12 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1988–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wild West Trading Co. v. Gbs&h Architects, Landscape Architects, Planners, Inc.green2 sentences1995Thus, because the June 1990 change order was not among the "Contract Documents," Taylor's claim for quantum meruit recovery for the work performed under the invalid change order was not a claim "relating to the Contract *853 Documents." By the parties' contract, claims not relating to the Contract Documents were not within the arbitrator's scope of authority. [2] See Wild West Trading Co. v. gbs & h Architects, Landscape Architects, Planners, Inc., 881 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Wyo. 1994). 1995Thus, because the June 1990 change order was not among the “Contract Documents,” Taylor’s claim for quantum meruit recovery for the work performed under the invalid change order was not a claim “relating to the Contract Documents.” By the parties’ contract, claims not relating to the Contract Documents were not within the arbitrator’s scope of authority. 2 See Wild West Trading Co. v. gbs & h Architects, Landscape Architects, Planners, Inc., 881 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Wyo. 1994). | 2 | 2 |
Jay v. Com.green1 sentence2020Despite the numerous questions raised by the language of the “introduction into commerce” exception,3 we need not resolve those here as Taylor wholly failed to meet his 1 Under Rule 5A:20(e), an appellant’s opening brief must contain “[t]he principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relating to each assignment of error.” Here, although Taylor’s brief included principles of law and authorities, this single vague and ungrammatical sentence is the only presentation of his argument on brief, after which he concludes: “Therefore, Taylor’s conduct does not meet the elements of the statute. | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen1 sentence2019See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 161 (2013) (“[A]ll 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983) (noting one-year license revocation “for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate”). -6- 2. | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen1 sentence2019See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 161 (2013) (“[A]ll 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983) (noting one-year license revocation “for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate”). -6- 2. | 1 | 1 |
Lutes v. Alexandergreen2 sentences2012See Lutes v. Alexander, 14 Va. App. 1075, 1077 , 421 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1992). 2012See Lutes v. Alexander, 14 Va. App. 1075, 1077 , 421 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Bly v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010The trial court was at liberty to disbelieve Taylor’s claim that pain from a cracked tooth caused her erratic driving and, based upon this finding, “conclude that [s]he was ‘lying to conceal [her] guilt.’” Bly v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 1, 12 , 682 S.E.2d 556, 562 (2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). 2010The trial court was at liberty to disbelieve Taylor’s claim that pain from a cracked tooth caused her erratic driving and, based upon this finding, “conclude that [s]he was ‘lying to conceal [her] guilt.’” Bly v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 1, 12 , 682 S.E.2d 556, 562 (2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010“This principle naturally follows from the broader observation that ‘whenever a witness testifies, his or her credibility becomes an issue.’” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 25-26 , 660 S.E.2d 687, 690-91 (2008) (citation omitted). 2010“This principle naturally follows from the broader observation that ‘whenever a witness testifies, his or her credibility becomes an issue.’” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 25-26 , 660 S.E.2d 687, 690-91 (2008) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2003II. “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 2003II. “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Wiglesworth v. Taylorgreen1 sentence1998The court stated that “in the absence of his denial or repudiation of the trust, which must be communicated to the beneficiary, a fiduciary cannot assert the bar of the statute of limitations or laches against the trust beneficiary.” Id., at 608 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leon
green
1 sentence2016The facts alleged by Perry in his affidavit supporting his request for the warrant and in his sworn testimony before the magistrate established a probability that Taylor would accept the package upon delivery and that contraband and evidence of criminal activity would be found in his home. - 19 - For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s decision denying Taylor’s motion to suppress the evidence found at his residence.9 Affirmed. 9 Although both parties addressed the application of the good faith exception outlined in Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , in their appellate briefs, our resolution of this | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lane v. Vaughn
green
1 sentence2003The defendants filed demurrers and asserted, among other things, that plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for attorney malpractice because he failed to allege that he obtained post-conviction relief as required by this Court’s decision in Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275 , 482 S.E.2d 797 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937 (1997). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences2003This evidence “if disclosed and used effectively,” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 , 105 S.Ct. at 3380 , would have brought into sharp focus Taylor’s defense that the witnesses’ trial testimony was simply mistaken and, in some instances, contradictory to their pretrial recollection of the events. 2003This evidence “if disclosed and used effectively,” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 , 105 S.Ct. at 3380 , would have brought into sharp focus Taylor’s defense that the witnesses’ trial testimony was simply mistaken and, in some instances, contradictory to their pretrial recollection of the events. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2003In short, as the Supreme Court noted in Kyles , “[djisclosure of their statements would have resulted in a markedly weaker case for the prosecution and a markedly stronger one for the defense.” 514 U.S. at 441 , 115 S.Ct. at 1569 . 2003In short, as the Supreme Court noted in Kyles , “[djisclosure of their statements would have resulted in a markedly weaker case for the prosecution and a markedly stronger one for the defense.” 514 U.S. at 441 , 115 S.Ct. at 1569 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Adkins v. Dixon
green
2 sentences2003The defendants filed demurrers and asserted, among other things, that plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for attorney malpractice because he failed to allege that he obtained post-conviction relief as required by this Court’s decision in Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275 , 482 S.E.2d 797 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937 (1997). 2003The defendants filed demurrers and asserted, among other things, that plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for attorney malpractice because he failed to allege that he obtained post-conviction relief as required by this Court’s decision in Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275 , 482 S.E.2d 797 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937 (1997). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Taylor v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2001We characterized that activity as a “strip search.” In Moss v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 219 , 516 S.E.2d 246 (1999), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Moss’s motion to suppress, finding that the officers’ discovery of crack cocaine in Moss’ buttocks constituted a “strip search.” In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 638 , 507 S.E.2d 661 (1998), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress, finding Taylor was subjected to an illegal “strip search” when officers forced him to remove his clothing, including his underwear, item by item. 2001We characterized that activity as a “strip search.” In Moss v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 219 , 516 S.E.2d 246 (1999), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Moss’s motion to suppress, finding that the officers’ discovery of crack cocaine in Moss’ buttocks constituted a “strip search.” In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 638 , 507 S.E.2d 661 (1998), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress, finding Taylor was subjected to an illegal “strip search” when officers forced him to remove his clothing, including his underwear, item by item. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Moss v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2001We characterized that activity as a “strip search.” In Moss v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 219 , 516 S.E.2d 246 (1999), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Moss’s motion to suppress, finding that the officers’ discovery of crack cocaine in Moss’ buttocks constituted a “strip search.” In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 638 , 507 S.E.2d 661 (1998), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress, finding Taylor was subjected to an illegal “strip search” when officers forced him to remove his clothing, including his underwear, item by item. 2001We characterized that activity as a “strip search.” In Moss v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 219 , 516 S.E.2d 246 (1999), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Moss’s motion to suppress, finding that the officers’ discovery of crack cocaine in Moss’ buttocks constituted a “strip search.” In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 638 , 507 S.E.2d 661 (1998), we reversed the trial court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress, finding Taylor was subjected to an illegal “strip search” when officers forced him to remove his clothing, including his underwear, item by item. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Gilmore
green
2 sentences2001In Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 27 Va.App. 320 , 498 S.E.2d 464 (1998), Gilmore was forced to remove all her clothing in preparation for a “strip search.” The police then conducted a body cavity search. 2001In Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 27 Va.App. 320 , 498 S.E.2d 464 (1998), Gilmore was forced to remove all her clothing in preparation for a “strip search.” The police then conducted a body cavity search. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lamar's Ex'or v. Hale
green
1 sentence1988Although Taylor contends that the statute of limitations has no application to fiduciaries, citing Lamar v. Hale, 79 Va. 147 (1884), this court is of the opinion that Section 11(E) of the Bankruptcy Act provides for a two-year statute of limitations in bankruptcy cases. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.