began analysis in Oregon

2014Whether a statute creates a duty, or enacts a standard of care, is determined by discerning what the legislature intended.” Scovill, 324 Or at 166 .

2014Whether a statute creates a duty, or enacts a standard of care, is determined by discerning what the legislature intended.” Scovill, 324 Or at 166 .

2025The court began its analysis by observing that an insurer’s duty to indemnify is “based on the nature of the insured’s liability in the underlying legal action.” Id. at 270 .

2025The court began its analysis by observing that an insurer’s duty to indemnify is “based on the nature of the insured’s liability in the underlying legal action.” Id. at 270 .

2014Dalury, 670 A2d at 797 .

2014Dalury, 670 A2d at 797 .

2004The court began its analysis by noting the state’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s analysis of officer safety searches in Michigan v. Long, 463 US 1032 , 103 S Ct 3469 , 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), and this court’s own previous analysis in State v. Riley, 240 Or 521 , 402 P2d 741 (1965), in which the court had acknowledged that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety.” Bates, 304 Or at 523 .

2004The court began its analysis by noting the state’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s analysis of officer safety searches in Michigan v. Long, 463 US 1032 , 103 S Ct 3469 , 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), and this court’s own previous analysis in State v. Riley, 240 Or 521 , 402 P2d 741 (1965), in which the court had acknowledged that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety.” Bates, 304 Or at 523 .

2004The court began its analysis by noting the state's reliance on the Supreme Court's analysis of officer safety searches in Michigan v. Long , 463 US 1032 , 103 S Ct 3469 , 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), and this court's own previous analysis in State v. Riley , 240 Or 521 , 402 P2d 741 (1965), in which the court had acknowledged that "police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety." Bates , 304 Or at 523 .

2004The court began its analysis by noting the state’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s analysis of officer safety searches in Michigan v. Long, 463 US 1032 , 103 S Ct 3469 , 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), and this court’s own previous analysis in State v. Riley, 240 Or 521 , 402 P2d 741 (1965), in which the court had acknowledged that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety.” Bates, 304 Or at 523 .

2004The court began its analysis by noting the state’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s analysis of officer safety searches in Michigan v. Long, 463 US 1032 , 103 S Ct 3469 , 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), and this court’s own previous analysis in State v. Riley, 240 Or 521 , 402 P2d 741 (1965), in which the court had acknowledged that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety.” Bates, 304 Or at 523 .

2004The court began its analysis by noting the state’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s analysis of officer safety searches in Michigan v. Long, 463 US 1032 , 103 S Ct 3469 , 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983), and this court’s own previous analysis in State v. Riley, 240 Or 521 , 402 P2d 741 (1965), in which the court had acknowledged that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety.” Bates, 304 Or at 523 .

2022Id. at 203 .

2022The court began its analysis by naming two “stat- utory prerequisites” to review—that “a record or exhibit nec- essary to the prosecution of an appeal is destroyed and that destruction occurred through no fault of the appellant”—and saying that “there is no dispute” that both “are met.” Id. at 338 .

2022This court began its analysis with the following description of the underpinnings of the defense: “Underlying the rule of absolute privilege is the assump- tion that to permit suits against public officers would inhibit courageous and independent official action, and the further assumption that the public interest thus served outweighs the interest of persons damaged by the willful and malicious conduct of public officers.” Id.

2021The court began its analysis by noting that it was an “unexceptional premise that when a trial court incor- rectly instructs a jury, that is legal error.” Id. at 795 .

2021The court noted that a party may move for a new trial under ORCP 64 B(6) based on legal error, but that provision states that the error must have been “ ‘objected to or excepted to by the party making the application.’ ” Id. at 796 (quoting ORCP 64 B(6) (emphasis omitted)).

2021Cite as 369 Or 1 (2021) 25 The majority instead focuses on the short time period between the state’s last effort to contact the witness by going to her home at 8:20 a.m. on the day of trial and about an hour later when the trial court began hearing pre- trial motions.

2021Notably, in Carlton, the court began its analysis with an extensive exploration of the meaning of the applicable Oregon statute, ORS 137.719(3)(b)(B), before turning to the question whether the California statute at issue fell within its ambit. 361 Or at 35-43 . 132 State v. Ramirez issue in Mullen was whether the defendant, who previously had been convicted of reckless driving under a different stat- ute, was entitled to a jury instruction requiring the jury to determine whether the defendant had been previously con- victed of an offense involving alcohol or drugs. 186 Wash App at 325-26.

2019Id. at 538-39 , 368 P.3d 11 .

2019Id. at 538-39 , 368 P.3d 11 .

2018The court began its analysis by noting that "[s]omething more is necessary to connect [a] breath test result to the statutory requirement of a BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving" because "it is virtually always the case that the chemical test of the breath or blood is administered some time after the person has stopped driving." Id. at 9-10 , 277 P.3d 549 (emphasis in original).

2018The court began its analysis by noting that "[s]omething more is necessary to connect [a] breath test result to the statutory requirement of a BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving" because "it is virtually always the case that the chemical test of the breath or blood is administered some time after the person has stopped driving." Id. at 9-10 , 277 P.3d 549 (emphasis in original).

2017For context, Remme attempted to reconcile three Supreme Court cases concerning permissible and impermissible expert testimony bearing on the credibility of witnesses-State v. Keller, 315 Or 273 , 844 P2d 195 (1993), State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621 , 756 P2d 620 (1988), and State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427 , 657 P2d 1215 (1983).

2017For context, Remme attempted to reconcile three Supreme Court cases concerning permissible and impermissible expert testimony bearing on the credibility of witnesses-State v. Keller, 315 Or 273 , 844 P2d 195 (1993), State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621 , 756 P2d 620 (1988), and State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427 , 657 P2d 1215 (1983).

2017For context, Remme attempted to reconcile three Supreme Court cases concerning permissible and impermissible expert testimony bearing on the credibility of witnesses-State v. Keller, 315 Or 273 , 844 P2d 195 (1993), State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621 , 756 P2d 620 (1988), and State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427 , 657 P2d 1215 (1983).

2017For context, Remme attempted to reconcile three Supreme Court cases concerning permissible and impermissible expert testimony bearing on the credibility of witnesses-State v. Keller, 315 Or 273 , 844 P2d 195 (1993), State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621 , 756 P2d 620 (1988), and State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427 , 657 P2d 1215 (1983).

2017For context, Remme attempted to reconcile three Supreme Court cases concerning permissible and impermissible expert testimony bearing on the credibility of witnesses-State v. Keller, 315 Or 273 , 844 P2d 195 (1993), State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621 , 756 P2d 620 (1988), and State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427 , 657 P2d 1215 (1983).

2017For context, Remme attempted to reconcile three Supreme Court cases concerning permissible and impermissible expert testimony bearing on the credibility of witnesses-State v. Keller, 315 Or 273 , 844 P2d 195 (1993), State v. Milbradt, 305 Or 621 , 756 P2d 620 (1988), and State v. Middleton, 294 Or 427 , 657 P2d 1215 (1983).

2016The court began its analysis with a discussion of an earlier case, Johnston v. The Oregon Bank, 285 Or 423 , 591 P2d 746 (1979), which the parties agreed was “on point as to whether the individual partners stated contract claims against Bank.” Caplener, 317 Or at 513 .

2016The court began its analysis with a discussion of an earlier case, Johnston v. The Oregon Bank, 285 Or 423 , 591 P2d 746 (1979), which the parties agreed was “on point as to whether the individual partners stated contract claims against Bank.” Caplener, 317 Or at 513 .

2016The court began its analysis with a discussion of an earlier case, Johnston v. The Oregon Bank, 285 Or 423 , 591 P2d 746 (1979), which the parties agreed was “on point as to whether the individual partners stated contract claims against Bank.” Caplener, 317 Or at 513 .

2016The court began its analysis by noting that the phrasing of Article I, section 11, indicating that the right was “to be heard by himself and counsel,” suggested a right to “present argument without taking the stand, similar to the way in which his counsel may make an unsworn closing statement to the factfinder.” Id. at 297 .

2015The Court began its analysis by noting that the Fourth Amendment is a guarantee only against “unreasonable” searches and that a co-tenant’s consent to the search of a residence can make a warrantless search “reasonable.” Id. at 183-84 .

2015The Court began its analysis by noting that the Fourth Amendment is a guarantee only against “unreasonable” searches and that a co-tenant’s consent to the search of a residence can make a warrantless search “reasonable.” Id. at 183-84 .

2014The Court began its analysis by noting that Cite as 355 Or 612 (2014) 649 central to the right of a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is the principle that a per- son accused of a crime “is entitled to have his [or her] guilt determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” Id. at 567 (citation omitted).

2012Phase II, 349 Or 330, 336 , 245 P3d 81 (2010).

2012As discussed, this court began its analysis by considering the text of ORS 311.216 and concluded, at the outset, that “[t]he text of ORS 311.216 permits both parties’ interpretations. * * * The text, standing alone, does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” Clackamas Cty Assessor, 349 Or at 336 .

2011The court began its analysis by addressing the point at which the right to counsel guaranteed by Article I, section 11, “begins.” Sparklin, 296 Or at 92 .

2011Id. at 32 . 9 However, the court specifically elected not to adopt the Supreme Court’s rationale or *190 to extend the Oregon exception.

2009Foster, 219 Or App at 281 .

2009The court began its analysis with the statement, “A claim brought under ORS 654.062(5) must be processed by the BOLI Commissioner[.]” Cantley, 422 F Supp 2d at 1222 .

2009The court then concluded that, in such an action processed by the BOLI commissioner, “only the equitable remedies of injunction, reinstatement, two years back pay, as well as attorney fees and costs, are available * * *; no compensatory or punitive damages are recoverable.” Id.