Taylor objection in Kentucky

2017Even where testimony is' introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional evidentia:ry ' . error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . a~mitted befdre- credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is' introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional evidentia:ry ' . error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . a~mitted befdre- credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is' introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional evidentia:ry ' . error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . a~mitted befdre- credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is' introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional evidentia:ry ' . error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . a~mitted befdre- credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is' introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional evidentia:ry ' . error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . a~mitted befdre- credibility is attacked, any

2017Even where testimony is introduced in error, "... this Court may still determine that the error is harmless pursuant to RCr 9.24 and the standards set forth in· Winstead v. Commonwealth2D."21 "A non-constitutional \ . evidentiary error .. .is harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."22 Errors have also been found to be harmless in light of other strong evidence, as there is no possibility · · the error substantially swayed the jury.23 "When rehabilitation evidence is . admitted befdre. credibility is attacked, any

2026Moreover, although the Commonwealth relies upon recent out- of-state authority suggesting a categorical prohibition on the use of civil rule relief in post-conviction proceedings, we decline to depart from Kentucky’s longstanding jurisprudence recognizing the applicability of CR 60.02 in criminal cases, as discussed more fully below. 8 SUCCESSIVE 60.02 MOTIONS Relevant here, CR 60.02(f) provides relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for “any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief” . . . “made within a reasonable time.” Rule 60.02(f) “may be invoked only under th

2026Moreover, although the Commonwealth relies upon recent out- of-state authority suggesting a categorical prohibition on the use of civil rule relief in post-conviction proceedings, we decline to depart from Kentucky’s longstanding jurisprudence recognizing the applicability of CR 60.02 in criminal cases, as discussed more fully below. 8 SUCCESSIVE 60.02 MOTIONS Relevant here, CR 60.02(f) provides relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for “any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief” . . . “made within a reasonable time.” Rule 60.02(f) “may be invoked only under th

2024On appeal, Taylor argues that “[Scalf] and [Simpson’s] drug dealing might not seem to be related but each witness in the case had something in common, they all used meth” and “[Scalf] and [Simpson] were directly involved with [Saylor’s] disappearance” further noting that Scalf had some of Saylor’s clothes in the trunk of her car that she burned after Saylor was dead and kept quiet about Saylor’s death “for weeks.” According to Taylor, Scalf “being a drug 6 dealer in the local area [and] having possible connections to the other witnesses had direct bearing on whether her testimony was truthful

2024On appeal, Taylor argues that “[Scalf] and [Simpson’s] drug dealing might not seem to be related but each witness in the case had something in common, they all used meth” and “[Scalf] and [Simpson] were directly involved with [Saylor’s] disappearance” further noting that Scalf had some of Saylor’s clothes in the trunk of her car that she burned after Saylor was dead and kept quiet about Saylor’s death “for weeks.” According to Taylor, Scalf “being a drug 6 dealer in the local area [and] having possible connections to the other witnesses had direct bearing on whether her testimony was truthful

2024On appeal, Taylor argues that “[Scalf] and [Simpson’s] drug dealing might not seem to be related but each witness in the case had something in common, they all used meth” and “[Scalf] and [Simpson] were directly involved with [Saylor’s] disappearance” further noting that Scalf had some of Saylor’s clothes in the trunk of her car that she burned after Saylor was dead and kept quiet about Saylor’s death “for weeks.” According to Taylor, Scalf “being a drug 6 dealer in the local area [and] having possible connections to the other witnesses had direct bearing on whether her testimony was truthful

2023Only then was Taylor put on notice that the principal damage (the adverse judgment) was real; but more importantly, only then could he justifiably claim that the entire damage was proximately caused by counsel's failure, for which he might seek a remedy, and not by the trial court's error, for which he would have none.57 The Hibbard Court accordingly affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Taylor’s claim was timely filed.58 In Michels, John Sklavos hired Fredrick Michels and Nicholas Carlin to represent him in a wrongful termination suit against his former employer.59 The claim was initial

2021Although we ultimately agree with the circuit court that Taylor’s CR 60.02 motion fails on the merits, “we may affirm a trial court’s ruling despite the fact that it reached the correct result for the wrong reason.” Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Ky. App. 2009) (citing Hodge, 116 S.W.3d at 470 ).

2019As we make this determination, we are mindful of our statutes and caselaw that place the ALJ in the central 1 Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Ky. 2011) (citing Roark v. Alva Coal Corp., 371 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1963); Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984); Snaivder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1979)). 2 Stovall v. Collett, 671 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. App. 1984). 3 FEI Installation, Inc. v. Williams, 214 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Ky. 2007) (citing Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986)). 2 role of fact-finder in workers’ compensation cases.

2019As we make this determination, we are mindful of our statutes and caselaw that place the ALJ in the central 1 Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Ky. 2011) (citing Roark v. Alva Coal Corp., 371 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1963); Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984); Snaivder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1979)). 2 Stovall v. Collett, 671 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. App. 1984). 3 FEI Installation, Inc. v. Williams, 214 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Ky. 2007) (citing Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986)). 2 role of fact-finder in workers’ compensation cases.

2019As we make this determination, we are mindful of our statutes and caselaw that place the ALJ in the central 1 Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Ky. 2011) (citing Roark v. Alva Coal Corp., 371 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1963); Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984); Snaivder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1979)). 2 Stovall v. Collett, 671 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. App. 1984). 3 FEI Installation, Inc. v. Williams, 214 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Ky. 2007) (citing Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986)). 2 role of fact-finder in workers’ compensation cases.

2019As we make this determination, we are mindful of our statutes and caselaw that place the ALJ in the central 1 Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Ky. 2011) (citing Roark v. Alva Coal Corp., 371 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1963); Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984); Snaivder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1979)). 2 Stovall v. Collett, 671 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. App. 1984). 3 FEI Installation, Inc. v. Williams, 214 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Ky. 2007) (citing Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986)). 2 role of fact-finder in workers’ compensation cases.