began analysis in Texas

2013Id. at 499 , 113 S.Ct. 2202 (discussing United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 , 64 S.Ct. 1162 , 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944)).

2013Id. at 499 , 113 S.Ct. 2202 (discussing United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 , 64 S.Ct. 1162 , 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944)).

2015The court began its analysis of that issue in Hankins by listing the common issues the trial court had identified. 111 S.W.3d at 73 .

2011The court began its analysis of that issue in Hankins by listing the common issues the trial court had identified. 111 S.W.3d at 73 .

2015Again, the Court began its analysis by noting that “Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called,” and explaining that the Court was “not bound by legal formalisms, but instead [must] take account of the economics of the transaction under investigation.” Id. at 61 .

2015Again, the Court began its analysis by noting that “Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever-..form .they are made .and by whatever name- they ■ are called,” and explaining that the Court was “not bound by legal formalisms, but instead [must] take' account of the economics of the transaction under , investigation.” Id. at 61 , 110 S.Ct. 945 .

2011After quoting the statements made in the broadcast, the court began its analysis by emphasizing that summary judgment would be appropriate if the statements were shown to be substantially true, and that this standard “involves consideration of whether the alleged defamatory statement was more damaging to Jacob’s reputation, in the mind of the average listener, than a truthful statement would have been.” Id. at 16 .

2011After quoting the statements made in the broadcast, the court began its analysis by emphasizing that summary judgment would be appropriate if the statements were shown to be substantially true, and that this standard “involves consideration of whether the alleged defamatory statement was more damaging to Jacob’s reputation, in the mind of the average listener, than a truthful statement would have been.” Id. at 16 .

2002In Mittleman , the court began its analysis with a discussion of the federal law relating to background investigations, noting that such investigations were authorized by executive order, as well as other provisions of federal law, to ensure that employing "the person being investigated [was] clearly consistent with the interest of national security." Id. (citing, inter alia , 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104 , 1303-1305, 2301, 3301, 7312, 2455, and Executive Order No. 10450).

2002In Mittleman, the court began its analysis with a discussion of the federal law relating to background investigations, noting that such investigations were authorized by executive order, as well as other provisions of federal law, to ensure that employing “the person being investigated [was] clearly consistent with the interest of national security.” Id. (citing, inter alia, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104 , 1303-1305, 2301, 3301, 7312, 2455, and Executive Order No. 10450).

2012Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 440 .

2012Ruttiger, 2012 WL 2361697, at *1 .

1977The court began its analysis by noting that the ordinance was "clearly legislative in nature." - Id. at 411 .

1977The court began its analysis by noting that the ordinance was `clearly legislative in nature.' Id. at 411 .

2025The only question was whether access should be restricted for in-house counsel who were or might in the future be involved in competitive decision-making—indeed, the court began its analysis noting the important difference: “Where in-house counsel are involved in competitive decision making, . . . the risk of inadvertent disclosure is obviously higher than for retained counsel.” Id. at 408 .

2024Id. at 363 .

2023The Court began with the presumption that an indigent litigant has a due process right to appointed counsel “only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” Id. at 26–27.

2022Id. at 566 (citing Tex. Civ.

2021Id. at 871 . 5 This Court began its analysis by observing that “the history of the relevant statutory provision seems to indicate that, with respect to a vehicle’s straying over a lane marker, a traffic violation occurs only when the vehicle’s movement is in some way unsafe.” Id.

2021Id. at 871 . 5 This Court began its analysis by observing that “the history of the relevant statutory provision seems to indicate that, with respect to a vehicle’s straying over a lane marker, a traffic violation occurs only when the vehicle’s movement is in some way unsafe.” Id.

2020Id. at 83–84.

2018The Court began its analysis by stating that "[a] plaintiff establishes standing to maintain a breach-of-contract action by demonstrating that it has an enforceable interest as a party to the contract, as an assignee of a party, or as a third party beneficiary." Id. at 430 .

2018The Court further observed that an assignor's obligations under a contract generally survive assignment, and that conversely, "a party who assigns its interest under a contract has standing to sue for damages that it incurred based on the rights it had prior to the assignment, unless the breaching party's actions caused no damage to the assignor or the assignor right's under the agreement were terminated or otherwise released; liability for the non-assigning party's breach of its obligations do not disappear upon assignment, but remain in place." Id.

2018Id. (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489 , 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) ).

2018Id. (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489 , 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) ).

2017In Alexis O., the court began its analysis by stating it had to construe the plain language of the ICPC to determine wheth er the compact applied to interstate parental placements. 959 A.2d at 181 .

2015The court began its analysis by noting that a criminal statute that seeks to punish threats must “clearly distinguish between an actionable or true threat and protected speech.” Id. at 272 .

2015In VR Elec, supra at 678 , the court began its analysis of §3.406 by clearly stating: “[A]s shown above, the Bank must prove that (1) [the customer] failed to exercise ordinary care that substantially contributed to the alteration of the check and (2) paid the check in “good faith” (emphasis added).