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7 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
UMC Development, LLC v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2017For reasons we shall 8 See UMC Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia, 120 A.3d 37, 43 (D.C. 2015) (―[A] plaintiff‘s standing is properly raised as a challenge to the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction via a motion to dismiss under Super. | 1 | 1 |
Burwell v. Burwellgreen1 sentence2009D.C.Code § 16-910(b) (mandating trial court make an “equitable, just and reasonable” distribution of marital property after considering nonexclusive list of enumerated factors); see Burwell v. Burwell, 700 A.2d 219, 223 (D.C.1997) (the court must divide marital property equitably, in a manner that is “just and reasonable”). | 1 | 1 |
Pickett v. Browngreen2 sentences1983In a 1982 decision, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982), the Court ruled that the Texas counterpart to § 16-2342, which imposed a flat, 1-year period for bringing such actions, was unconstitutional. 6 Approximately 1 year later in Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), the Court applied the principles announced in Mills to Tennessee’s more flexible 2-year statute of limitations 7 and *462 concluded that it too was unconstitutional. 8 In both Mills and Pickett the Court began its analysis by noting its previous holding in Gomez 1983In a 1982 decision, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982), the Court ruled that the Texas counterpart to § 16-2342, which imposed a flat, 1-year period for bringing such actions, was unconstitutional. 6 Approximately 1 year later in Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), the Court applied the principles announced in Mills to Tennessee’s more flexible 2-year statute of limitations 7 and *462 concluded that it too was unconstitutional. 8 In both Mills and Pickett the Court began its analysis by noting its previous holding in Gomez | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lafler v. Cooper
green
1 sentence2019After that, the court’s focus was on whether appellant would actually have taken the plea — in the words of Lafler, whether “there is a reasonable probability . . . that the defendant would have accepted the plea.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Porter v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
green
1 sentence2005Porter, 625 A.2d at 888 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Willie Robinson, Jr.
green
2 sentences2003The court began its analysis by differentiating between two types of traffic stops: “pure” traffic stops and those involving “special circumstances.” The latter category often includes a situation in which an *967 “officer notes a suspicious movement by one of the car’s occupants as he makes his approach.” Id. at 38, 465 F.2d at 623 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 46 , 62 n. 14, 447 F.2d 1215 , 1231 n. 14 (1971) (en bane)). 2003The court began its analysis by differentiating between two types of traffic stops: “pure” traffic stops and those involving “special circumstances.” The latter category often includes a situation in which an *967 “officer notes a suspicious movement by one of the car’s occupants as he makes his approach.” Id. at 38, 465 F.2d at 623 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 46 , 62 n. 14, 447 F.2d 1215 , 1231 n. 14 (1971) (en bane)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Harry Green
green
2 sentences2003The court began its analysis by differentiating between two types of traffic stops: “pure” traffic stops and those involving “special circumstances.” The latter category often includes a situation in which an *967 “officer notes a suspicious movement by one of the car’s occupants as he makes his approach.” Id. at 38, 465 F.2d at 623 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 46 , 62 n. 14, 447 F.2d 1215 , 1231 n. 14 (1971) (en bane)). 2003Noting that the traffic stop in Green might have begun as a “pure” or routine one, “it ceased to be such when the officers, observing the furtive movements by the occupant of the vehicle, became reasonably fearful of danger.” 151 U.S.App.D.C. at 38, 465 F.2d at 623 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Mussallem
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 807 . 1997Id. at 807 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Mills v. Habluetzel
green
2 sentences1983In a 1982 decision, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982), the Court ruled that the Texas counterpart to § 16-2342, which imposed a flat, 1-year period for bringing such actions, was unconstitutional. 6 Approximately 1 year later in Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), the Court applied the principles announced in Mills to Tennessee’s more flexible 2-year statute of limitations 7 and *462 concluded that it too was unconstitutional. 8 In both Mills and Pickett the Court began its analysis by noting its previous holding in Gomez 1983In a 1982 decision, Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982), the Court ruled that the Texas counterpart to § 16-2342, which imposed a flat, 1-year period for bringing such actions, was unconstitutional. 6 Approximately 1 year later in Pickett v. Brown, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), the Court applied the principles announced in Mills to Tennessee’s more flexible 2-year statute of limitations 7 and *462 concluded that it too was unconstitutional. 8 In both Mills and Pickett the Court began its analysis by noting its previous holding in Gomez | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.