began analysis in Connecticut

2021The court began its analysis in Skilling with the ‘‘foundation precedent’’ of Rideau v. Louisiana, supra, 373 U.S. 723 , in which ‘‘Wilbert Rideau robbed a bank in a small Louisiana town, [kidnapped] three bank employees, and killed one of them.

2018The court began its analysis with the recognition that "[d]ivining the meaning of '[wilfully]' in criminal statutory mens rea terms has long bedeviled American courts." Id., at 389 .

2017In considering the timeliness of the request, it is important to note that "[w]e are especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion where the court has denied a motion for continuance made on the day of the trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 394, 42 A.3d 446 .

2015Id., 139 .

2015(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 544 , citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 , 110 S. Ct. 668 , 107 L.

2015(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 544 , citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 , 110 S. Ct. 668 , 107 L.

2015(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 544 , citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 , 110 S. Ct. 668 , 107 L.

2012The court began its analysis by noting: “An insurance contract, like any other, must be construed to effect the intent of the parties as expressed by their words and purposes.” Id.

2009The court began its analysis by acknowledging that “[o]rdinarily the denial of a motion to reopen a judgment is not a final judgment within the appeal statute” before qualifying that statement: “The denial of such a motion falls within the rule that, in a proper case, supplemental proceedings following a judgment may be assigned as error in an appeal from the judgment.” Id., 376 .

2009With regard to intoxication, the court began its instruction by stating: "When deliberating the specific intent element of a crime, you must consider intoxication." Later, the court instructed that "if you find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime charged that he was not mentally able even to form the specific intent to commit the crime, then the intent element of the crime charged would not be provided, and you will be required to acquit the defendant of that charge." In the sentence immediately following the challenged instruction, the court stated: "If, however, yo

2009With regard to intoxication, the court began its instruction by stating: “When deliberating the specific intent element of a crime, you must consider intoxication.” Later, the court instructed that “if you find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime charged that he was not mentally able even to form the specific intent to commit the crime, then the intent element of the crime charged would not be provided, and you will be required to acquit the defendant of that charge.” In the sentence immediately following the challenged instruction, the court stated: “If, however, yo

2009With regard to intoxication, the court began its instruction by stating: "When deliberating the specific intent element of a crime, you must consider intoxication." Later, the court instructed that "if you find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime charged that he was not mentally able even to form the specific intent to commit the crime, then the intent element of the crime charged would not be provided, and you will be required to acquit the defendant of that charge." In the sentence immediately following the challenged instruction, the court stated: "If, however, yo

2009With regard to intoxication, the court began its instruction by stating: “When deliberating the specific intent element of a crime, you must consider intoxication.” Later, the court instructed that “if you find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime charged that he was not mentally able even to form the specific intent to commit the crime, then the intent element of the crime charged would not be provided, and you will be required to acquit the defendant of that charge.” In the sentence immediately following the challenged instruction, the court stated: “If, however, yo

2009With regard to intoxication, the court began its instruction by stating: “When deliberating the specific intent element of a crime, you must consider intoxication.” Later, the court instructed that “if you find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime charged that he was not mentally able even to form the specific intent to commit the crime, then the intent element of the crime charged would not be provided, and you will be required to acquit the defendant of that charge.” In the sentence immediately following the challenged instruction, the court stated: “If, however, yo

2009With regard to intoxication, the court began its instruction by stating: “When deliberating the specific intent element of a crime, you must consider intoxication.” Later, the court instructed that “if you find that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime charged that he was not mentally able even to form the specific intent to commit the crime, then the intent element of the crime charged would not be provided, and you will be required to acquit the defendant of that charge.” In the sentence immediately following the challenged instruction, the court stated: “If, however, yo

2007The court cited our statement in Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002), that “when there is an environmental legislative and regulatory scheme in place that specifically governs the conduct that [allegedly] constitutes an unreasonable impairment under CEPA, whether the conduct is unreasonable under CEPA will depend on whether it complies with that scheme.” The trial court also noted that counsel for the plaintiffs had stated several times during trial that the plaintiffs were not claiming that Hart’s conduct had resulted in unreasonable pollution but that there had

2007The court cited our statement in Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 557 , 800 A.2d 1102 (2002), that “when there is an environmental legislative and regulatory scheme in place that specifically governs the conduct that [allegedly] constitutes an unreasonable impairment under CEPA, whether the conduct is unreasonable under CEPA will depend on whether it complies with that scheme.” The trial court also noted that counsel for the plaintiffs had stated several times during trial that the plaintiffs were not claiming that Hart’s conduct had resulted in unreasonable pollution but that there had

2007The court began its analysis with a discussion of Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S. Ct. 87 , 58 L.

2007The court began its analysis with a discussion of Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978), in which it considered a similar question regarding the 180 day filing requirement contained in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. ž 621 et seq.

2007The court began its analysis with a discussion of Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S. Ct. 87 , 58 L.

2007The court began its analysis with a discussion of Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978), in which it considered a similar question regarding the 180 day filing requirement contained in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. ž 621 et seq.

2007The court began its analysis with a discussion of Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S. Ct. 87 , 58 L.

2007The court began its analysis with a discussion of Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978), in which it considered a similar question regarding the 180 day filing requirement contained in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. ž 621 et seq.

2004Gaudiani testified that, to her personal knowledge, parcel 4A was the “preferred” and more likely site for the museum. 103 The trial court began its analysis with the proposition that, “it is not necessary that the officials proceed to make immediate use of the property thus acquired, or that they have ‘plans and specifications prepared and all other preparations necessary for immediate construction before it [the county] can determine the necessity for taking private property for public purpose.’ Carlor Co. v. [Miami, 62 So. 2d 897, 902 (Emphasis added.) (Fla. 1953)].” Wright v. Dade County,

2004Gaudiani testified that, to her personal knowledge, parcel 4A was the “preferred” and more likely site for the museum. 103 The trial court began its analysis with the proposition that, “it is not necessary that the officials proceed to make immediate use of the property thus acquired, or that they have ‘plans and specifications prepared and all other preparations necessary for immediate construction before it [the county] can determine the necessity for taking private property for public purpose.’ Carlor Co. v. [Miami, 62 So. 2d 897, 902 (Emphasis added.) (Fla. 1953)].” Wright v. Dade County,

2004Gaudiani testified that, to her personal knowledge, parcel 4A was the “preferred” and more likely site for the museum. 103 The trial court began its analysis with the proposition that, “it is not necessary that the officials proceed to make immediate use of the property thus acquired, or that they have ‘plans and specifications prepared and all other preparations necessary for immediate construction before it [the county] can determine the necessity for taking private property for public purpose.’ Carlor Co. v. [Miami, 62 So. 2d 897, 902 (Emphasis added.) (Fla. 1953)].” Wright v. Dade County,

1999(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676 , 686 , [ 687 A.2d 146 (1997)]." Wozniak v. Keystone Ins.

1999(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gil v. Courthouse One, 239 Conn. 676 , 686 , [ 687 A.2d 146 (1997)]." Wozniak v. Keystone Ins.

1998In Lopez, supra , the court began its analysis with a discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden , 9 Wheat 1, 22 U.S. 1 , 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824), wherein the court stated that "[c]ommerce undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.

1998In Lopez, supra , the court began its analysis with a discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden , 9 Wheat 1, 22 U.S. 1 , 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824), wherein the court stated that "[c]ommerce undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.

1990In arriving at this conclusion, the court began its analysis by noting that: (1) the fourth amendment “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands”; id., 906 ; (2) “the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong’ ”; id., quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L.

1990In arriving at this conclusion, the court began its analysis by noting that: (1) the fourth amendment “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands”; id., 906 ; (2) “the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong’ ”; id., quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L.

1990Ed. 2d 561 (1974); (3) “[t]he wrong condemned by the Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful search or seizure itself”; United States v. Leon, supra, quoting United States v. Calandra, supra; and (4) “the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v. Leon, supra, quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 , 96 S. Ct. 3037 , 49 L.

1990Ed. 2d 561 (1974); (3) “[t]he wrong condemned by the Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ by the unlawful search or seizure itself”; United States v. Leon, supra, quoting United States v. Calandra, supra; and (4) “the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v. Leon, supra, quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 , 96 S. Ct. 3037 , 49 L.