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9 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2012See Taylor I, 947 P.2d 681, 685-86 (Utah 1998); see also Taylor II, 2007 UT 12, ¶¶ 18-22 , 156 P.3d 739 . 2007Id. | 1 | 2 |
Gardner v. Holdengreen1 sentence2024In Gardner v. Holden, for example, our supreme court noted that a “presumption of prejudice” applies “when defense counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest, because an attorney’s duty of loyalty is the most basic of counsel’s duties.” 888 P.2d 608, 620 (Utah 1994) (quotation simplified). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2017My research showed that ... the law is pretty clear that the fact that [the stop] was a pretext does not preclude [the officer] from having a valid stop.” Given that the law controlling pretext stops has been settled in Utah since 1994, see State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (stating that “the Fourth Amendment simply does not require an officer’s state of mind to perfectly correspond to his or her legally justified actions”), counsel’s failure to engage with the State on that point could not have been prejudicial to Taylor’s defense, see State v. Edgar, 2017 UT App 53, ¶ 10 , 397 | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Taylor I, 947 P.2d 681, 685-86 (Utah 1998); see also Taylor II, 2007 UT 12, ¶¶ 18-22 , 156 P.3d 739 . 2012See Taylor I, 947 P.2d 681, 685-86 (Utah 1998); see also Taylor II, 2007 UT 12, ¶¶ 18-22 , 156 P.3d 739 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Menziesgreen2 sentences2009For us to abandon the Taylor standard, the Hoyers have to meet the "substantial burden of persuasion" required for us to overturn our prior precedent and disregard "the doctrine of stare decisis." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). 2009For us to abandon the Taylor standard, the Hoyers have to meet the "substantial burden of persuasion" required for us to overturn our prior precedent and disregard "the doctrine of stare decisis." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Barnard v. Sutliffgreen1 sentence1998Rule 11 Sanctions In Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1233-35 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a three-tiered standard of review for trial court rulings under Rule 11. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Richard Anthony Badolato, Dean Quarnstrom, and Richard Vaughngreen1 sentence1995Instead, we look to counsel’s actual performance to determine whether it was adequate. 2 See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 412-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that inexperience was not grounds for a presumption of ineffectiveness); accord United States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 926 (11th Cir.1983); see also Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that inexperience does not constitute ineffeetiveness per se; petitioner must still make showing of deficient performance and prejudice), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 433 , 111 S.Ct. 862 , 112 L.Ed.2d 962 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Marvin R. \Rusty\" Hall"green1 sentence1995Instead, we look to counsel’s actual performance to determine whether it was adequate. 2 See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 412-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that inexperience was not grounds for a presumption of ineffectiveness); accord United States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 926 (11th Cir.1983); see also Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that inexperience does not constitute ineffeetiveness per se; petitioner must still make showing of deficient performance and prejudice), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 433 , 111 S.Ct. 862 , 112 L.Ed.2d 962 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Jimmie Burden, Jr. v. Walter Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Centerred1 sentence1995Instead, we look to counsel’s actual performance to determine whether it was adequate. 2 See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 412-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that inexperience was not grounds for a presumption of ineffectiveness); accord United States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 926 (11th Cir.1983); see also Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that inexperience does not constitute ineffeetiveness per se; petitioner must still make showing of deficient performance and prejudice), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 433 , 111 S.Ct. 862 , 112 L.Ed.2d 962 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. Lawlor
green
1 sentence2026And although its analysis in this regard was brief, the court appeared to be invoking rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as its authority for refusing to accept the Amended Opposition. ¶10 The next day, Taylor filed a motion that he styled as a “Motion for Clarification,” in which he asked for “clarification from the [c]ourt as to which rule or rules the Amended Opposition fail[ed] to comply with,” offering his view that “[w]ithout such clarification, [he was] unable to determine what further corrections [were] required.” ¶11 Just four days later—before the Lawlors’ deadline for fili | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Harding Trust
green
1 sentence2023After the hearing, the court signed an order memorializing the ruling, therein briefly stating that it had denied Taylor’s motion because “adequate justification has not been provided” and because it considered Taylor’s delay “unreasonable.” Taylor had attempted to justify the amendment, at least in part, by asserting that he had intended his incorporation of Robert’s ex-wife’s affirmative defenses to include “all applicable statutes of limitations and laches defenses.” The court rejected this justification as “faulty,” determining that Robert’s ex-wife’s defense was “limited in scope to one s | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Edgar
green
2 sentences2017My research showed that ... the law is pretty clear that the fact that [the stop] was a pretext does not preclude [the officer] from having a valid stop.” Given that the law controlling pretext stops has been settled in Utah since 1994, see State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (stating that “the Fourth Amendment simply does not require an officer’s state of mind to perfectly correspond to his or her legally justified actions”), counsel’s failure to engage with the State on that point could not have been prejudicial to Taylor’s defense, see State v. Edgar, 2017 UT App 53, ¶ 10 , 397 2017My research showed that ... the law is pretty clear that the fact that [the stop] was a pretext does not preclude [the officer] from having a valid stop.” Given that the law controlling pretext stops has been settled in Utah since 1994, see State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (stating that “the Fourth Amendment simply does not require an officer’s state of mind to perfectly correspond to his or her legally justified actions”), counsel’s failure to engage with the State on that point could not have been prejudicial to Taylor’s defense, see State v. Edgar, 2017 UT App 53, ¶ 10 , 397 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. DeMille
green
1 sentence2012In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), we considered a similar question. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Laney v. Fairview City
green
2 sentences2009Seq, e.g., Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 15 , 173 P.3d 166 (holding that atmospheric conditions do not come within the exception for natural conditions on the land); Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 39 , 133 P.3d 402 (holding that the use of orange barrels on the *555 highway did not qualify as a discretionary exeeption to the waiver of governmental immunity); Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 1 , 57 P.3d 1007 (holding that the city could not escape liability under the Governmental Immunity Act for negligently operating a power system because the definition of "governmental fun 2009Seq, e.g., Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 15 , 173 P.3d 166 (holding that atmospheric conditions do not come within the exception for natural conditions on the land); Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 39 , 133 P.3d 402 (holding that the use of orange barrels on the *555 highway did not qualify as a discretionary exeeption to the waiver of governmental immunity); Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 1 , 57 P.3d 1007 (holding that the city could not escape liability under the Governmental Immunity Act for negligently operating a power system because the definition of "governmental fun | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City
green
2 sentences2009Seq, e.g., Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 15 , 173 P.3d 166 (holding that atmospheric conditions do not come within the exception for natural conditions on the land); Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 39 , 133 P.3d 402 (holding that the use of orange barrels on the *555 highway did not qualify as a discretionary exeeption to the waiver of governmental immunity); Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 1 , 57 P.3d 1007 (holding that the city could not escape liability under the Governmental Immunity Act for negligently operating a power system because the definition of "governmental fun 2009Seq, e.g., Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 15 , 173 P.3d 166 (holding that atmospheric conditions do not come within the exception for natural conditions on the land); Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 39 , 133 P.3d 402 (holding that the use of orange barrels on the *555 highway did not qualify as a discretionary exeeption to the waiver of governmental immunity); Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 1 , 57 P.3d 1007 (holding that the city could not escape liability under the Governmental Immunity Act for negligently operating a power system because the definition of "governmental fun | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Johnson v. Utah Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2009Seq, e.g., Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 15 , 173 P.3d 166 (holding that atmospheric conditions do not come within the exception for natural conditions on the land); Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 39 , 133 P.3d 402 (holding that the use of orange barrels on the *555 highway did not qualify as a discretionary exeeption to the waiver of governmental immunity); Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 1 , 57 P.3d 1007 (holding that the city could not escape liability under the Governmental Immunity Act for negligently operating a power system because the definition of "governmental fun 2009Seq, e.g., Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 15 , 173 P.3d 166 (holding that atmospheric conditions do not come within the exception for natural conditions on the land); Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 39 , 133 P.3d 402 (holding that the use of orange barrels on the *555 highway did not qualify as a discretionary exeeption to the waiver of governmental immunity); Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 1 , 57 P.3d 1007 (holding that the city could not escape liability under the Governmental Immunity Act for negligently operating a power system because the definition of "governmental fun | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Burden v. Zant
green
2 sentences1995Instead, we look to counsel’s actual performance to determine whether it was adequate. 2 See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 412-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that inexperience was not grounds for a presumption of ineffectiveness); accord United States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 926 (11th Cir.1983); see also Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that inexperience does not constitute ineffeetiveness per se; petitioner must still make showing of deficient performance and prejudice), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 433 , 111 S.Ct. 862 , 112 L.Ed.2d 962 (1991). 1995Instead, we look to counsel’s actual performance to determine whether it was adequate. 2 See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 412-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that inexperience was not grounds for a presumption of ineffectiveness); accord United States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 926 (11th Cir.1983); see also Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that inexperience does not constitute ineffeetiveness per se; petitioner must still make showing of deficient performance and prejudice), rev’d on other grounds, 498 U.S. 433 , 111 S.Ct. 862 , 112 L.Ed.2d 962 (1991). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.