amply sufficient in illustrating the joint nature of defendant's and co-defendant's activities, the fact that the co-defendant's shots may have actually inflicted the victim's fatal injuries and a bystander's leg wounds was irrelevant to the question of defendant's criminal liability for the offenses. Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991).

So long as a defendant renders the requisite aid or encouragement to the principal with regard to the offense at issue, the defendant is an accomplice even though the defendant may have rendered the encouragement or aid reluctantly. Thomas v. State, 312 Ark. 158, 847 S.W.2d 695 (1993).

When two people assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable for the conduct of both; one cannot disclaim accomplice liability simply because he did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Henson v. State, 94 Ark. App. 163, 227 S.W.3d 450 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for capital murder, in violation of § 5-10-101(a)(4), was proper because there was substantial evidence that defendant was guilty as an accomplice pursuant to §§ 5-2-401, 5-2-402(2) and subdivisions (b)(1) and (2) of this section, and his argument that there was insufficient evidence of his acting as an accomplice by encouraging, aiding, or assisting the killer in stabbing the victim, was not preserved for review. Lawshea v. State, 2009 Ark. 600, 357 S.W.3d 901 (2009).

Because the juvenile was not “charged with supervision of a minor” as set forth in § 5-27-205, she was not in the class of persons who could commit the offense of first-degree endangering the welfare of a minor, and thus she could not be principally culpable for committing the offense. The juvenile's sister, and not the juvenile, was identified as the babysitter of the one-year-old child. And because the juvenile, and not her sister, was the person who sparked the stun gun at the child, she could not be charged as an accomplice and therefore her adjudication was reversed. K.F. v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 312, 578 S.W.3d 324 (2019).

Question of Law or Fact.

Whether a witness was an accomplice to an alleged crime was generally a question of fact for the jury; if the facts were in dispute, it was a mixed question of law and fact. Rogers v. State, 136 Ark. 161, 206 S.W. 152 (1918) (decision under prior law).

It was error to refuse to submit to the jury the question of whether or not the state's witnesses were accomplices. Satterfield v. State, 245 Ark. 337, 432 S.W.2d 472 (1968) (decision under prior law).

Where the testimony of the witnesses showed conclusively that they were accomplices and took part in the conspiracy, the question of whether they were accomplices for purposes of § 16-89-111 is one of law. Williams v. State, 328 Ark. 487, 944 S.W.2d 822 (1997).

Testimony.

Defendant's convictions for capital murder and kidnapping were appropriate because a witness' testimony alone was enough to corroborate an accomplice's testimony against defendant. Evidence showed that bullets found near the victims' bodies were fired from a .22 caliber rifle and a .38 caliber revolver and according to another witness, an individual wanted to buy a .38 caliber revolver from defendant; essentially, when all of the evidence was viewed in a light most favorable to the state, it tended to connect defendant to the commission of the crimes. Gilcrease v. State, 2009 Ark. 298, 318 S.W.3d 70 (2009), appeal dismissed, 2011 Ark. 108 (2011).

Cited: Bowles v. State, 265 Ark. 457, 579 S.W.2d 596 (1979); Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 810, 611 S.W.2d 179 (1981); Lear v. State, 278 Ark. 70, 643 S.W.2d 550 (1982); Blann v. State, 15 Ark. App. 364, 695 S.W.2d 382 (1985); Heffernan v. Lockhart, 834 F.2d 1431 (8th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. State, 25 Ark. App. 126, 753 S.W.2d 287 (1988); Perkins v. State, 298 Ark. 322, 767 S.W.2d 514 (1989); Wilford v. State, 300 Ark. 185, 777 S.W.2d 855 (1989); Wilson v. State, 301 Ark. 342, 783 S.W.2d 852 (1990); Clements v. State, 303 Ark. 319, 796 S.W.2d 839 (1990); Wofford v. State, 44 Ark. App. 94, 867 S.W.2d 181 (1993); Kennedy v. State, 325 Ark. 3, 923 S.W.2d 274 (1996); Peete v. State, 59 Ark. App. 186, 955 S.W.2d 708 (1997); Strain v. State, 2012 Ark. 42, 394 S.W.3d 294 (2012).