began analysis in Michigan

2024This Court began its analysis by stating, “[e]ven assuming that [the husband’s] brother’s rights were affected by this judgment of divorce,” there is “an exception to the rule that a court cannot affect the rights of nonparties . . . when it is claimed that a third party has conspired with one spouse to deprive the other of his or her rightful interest in the marital estate.” Id.

2017This Court began its analysis by confirming that “[e]ven assuming that defendant’s brother’s rights were affected by this judgment of divorce, an exception to the rule that a court cannot affect the rights of nonparties is applicable when it is claimed that a third party has conspired with one spouse to deprive the other of his or her rightful interest in the marital estate.” Id.

2017Hyatt, 316 Mich App at ___ ; slip op at 23-24.

2017Hyatt, 316 Mich App at ___ ; slip op at 23-24.

2004With respect to individual liability under the CRA, the Court began its analysis by rejecting this Court’s decision in Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785 ; 369 NW2d 223 (1985), wherein it was held that individual defendants could be held liable under the CRA.

2004With respect to individual liability under the CRA, the Court began its analysis by rejecting this Court’s decision in Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785 ; 369 NW2d 223 (1985), wherein it was held that individual defendants could be held liable under the CRA.

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Rory v Continental Ins Co, 262 Mich App 679, 680 ; 687 NW2d 304 (2004), rev’d 473 90 Mich 457 (2005). 91 Id. at 683-685. 92 Id. at 687. 93 Rory v Continental Ins Co, 471 Mich 904, 904 (2004). 21 This Court began its analysis in Rory by reviewing the “reasonableness” doctrine in Michigan.

2025Rory v Continental Ins Co, 262 Mich App 679, 680 ; 687 NW2d 304 (2004), rev’d 473 90 Mich 457 (2005). 91 Id. at 683-685. 92 Id. at 687. 93 Rory v Continental Ins Co, 471 Mich 904, 904 (2004). 21 This Court began its analysis in Rory by reviewing the “reasonableness” doctrine in Michigan.

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2025Tom Thomas first articulated the “ ‘general rule’ that a shortened contractual period of limitations was ‘valid if reasonable,’ ” 94 although it relied on a secondary source and not on any Michigan law to do so. 95 Then, in Camelot, the Court expanded on the Tom Thomas dicta and upheld a limitations period because it was “reasonable.” 96 But neither of these cases’ statements about “reasonableness” had any support in Michigan jurisprudence, as Camelot’s sole Michigan source for the idea was Tom Thomas, and Tom Thomas relied on no Michigan authorities. 97 The Rory Court concluded that, by using

2024The Court began its analysis by cautioning trial courts that that “while intoxication may explain why a person acted in a particular manner, being intoxicated, by itself, is not conduct amounting to gross negligence.” Id. at 199 .

2024We begin our analysis with the “general rule” that “judicial decisions are given full retroactive effect.” Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 695 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002).

2024We begin our analysis with the “general rule” that “judicial decisions are given full retroactive effect.” Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 695 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002).

2024The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it. ‘For as the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed.’ ”

2023In the instant case, the trial court began its analysis by determining the “fees customarily charged for the top attorneys,” which, as observed in Smith, is not necessarily “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” Id. at 533 .

2015The Court began its analysis by quoting to the standard of care for police officer-drivers set forth in McKay v Hargis, 351 Mich 409, 418 ; 88 NW2d 456 (1958), articulating that an “officer’s conduct should be compared to ‘that care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances.’” Fiser, 417 Mich at 470 .

2015The Court began its analysis by quoting to the standard of care for police officer-drivers set forth in McKay v Hargis, 351 Mich 409, 418 ; 88 NW2d 456 (1958), articulating that an “officer’s conduct should be compared to ‘that care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances.’” Fiser, 417 Mich at 470 .

2015The Court began its analysis by quoting to the standard of care for police officer-drivers set forth in McKay v Hargis, 351 Mich 409, 418 ; 88 NW2d 456 (1958), articulating that an “officer’s conduct should be compared to ‘that care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances.’” Fiser, 417 Mich at 470 .

2014The court began its analysis concluding that the Does retained an undiminished expectation to privacy: “Although the Does’ daughter is on probation, it does not necessarily follow that they themselves are subject to a diminished expectation of privacy in their bodily fluids.” Id. at 358 .

2014The court acknowledged the state’s legitimate interest in protecting and rehabilitating children but held that “even where a substan tial State interest exists, this Court will not uphold a search ‘whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’ ” Id. at 359 quoting City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32, 44 ; 121 S Ct 447 ; 148 L Ed 2d 333 (2000).

2014The court acknowledged the state’s legitimate interest in protecting and rehabilitating children but held that “even where a substan tial State interest exists, this Court will not uphold a search ‘whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’ ” Id. at 359 quoting City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32, 44 ; 121 S Ct 447 ; 148 L Ed 2d 333 (2000).

2014The court acknowledged the state’s legitimate interest in protecting and rehabilitating children but held that “even where a substan tial State interest exists, this Court will not uphold a search ‘whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.’ ” Id. at 359 quoting City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32, 44 ; 121 S Ct 447 ; 148 L Ed 2d 333 (2000).

2010The Court began its analysis by adopting the proposition that “the attorney’s client is the corporation and not the shareholders.” Id.

2007The Court began its analysis by noting that under the fact-based approach set forth in Martin and Stewart, if “the proof adduced at trial indicates that one offense is a necessarily or cognate lesser included offense of the other, then conviction of both the offenses will be precluded.” Wilder, supra at 343-344 .

2007The Court began its analysis by noting that under the factbased approach set forth in Martin and Stewart, if "the proof adduced at trial indicates that one offense is a necessarily or cognate lesser included offense of the other, then conviction of both the offenses will be precluded." Wilder, supra at 343-344 , 308 N.W.2d 112 .

2006In Hillsdale Co , this Court addressed the issue of whether a funding unit could be compelled to appropriate funds for salary increases that were neither approved by it nor “proven to be necessary to maintain a statutory function of the court or to provide for the overall administration of justice.” 8 This Court began its analysis by noting that “[e]ach branch of government has inherent power to preserve its constitutional authority.” Id.

2006In Hillsdale Co., this Court addressed the issue of whether a funding unit could be compelled to appropriate funds for salary increases that were neither approved by it nor "proven to be necessary to maintain a statutory function of the court or to provide for the overall administration of justice." [8] This Court began its analysis by noting that "[e]ach branch of government has inherent power to preserve its constitutional authority." Id.

2006On the other hand, “an indispensable ingredient of the concept of coequal branches of government is that ‘each branch must recognize and respect the limits on its own authority and the boundaries of the authority delegated to the other branches.’ ” Id., quoting United States v Will, 449 US 200, 228 ; 101 S Ct 471 ; 66 L Ed 2d 392 (1980).

2006On the other hand, “an indispensable ingredient of the concept of coequal branches of government is that ‘each branch must recognize and respect the limits on its own authority and the boundaries of the authority delegated to the other branches.’ ” Id., quoting United States v Will, 449 US 200, 228 ; 101 S Ct 471 ; 66 L Ed 2d 392 (1980).

2005“This presumption is especially strong where tax legislation is concerned.” Kostyu, supra at 93 .

2005Third, if possible the statute must be construed in such a way as to “render it valid, not invalid, as conferring administrative, not legislative” power and as vesting discretionary, not arbitrary, authority. [Seaman, supra at 309 (citations and punctuation deleted).] The trial court began its analysis with the third criterion and the “well-established rule that a statute is presumed to be constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 24 ; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).

2005Third, if possible the statute must be construed in such a way as to “render it valid, not invalid, as conferring administrative, not legislative” power and as vesting discretionary, not arbitrary, authority. [Seaman, supra at 309 (citations and punctuation deleted).] The trial court began its analysis with the third criterion and the “well-established rule that a statute is presumed to be constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 24 ; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).

2005This Court began its analysis by noting that the riparian owner "holds the naked legal title [the jus privatum ], and with it he takes such proprietary rights as are consistent with the public right of navigation [the jus publicum ], and the control of congress over that right." Id. at 314 , 167 N.W. 990 (citation omitted).

2005This Court began its analysis by noting that the riparian owner "holds the naked legal title [the jus privatum ], and with it he takes such proprietary rights as are consistent with the public right of navigation [the jus publicum ], and the control of congress over that right." Id. at 314 , 167 N.W. 990 (citation omitted).