39 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1976–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2015See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 697, 701 . (stating that ambiguity precludes finding of unmistakable legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity and requiring that waiver be unambiguous and “beyond doubt”). ' • Because a violation of the Securities Act “sounds in tort” and the four Taylor factors do not support the conclusion that the Legislature waived immunity under the statute, we conclude that a violation of the Securities Act is a claim that “could have been brought under [the Tort. 2010We are not persuaded by Oncor’s argument that the statutes at issue “indicate no reasonable construction other than a waiver of governmental immunity.” Finally, we address Oncor’s argument that “[a] proper analysis of the Taylor factors indicates that the legislature did clearly and unambiguously waive governmental immunity in Section 181.004.” See Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 697-98 . | 2 | 3 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences1981As we wrote in Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.Cr.App.1979): “While this Court continues to revisit the Taylor doctrine [from Taylor v. State, 421 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1967)] from time to time, see, e. g., Duncantell v. State, 563 S.W.2d 252, 256 (1978), it has examined each precise fact situation to determine that after the traffic stop each movement made by an officer is factually and legally justified.. 1981As we wrote in Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.Cr.App.1979): “While this Court continues to revisit the Taylor doctrine [from Taylor v. State, 421 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1967)] from time to time, see, e. g., Duncantell v. State, 563 S.W.2d 252, 256 (1978), it has examined each precise fact situation to determine that after the traffic stop each movement made by an officer is factually and legally justified.. | 2 | 3 |
Duncantell v. Stategreen2 sentences1981As we wrote in Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.Cr.App.1979): “While this Court continues to revisit the Taylor doctrine [from Taylor v. State, 421 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1967)] from time to time, see, e. g., Duncantell v. State, 563 S.W.2d 252, 256 (1978), it has examined each precise fact situation to determine that after the traffic stop each movement made by an officer is factually and legally justified.. 1981As we wrote in Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.Cr.App.1979): “While this Court continues to revisit the Taylor doctrine [from Taylor v. State, 421 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1967)] from time to time, see, e. g., Duncantell v. State, 563 S.W.2d 252, 256 (1978), it has examined each precise fact situation to determine that after the traffic stop each movement made by an officer is factually and legally justified.. | 2 | 2 |
Taylor v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Taylor v. State, 555 S.W.3d 765, 775 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Richard Cruz v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Cruz, 565 S.W.3d at 381 . | 1 | 1 |
TV Azteca v. Ruizgreen1 sentence2024TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Cire v. Cummingsgreen1 sentence2023See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004) (trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion). | 1 | 1 |
Prible v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See id. art. 64.03(a). | 1 | 1 |
Fitness Entertainment Ltd. v. Hurstgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Fitness Entm’t Ltd. v. Hurst, 527 S.W.3d 699, 703-05 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied); Tex. Health Res. v. Kruse, No. 05-13-01754-CV, 2014 WL 3408636 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Applicable Law “The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of identification testimony from a witness who was subjected to an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure.” Roberts v. State, 923 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Crain v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48 . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Maddinggreen2 sentences2016“The rationale for this rule is that the imposition of sentence is the crucial moment when all of the parties are physically present at the sentence hearing and able to hear and respond to the imposition of sentence.” Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. 2016“The rationale for this rule is that the imposition of sentence is the crucial moment when all of the parties are physically present at the sentence hearing and able to hear and respond to the imposition of sentence.” Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Munoz v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Munoz v. State, 288 S.W.3d 55 , 59–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not err in allowing hearsay testimony of therapist where testimony established both prongs of Taylor test). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rossgreen1 sentence2016See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Hollins v. Stategreen2 sentences2015P. 33.1(a)(1); see also Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 807 ; Hollins, 805 S.W.2d at 476 . 2 Though the trial court did not expressly overrule or sustain Taylor’s objection, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(2)(A) provides that error is preserved if, among other things, the trial court implicitly ruled on the objection. 2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
Wyatt v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (explaining that determination regarding whether statement is voluntary is made based on totality of circumstances). | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen1 sentence2015In three Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in points, the State argues that the trial court abused its Missouri v. McNeely, the court of criminal appeals has held discretion by ruling that the arresting officer in this case that the provisions in the Transportation Code do not, taken violated Taylor's Fourth Amendment rights when he had by themselves, form a constitutionally valid alternative to medical personnel perform amandatory blood draw from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. ––– U.S. ––––, Taylor in accordance with Texas Transportation Code section 133 S.Ct. 15 | 1 | 1 |
Pena, Jose Luisgreen1 sentence2015P. 33.1(a)(1); see also Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 807 ; Hollins, 805 S.W.2d at 476 . 2 Though the trial court did not expressly overrule or sustain Taylor’s objection, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(2)(A) provides that error is preserved if, among other things, the trial court implicitly ruled on the objection. | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Bankhead, 314 S.W.3d at 469 (holding section 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied in dismissing health care liability claim of indigent inmate); Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 461 (holding section 74.351 did not violate due course of law provision of Texas Constitution); Thoyakulathu v. Brennan, 192 S.W.3d 849 , 855–56 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding section 9 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff who failed to meet expert report deadline due to malfunctioning fax machine and stating, “[W]e conclude that [the] statute need not provide exceptions that wou | 1 | 1 |
Herrera v. Seton Northwest Hospitalgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Bankhead, 314 S.W.3d at 469 (holding section 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied in dismissing health care liability claim of indigent inmate); Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 461 (holding section 74.351 did not violate due course of law provision of Texas Constitution); Thoyakulathu v. Brennan, 192 S.W.3d 849 , 855–56 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding section 9 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff who failed to meet expert report deadline due to malfunctioning fax machine and stating, “[W]e conclude that [the] statute need not provide exceptions that wou | 1 | 1 |
Bankhead v. Spencegreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Bankhead, 314 S.W.3d at 469 (holding section 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied in dismissing health care liability claim of indigent inmate); Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 461 (holding section 74.351 did not violate due course of law provision of Texas Constitution); Thoyakulathu v. Brennan, 192 S.W.3d 849 , 855–56 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding section 9 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff who failed to meet expert report deadline due to malfunctioning fax machine and stating, “[W]e conclude that [the] statute need not provide exceptions that wou | 1 | 1 |
| City of Keller v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Choyce v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit of the Texas Department of Human Resourcesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Mexia v. Tookegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Howard v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Delaware v. Prousegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2003In doing so, the Supreme Court reaffirmed “The thrust of our decisions” on the issue: “[I]n the absence of legislative authorization of serious penalties for contempt, a State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if it determines not to impose a sentence longer than six months.” 418 U.S. at 496 , 94 S.Ct. at 2702 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 906 . 2003In doing so, the Supreme Court reaffirmed “The thrust of our decisions” on the issue: “[I]n the absence of legislative authorization of serious penalties for contempt, a State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if it determines not to impose a sentence longer than six months.” 418 U.S. at 496 , 94 S.Ct. at 2702 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 906 . | 4 | 2003–2003 |
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences2011The court of appeals concluded that Taylor’s objection to the State’s question should have been sustained because “[although the witness in the instant case did not testify as to [Taylor’s] guilt, he did testify as to his opinion of [Taylor’s] culpable mental state, which is an ultimate fact question for the jury’s determination.” 3 Id. 2011The court of appeals concluded that Taylor's objection to the State's question should have been sustained because "[a]lthough the witness in the instant case did not testify as to [Taylor's] guilt, he did testify as to his opinion of [Taylor's] culpable mental state, which is an ultimate fact question for the jury's determination." [3] Id. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
City of Carrollton v. McMahon Contracting, L.P.
green
2 sentences2005Based on this review, we again concluded that section 51.075 does not effect a waiver of the City’s immunity “by clear and unambiguous language.” See McMahon, 134 S.W.3d at 928 . 2005Based on this review, we again concluded that section 51.075 does not effect a waiver of the City's immunity "by *923 clear and unambiguous language." See McMahon, 134 S.W.3d at 928 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
George v. City of Fort Worth
green
1 sentence2024Cf. George v. City of Fort Worth, 434 S.W.2d 903 , 905–07 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that bottom step of unlit stairwell blended with walkway to create optical illusion, affirming summary judgment for defendants due to lack of evidence of negligence, and noting further that hazard was open and obvious). 6 tripped on a “[c]loudy, . . . [d]ry” day at approximately 2:00 p.m., and Taylor confirmed that it had not been dark outside when she tripped. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Weekley Homes, L.P.
green
1 sentence2021Direct benefits estoppel turns on the substance of the asserted claims (In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d at 131-32 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
First Bank v. Brumitt
green
1 sentence2021The third-party-beneficiary theory looks “solely to the contract’s language” (Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d at 102 ); here, the Purchase Agreement was offered into evidence with Taylor’s motion to compel. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Thoyakulathu v. Brennan
green
1 sentence2013See, e.g., Bankhead, 314 S.W.3d at 469 (holding section 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied in dismissing health care liability claim of indigent inmate); Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 461 (holding section 74.351 did not violate due course of law provision of Texas Constitution); Thoyakulathu v. Brennan, 192 S.W.3d 849 , 855–56 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding section 9 74.351 was not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff who failed to meet expert report deadline due to malfunctioning fax machine and stating, “[W]e conclude that [the] statute need not provide exceptions that wou | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Long v. State
green
1 sentence2011The State acknowledges, citing Long v. State , 800 S.W.2d 545 , 546 – 48 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Adley v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Long v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Attwood v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Dillard v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Chambers v. Maroney green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Sublett v. World Ins. Co. neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| National Life Underwriters v. Miller neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.