began analysis in Maryland

2022The court began its analysis with a restatement of the “well established [rule] that a regular and complete attestation clause makes out a prima facie case of due execution of the will.” Id.

2002The court began its analysis with a restatement of the “well established [rule] that a regular and complete attestation clause makes out a prima facie case of due execution of the will.” Id.

2019In reaching this conclusion, the Court began its analysis by explaining that “‘Basic principles of waiver’ apply to coram nobis proceedings and ‘the same body of law concerning waiver and final litigation of an issue’ applies to coram nobis proceedings as applies to the [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act].” Id. at 672 .

2019In reaching this conclusion, the Court began its analysis by explaining that “‘Basic principles of waiver’ apply to coram nobis proceedings and ‘the same body of law concerning waiver and final litigation of an issue’ applies to coram nobis proceedings as applies to the [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act].” Id. at 672 .

2021Those cases, exemplified by Baumgartner v. Eigenbrot, 100 Md. 508 (1905), recognized a tort cause of action resulting from the harboring or the abduction 11 a child from a parent or anyone having custody.

2021The court began its analysis by “[t]racing the evolution of theories in the decisional law of public employee statutory pension rights,” id. at 629 , from which the court discerned two general approaches in this area: (1) a majority of states treated pension “rights” merely as “gratuities which a gracious and beneficent governmental employer may confer, withhold, modify or repeal as the whim of an omniscient sovereign dictates”; and (2) a minority of states had adopted “a basic concept of contractual rights that vest at time of employment,” but this latter group was “divided upon the extent to

2021The court began its analysis by “[t]racing the evolution of theories in the decisional law of public employee statutory pension rights,” id. at 629 , from which the court discerned two general approaches in this area: (1) a majority of states treated pension “rights” merely as “gratuities which a gracious and beneficent governmental employer may confer, withhold, modify or repeal as the whim of an omniscient sovereign dictates”; and (2) a minority of states had adopted “a basic concept of contractual rights that vest at time of employment,” but this latter group was “divided upon the extent to

2021The Court began its analysis by referring to a criminal defendant’s right to be present at trial. 344 Md. at 106 .

2021The Court stated that a defendant’s “right to be present at a trial de novo cannot be considered waived by non-appearance, that is, withdrawn, when the trial court has information that the appellant’s failure to appear was neither wilful nor voluntary.” Id.

2019This Court began its analysis by reiterating that “evidence of an accused’s financial situation is admissible under special circumstances that show a nexus between the accused’s financial status and the motive for a particular crime.” Id.

2019Affirming the judgments against Morrison, we concluded that the evidence at issue tended to show that Morrison “committed the crimes at issue because he was unable to repay the $2,000.00 he had stolen and was unable to convince the victim to drop the charges.” Id.

2018The court began its analysis by noting the general rule that rights of pure statutory origin, "unless vested, are subject to repeal or amendment at the will of the legislature." McComas , 88 Md.

2018App. at 147 , 594 A.2d at 584 -85 .

2017Id. at 344, 929 A.2d 113 .

2017The Court began its analysis by explaining: “Where a Government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.” Id. at 132 , 101 S.Ct. 426 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

2017The Court began its analysis by explaining: “Where a Government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.” Id. at 132 , 101 S.Ct. 426 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

2016Moore, 424 Md. at 129 , 34 A.3d 513 .

2016Moore, 424 Md. at 129 , 34 A.3d 513 .

2016Because the Supreme Court of South Carolina had not addressed the calculation of a subcontractor’s AWW, and because the statute did not address the matter, the Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance, including Fitzgerald, 322 S.E.2d 347 .

2015This Court began its analysis by reiterating that, to make out a prima facie case in negligence, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, “that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury[.]” Id. at 636 , 851 A.2d at 570 .

2015This Court began its analysis by reiterating that, to make out a prima facie case in negligence, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, “that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury[.]” Id. at 636 , 851 A.2d at 570 .

2015The Court began its analysis by recognizing that it “has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when *449 sent” in cases in which “the government attempted to provide notice and heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone awry[.]” Id. at 226 , 126 S.Ct. 1708 (citations omitted).

2015The Court began its analysis by recognizing that it “has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when *449 sent” in cases in which “the government attempted to provide notice and heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone awry[.]” Id. at 226 , 126 S.Ct. 1708 (citations omitted).

2015In Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 301-02 , 473 A.2d 450 (1984), the Court indicated that, in deciding whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the court should address first whether evidence is material, and if that is the case, then “the court inquires into the possible impact the newly discovered evidence would have on the outcome of the trial.” In Jackson, 216 Md.App. at 367-71 , 86 A.3d 97 this Court began with the analysis whether Mr. Kopera’s false testimony regarding his educational credentials was material.

2015In Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 301-02 , 473 A.2d 450 (1984), the Court indicated that, in deciding whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the court should address first whether evidence is material, and if that is the case, then “the court inquires into the possible impact the newly discovered evidence would have on the outcome of the trial.” In Jackson, 216 Md.App. at 367-71 , 86 A.3d 97 this Court began with the analysis whether Mr. Kopera’s false testimony regarding his educational credentials was material.

2015It applies to actions by the State, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), but generally does not apply to actions by private individuals.

2015It applies to actions by the State, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), but generally does not apply to actions by private individuals.

2015In Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 301-02 , 473 A.2d 450 (1984), the Court indicated that, in deciding whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the court should address first whether evidence is material, and if that is the case, then “the court inquires into the possible impact the newly discovered evidence would have on the outcome of the trial.” In Jackson, 216 Md.App. at 367-71 , 86 A.3d 97 this Court began with the analysis whether Mr. Kopera’s false testimony regarding his educational credentials was material.

2015In Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 301-02 , 473 A.2d 450 (1984), the Court indicated that, in deciding whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the court should address first whether evidence is material, and if that is the case, then “the court inquires into the possible impact the newly discovered evidence would have on the outcome of the trial.” In Jackson, 216 Md.App. at 367-71 , 86 A.3d 97 this Court began with the analysis whether Mr. Kopera’s false testimony regarding his educational credentials was material.

2014The Court began its analysis by acknowledging the general rule “under Maryland contract law that, as between the parties to an agreement, a party who signs a contract is presumed to have read and understood its terms and that the party will be bound by them when that document is executed.” Id. at 167, 913 A.2d 10 .

2013Co., 113 Md. 179, 183 , 77 A. 433 (1910)) (brackets added by Cities Service); see also Jones v. Anne Arundel County, 432 Md. 386, 403 , 69 A.3d 426 (2013) (“Special laws ‘relate[ ] to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law which applies to all persons or things of a class,’ and are enacted ‘for the relief of particular named parties, or providing for individual cases.’ ” (internal citations omitted; quoting Prince George’s County v. B & O, 113 Md. at 183 , 77 A. 433 , and Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481, 490 (1880))).

2013Co., 113 Md. 179, 183 , 77 A. 433 (1910)) (brackets added by Cities Service); see also Jones v. Anne Arundel County, 432 Md. 386, 403 , 69 A.3d 426 (2013) (“Special laws ‘relate[ ] to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law which applies to all persons or things of a class,’ and are enacted ‘for the relief of particular named parties, or providing for individual cases.’ ” (internal citations omitted; quoting Prince George’s County v. B & O, 113 Md. at 183 , 77 A. 433 , and Montague v. State, 54 Md. 481, 490 (1880))).

2013The Court began its analysis by noting that, although the concept of a special law had been articulated in various ways in earlier cases, “ ‘[a] special law is one that relates to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law which applies to all persons or things of a class.’ ” Id. at 567 , 431 A.2d 663 (quoting Prince George’s County v. B. & O.R.

2013The Court began its analysis by noting that, although the concept of a special law had been articulated in various ways in earlier cases, “ ‘[a] special law is one that relates to particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law which applies to all persons or things of a class.’ ” Id. at 567 , 431 A.2d 663 (quoting Prince George’s County v. B. & O.R.

2012The court began its analysis of the three-part test by noting that the parties do not dispute that Diamond and Brown were acting as judicial officers at the time of the sale, nor do they dispute that Respondents "acted within their delegated jurisdiction to dispose of the property by sale." D'Aoust, 197 Md.App. at 209 , 13 A.3d at 51 .

2012The court began its analysis of the three-part test by noting that the parties do not dispute that Diamond and Brown were acting as judicial officers at the time of the sale, nor do they dispute that Respondents "acted within their delegated jurisdiction to dispose of the property by sale." D'Aoust, 197 Md.App. at 209 , 13 A.3d at 51 .

2012Drawing on the holding of Schmerber , 28 the Minnesota court concluded that “establishing probable cause to arrest a person is not, by itself, sufficient to permit a biological specimen to be taken from the person without first obtaining a search warrant.” C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 490 (noting the holding in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70 , 86 S.Ct. at 1835 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 919 , that “[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained”).

2012Drawing on the holding of Schmerber , 28 the Minnesota court concluded that “establishing probable cause to arrest a person is not, by itself, sufficient to permit a biological specimen to be taken from the person without first obtaining a search warrant.” C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 490 (noting the holding in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70 , 86 S.Ct. at 1835 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 919 , that “[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained”).