17 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shaffer v. Heitnergreen2 sentences2012The Court began its analysis by noting that "[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on `the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,'" id. at 788 , 104 S.Ct. at 1486 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)), but that "[t]he plaintiff's lack of `contacts' will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence." Id. (citation omitted). 2012The Court began its analysis by noting that "[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on `the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,'" id. at 788 , 104 S.Ct. at 1486 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)), but that "[t]he plaintiff's lack of `contacts' will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence." Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Wilkin v. 1st Source Bankgreen1 sentence2024Under the doctrine of mutual mistake, “[w]here both parties share a common assumption about a vital fact upon which they based their bargain, and that assumption is false, the transaction may be avoided if because of the mistake a quite different exchange of values occurs from the exchange of values contemplated by the parties.” Wilkin v. 1st Source Bank, 548 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2013CMA also considered Morris v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 848 N.E.2d 663, 666-67 (Ind. 2006), in which our supreme court ruled that an insurance contract did not allow an insured to impose a prerequisite upon the insurer 14 before complying with agreed duties. 2013CMA also considered Morris v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 848 N.E.2d 663, 666-67 (Ind.2006), in which our supreme court ruled that an insurance contract did not allow an insured to impose a prerequisite upon the insurer before complying with agreed duties. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Paternity of ZTHgreen1 sentence2013The Court began its analysis by disapproving language in a previous case from this court, i.e., “a burden shifting approach is the most appropriate way to protect parental rights and the best interests of the child.” Id. at 459 (quoting In re the Paternity of Z.T.H., 839 N.E.2d 246, 252 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)). | 1 | 1 |
Summers v. Stategreen2 sentences2012The Court began its analysis stating: “It is now well-established that juveniles are entitled to basic requirements of due process and fair treatment during waiver hearings, including ‘the right to present evidence, if any be available to him, of any circumstances that would entitle[ ] him to the benefits that might be afforded to him by the provisions of the Juvenile Act.’” Id. (quoting Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 560 , 230 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ind.1967) (following Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-555 , 546 86 S.Ct. at 1054 )). 2012The Court began its analysis stating: “It is now well-established that juveniles are entitled to basic requirements of due process and fair treatment during waiver hearings, including ‘the right to present evidence, if any be available to him, of any circumstances that would entitle[ ] him to the benefits that might be afforded to him by the provisions of the Juvenile Act.’” Id. (quoting Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 560 , 230 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ind.1967) (following Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-555 , 546 86 S.Ct. at 1054 )). | 1 | 1 |
Modaber v. Kelleygreen2 sentences2010The Court began its analysis by *397 noting that "the law is established that an unborn child is not a 'person' within the meaning of [Virginia's] wrongful death statute." Modaber, 348 S.E.2d at 236 . 2010In concluding that the trial court did not err in instructing a jury that it was permitted to assess damages for injuries and mental anguish suffered by the mother as a result of the death of her fetus, the court adopted the view that "in tort litigation [] an unborn child is a part of the mother until birth," and that an "injury to an unborn child constitutes injury to the mother and that she may recover for such physical injury and mental suffering associated with a stillbirth." Id. at 236-287. | 1 | 1 |
Lehnen v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Before addressing MDM Investments' argument, this court began with the principle that " 'Eminent domain proceedings are statutory, and where the statute, fixes a definite procedure it must be followed.'" Id. (quoting Lehnen v. State, 693 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.). 2003Before addressing MDM Investments' argument, this court began with the principle that " `Eminent domain proceedings are statutory, and where the statute fixes a definite procedure it must be followed.' " Id. (quoting Lehnen v. State, 693 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
KD EX REL. KD v. Chambers
green
2 sentences2014This court began its analysis of the question by observing certain statutory provisions of the Act and stating that as such provisions “show, the question of whether defendants breached the standard of care must be presented to the medical review panel and answered based on the evidence submitted to it.” Id. at 864 . 2014This court began its analysis of the question by observing certain statutory provisions of the Act and stating that as such provisions “show, the question of whether defendants breached the standard of care must be presented to the medical review panel and answered based on the evidence submitted to it.” Id. at 864 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2012Id. (citing Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist. 2012Id. (citing Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986)). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Caleffe v. Vitale
green
2 sentences2012Id. (citing Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist. 2012Id. (citing Caleffe v. Vitale, 488 So.2d 627 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986)). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Howard v. State
green
1 sentence2017It is not uncommon for key witnesses to be deposed twice by the same party, once for discovery purposes and again for testimonial purposes.’ ” Id. at 469 (quoting Henry H. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Morrison v. State Board of Education
green
2 sentences2013The court began its analysis by observing that such terms were of a “general” nature and applied “against the holders of a variety of certificates, licenses and government jobs other than teaching,” and it had “not attempted to formulate explicit definitions of those terms which would apply to all the statutes in which they are used” and instead “have given those terms more precise meaning by referring in each case to the particular profession or the specific governmental position to which they were applicable.” Id., 82 CahRptr. 175, 461 P.2d at 379 . 2013The court began its analysis by observing that such terms were of a “general” nature and applied “against the holders of a variety of certificates, licenses and government jobs other than teaching,” and it had “not attempted to formulate explicit definitions of those terms which would apply to all the statutes in which they are used” and instead “have given those terms more precise meaning by referring in each case to the particular profession or the specific governmental position to which they were applicable.” Id., 82 CahRptr. 175, 461 P.2d at 379 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Paternity of K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H.
green
1 sentence2013The Court began its analysis by disapproving language in a previous case from this court, i.e., “a burden shifting approach is the most appropriate way to protect parental rights and the best interests of the child.” Id. at 459 (quoting In re the Paternity of Z.T.H., 839 N.E.2d 246, 252 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Kent v. United States
green
2 sentences2012The Court began its analysis stating: “It is now well-established that juveniles are entitled to basic requirements of due process and fair treatment during waiver hearings, including ‘the right to present evidence, if any be available to him, of any circumstances that would entitle[ ] him to the benefits that might be afforded to him by the provisions of the Juvenile Act.’” Id. (quoting Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 560 , 230 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ind.1967) (following Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-555 , 546 86 S.Ct. at 1054 )). 2012The Court began its analysis stating: “It is now well-established that juveniles are entitled to basic requirements of due process and fair treatment during waiver hearings, including ‘the right to present evidence, if any be available to him, of any circumstances that would entitle[ ] him to the benefits that might be afforded to him by the provisions of the Juvenile Act.’” Id. (quoting Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 560 , 230 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ind.1967) (following Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-555 , 546 86 S.Ct. at 1054 )). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flexdar, Inc.
green
1 sentence2012The Court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he language of the pollution exclusion at issue in this case is no stranger to this Court” and that it has “interpreted this or similar language on no fewer than three occasions, reaching the same result each time.” Id. at 848 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Calder v. Jones
green
2 sentences2012The Court began its analysis by noting that “[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,’” id. at 788 , 104 S.Ct. at 1486 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)), but that “[t]he plaintiff’s lack of ‘contacts’ will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence.” Id. (citation omitted). 2012The Court began its analysis by noting that "[i]n judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on `the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,'" id. at 788 , 104 S.Ct. at 1486 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)), but that "[t]he plaintiff's lack of `contacts' will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence." Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States Steel Corp. v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
green
1 sentence2011The court began its analysis by comparing the statutory definitions of “utility” and “public utility.” Id. at 505 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Britt v. Sears
green
2 sentences2010The Court began its analysis by discussing Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.App. 487 , 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971), a case addressing a prior version of the CWDS which lacked a specific definition of "child." Id. at 205-206. 2010The Court began its analysis by discussing Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.App. 487 , 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971), a case addressing a prior version of the CWDS which lacked a specific definition of "child." Id. at 205-206. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
MDM INVESTMENTS v. City of Carmel
green
2 sentences2003Before addressing MDM Investments' argument, this court began with the principle that " 'Eminent domain proceedings are statutory, and where the statute, fixes a definite procedure it must be followed.'" Id. (quoting Lehnen v. State, 693 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.). 2003Before addressing MDM Investments' argument, this court began with the principle that " `Eminent domain proceedings are statutory, and where the statute fixes a definite procedure it must be followed.' " Id. (quoting Lehnen v. State, 693 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.
green
2 sentences1982The Court began its analysis by recognizing that public school teachers may not be forced, as a condition of their employment, “to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work.” 391 U.S. at 568 , 88 S.Ct. at 1734 . 1982The Court began its analysis by recognizing that public school teachers may not be forced, as a condition of their employment, “to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work.” 391 U.S. at 568 , 88 S.Ct. at 1734 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.