began analysis in Kansas

2010The court began its analysis by discussing State v. Jones, 270 Kan. 526 , 17 P.3d 359 (2001), in which the court had previously held that once officers acting in good faith discovered an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest, they had a right to take the defendant into custody pursuant to the warrant and search the defendant incident to the arrest, even though the defendant might have been unlawfully detained prior to the discovery of the warrant. 270 Kan. 526 , 17 P.3d 359 , Syl.

2010The court began its analysis by discussing State v. Jones, 270 Kan. 526 , 17 P.3d 359 (2001), in which the court had previously held that once officers acting in good faith discovered an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest, they had a right to take the defendant into custody pursuant to the warrant and search the defendant incident to the arrest, even though the defendant might have been unlawfully detained prior to the discovery of the warrant. 270 Kan. 526 , 17 P.3d 359 , Syl.

2026The court stated, "When a 'challenged regulation [like § 922(g)(3)] addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century,' like substance abuse, 'the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.' Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26 , 142 S. Ct. 2111 . 'Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.' Id. at 26-27 , 142 S. C

2026The court stated, "When a 'challenged regulation [like § 922(g)(3)] addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century,' like substance abuse, 'the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.' Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26 , 142 S. Ct. 2111 . 'Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.' Id. at 26-27 , 142 S. C

2026The court began its analysis with the history of the "regulation of intoxicating substances," noting this as a "general societal problem[] for thousands of years" and "[c]olonial times were no exception." 98 F.4th at 910 .

2024This court began its analysis by noting the "general rule" that "a witness cannot claim a Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to those matters to which he has pled guilty." Anderson, 240 Kan. at 699 -700 (citing 9 A.L.R. 3d 990 , § 2 [1966]).

2021The Court began its analysis by reiterating the longstanding rule that the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment is always determined by federal common law, which, in turn, is ultimately pronounced by the United States Supreme Court. 531 U.S. at 507-08 .

2019The court began its analysis in each of its decisions by reiterating the interpretive rule it recently had set forth in State v. Murdock, 309 Kan. 585 , 591, 439 P.3d 307 (2019) (Murdock II), which holds that 12 "the legality of a sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 is controlled by the law in effect at the time the sentence was pronounced.

2017The court began its analysis by noting that many federal and state courts had concluded that when "an informant's statements were used only to provide context for the incriminating statements of the other party . . . the informant's statements were neither hearsay nor considered testimonial statements for the purpose of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause." 289 Conn. at 625 .

2017But the court cautioned that when applying this contextual approach, "there is a fine line between properly admitting an informant's statements under this theory and improperly admitting statements that are truly testimonial." 289 Conn. at 625 .

2017The Court began its analysis by reiterating that determination of the "primary purpose" of an interrogation is an objective endeavor. 562 U.S. at 359 .

2017This objective analysis includes the circumstances in which an encounter occurs—"e.g., at or near the scene of the crime versus at a police station, during an ongoing emergency or afterwards." 562 U.S. at 360 .

2017If the tax imposed by the ordinance fell within this class of taxes, it would be invalid, because it did not qualify as a sales tax and was not passed in the prescribed manner. 211 Kan. at 650 . 26 The court began its analysis by noting that "[t]he term 'excise tax' has come to mean and include practically any tax which is not an ad valorem tax." 211 Kan. at 651 .

2017If the tax imposed by the ordinance fell within this class of taxes, it would be invalid, because it did not qualify as a sales tax and was not passed in the prescribed manner. 211 Kan. at 650 . 26 The court began its analysis by noting that "[t]he term 'excise tax' has come to mean and include practically any tax which is not an ad valorem tax." 211 Kan. at 651 .

2015The court began its analysis by noting that “a deed can pass no greater estate than that owned by tire grantor” and “that a warranty deed will pass all of the estate owned by the grantor at the time of conveyance unless there are reservations or exceptions which reduce the estate conveyed.” 157 Tex. at 15 .

2014State v. Martin, 270 Kan. 603, 608-09 , 17 P.3d 344 (2001); State v. Sisk, 266 Kan. 41, 44 , 966 P.2d 671 (1998).

2014State v. Martin, 270 Kan. 603, 608-09 , 17 P.3d 344 (2001); State v. Sisk, 266 Kan. 41, 44 , 966 P.2d 671 (1998).

2014A search warrant permitting alcohol or drug concentration testing may be issued only upon a showing that a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and the motor vehicle was involved in an accident resulting in death or serious personal injury likely to result in death.' See SB 127 [1985], as Amended by Senate Committee of The Whole, and House Federal and State Affairs Committee, at 7." Adee, 241 Kan. at 832 .

2014A search warrant permitting alcohol or drug concentration testing may be issued only upon a showing that a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and the motor vehicle was involved in an accident resulting in death or serious personal injury likely to result in death.’ See SB 127 [1985], as Amended by Senate Committee of The Whole, and House Federal and State Affairs Committee, at 7.” Adee, 241 Kan. at 832 .

2014State v. Martin, 270 Kan. 603, 608-09 , 17 P.3d 344 (2001); State v. Sisk, 266 Kan. 41, 44 , 966 P.2d 671 (1998).

2014State v. Martin, 270 Kan. 603, 608-09 , 17 P.3d 344 (2001); State v. Sisk, 266 Kan. 41, 44 , 966 P.2d 671 (1998).

2009Despite this order of priorities, the court began its analysis by agreeing with the Court of Appeals that “the doctrine of comparative fault or comparative causation should be and is applicable to both strict liability claims and to those claims based on implied warranty in products liability cases.” Kennedy, 228 Kan. at 452 .

2006The court began its analysis by observing that “[pjostrelease supervision is a component of the underlying prison sentence.” 273 Kan. at 728 .

2006This did not run “afoul of the protections outlined in Apprendi and Gould,” however, because aggravated indecent liberties is “by [statutory] definition a sexually violent crime.” 273 Kan. at 729 .

2002The court began its analysis by noting that imposing consecutive sentences is an inherent power of the judiciary and is derived from the common law. 136 N.J. at 374 .

2002The court continued, citing cases beginning in 1957 that stood for the proposition juveniles may receive consecutive sentences although the sentencing statutes neither permit nor prohibit such sentences. 136 N.J. at 375 .