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12 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2019This rhetorical flaw was met with prompt objection and M7 Feb. 26, 2019 Defendant’s Direct Examination Tr., at 9-10 (D.I. 51). 7 See Martin v. State, 346 A.2d 158, 160 (Del. 1975) (forbidding a prosecutor’s cross- examination questions that seeking merely to repeat impeachment for past criminal acts already admitted on direct examination). 19 Feb. 27, 2019 Mistrial Motion Tr., at 13-14 (D.I. 42). 20 Feb. 26, 2019 Defendant’s Cross/Recross-Examination Tr., at 27 (D.I. 52) = The other risk in this specific context, of course, was that the “we” just now “hearing that [self-defense] story” could b 2019This rhetorical flaw was met with prompt objection and 7 Feb. 26, 2019 Defendant’s Direct Examination Tr., at 9-10 (D.I. 51). 18 See Martin v. State, 346 A.2d 158, 160 (Del. 1975) (forbidding a prosecutor's cross- examination questions that seeking merely to repeat impeachment for past criminal acts already admitted on direct examination). 19 Feb. 27, 2019 Mistrial Motion Tr., at 13-14 (D.I. 42). 20 Feb. 26, 2019 Defendant’s Cross/Recross-Examination Tr., at 27 (D.I. 52) 1 The other risk in this specific context, of course, was that the “we” just now “hearing that [self-defense] story” could b | 2 | 2 |
Cooke v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See id. . 11 Del. 2011See id. [35] 11 Del. | 2 | 2 |
Garvey v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, because the Taylor factors, whether counted numerically or balanced more generally, weigh in the State’s favor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams’s motion for a mistrial. 42 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558 , 565–66 (Del. 2006). 43 See Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d 723, 726 (Del. 2013) (“As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the substance of the law.”). 44 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 299 (Del. 2005). 45 App. to Opening Br. at A471. 17 2 Williams’s sec 2023Accordingly, because the Taylor factors, whether counted numerically or balanced more generally, weigh in the State’s favor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams’s motion for a mistrial. 42 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558 , 565–66 (Del. 2006). 43 See Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d 723, 726 (Del. 2013) (“As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the substance of the law.”). 44 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 299 (Del. 2005). 45 App. to Opening Br. at A471. 17 2 Williams’s sec | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, because the Taylor factors, whether counted numerically or balanced more generally, weigh in the State’s favor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams’s motion for a mistrial. 42 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558 , 565–66 (Del. 2006). 43 See Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d 723, 726 (Del. 2013) (“As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the substance of the law.”). 44 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 299 (Del. 2005). 45 App. to Opening Br. at A471. 17 2 Williams’s sec 2023Accordingly, because the Taylor factors, whether counted numerically or balanced more generally, weigh in the State’s favor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams’s motion for a mistrial. 42 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558 , 565–66 (Del. 2006). 43 See Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d 723, 726 (Del. 2013) (“As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the substance of the law.”). 44 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 299 (Del. 2005). 45 App. to Opening Br. at A471. 17 2 Williams’s sec | 1 | 1 |
Younger v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Apr. 28, 2017) (TRANSCRIPT)). 6 Id. 7 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 2 (4) Before addressing the merits of Taylor’s motion for postconviction relief, we first address the procedural bars.8 Under Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for postconviction relief is barred if it is untimely, repetitive, procedurally defaulted, or formerly adjudicated.9 These bars do not apply, however, if the movant can satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2).10 Under Rule 61(d)(2), a second motion for postconviction relief “shall be summarily dismissed, u | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2018In fact, in Taylor’s first motion for postconviction relief, Taylor argued that his counsel was “so focused on preparing a mental illness defense based on Dissociative Identity Disorder over Taylor’s objection that it precluded them from preparing for his chosen trial strategy of self-defense and accidental fall.” Id. at *5. 20 Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 379 (Del. 2011). 21 Id. at 385 . 22 Taylor, 2015 WL 7753046, at *37. 23 Id. at *33; id. at *38 (“Taylor’s own words buried his trial strategy, not his Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to thoroughly prepare for and vigorously pursue it. 2018In fact, in Taylor’s first motion for postconviction relief, Taylor argued that his counsel was “so focused on preparing a mental illness defense based on Dissociative Identity Disorder over Taylor’s objection that it precluded them from preparing for his chosen trial strategy of self-defense and accidental fall.” Id. at *5. 20 Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 379 (Del. 2011). 21 Id. at 385 . 22 Taylor, 2015 WL 7753046, at *37. 23 Id. at *33; id. at *38 (“Taylor’s own words buried his trial strategy, not his Trial Counsel’s alleged failure to thoroughly prepare for and vigorously pursue it. | 1 | 1 |
Dawson v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Apr. 28, 2017) (TRANSCRIPT)). 6 Id. 7 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 2 (4) Before addressing the merits of Taylor’s motion for postconviction relief, we first address the procedural bars.8 Under Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for postconviction relief is barred if it is untimely, repetitive, procedurally defaulted, or formerly adjudicated.9 These bars do not apply, however, if the movant can satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2).10 Under Rule 61(d)(2), a second motion for postconviction relief “shall be summarily dismissed, u | 1 | 1 |
Floudiotis v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Thus, we reject this claim on appeal. 9 Ayers v. State, 97 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Del. 2014) (quoting Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1210 (Del. 1999)). 5 (9) Taylor’s four remaining claims are that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony, for failing to challenge the victim’s coerced identification of Taylor at trial, for failing to file a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct and bias, and for failing to challenge the chain of custody of the gun. | 1 | 1 |
Ayers v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Thus, we reject this claim on appeal. 9 Ayers v. State, 97 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Del. 2014) (quoting Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1210 (Del. 1999)). 5 (9) Taylor’s four remaining claims are that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony, for failing to challenge the victim’s coerced identification of Taylor at trial, for failing to file a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct and bias, and for failing to challenge the chain of custody of the gun. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences2003Upon review of Taylor’s motion, we conclude that he is indeed correct that the Court’s opinion misconstrues the circumstances surrounding the life sentence imposed in Taylor (Antonio) v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del.1996) (hereinafter Antinio Taylor). 2003Upon review of Taylor's motion, we conclude that he is indeed correct that the Court's opinion misconstrues the circumstances surrounding the life sentence imposed in Taylor (Antonio) v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del.1996) (hereinafter Antinio Taylor ). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Guy v. State
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, because the Taylor factors, whether counted numerically or balanced more generally, weigh in the State’s favor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams’s motion for a mistrial. 42 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558 , 565–66 (Del. 2006). 43 See Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d 723, 726 (Del. 2013) (“As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the substance of the law.”). 44 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 299 (Del. 2005). 45 App. to Opening Br. at A471. 17 2 Williams’s sec 2023Accordingly, because the Taylor factors, whether counted numerically or balanced more generally, weigh in the State’s favor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams’s motion for a mistrial. 42 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558 , 565–66 (Del. 2006). 43 See Hamilton v. State, 82 A.3d 723, 726 (Del. 2013) (“As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the substance of the law.”). 44 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 299 (Del. 2005). 45 App. to Opening Br. at A471. 17 2 Williams’s sec | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Copper v. State
green
2 sentences2023And likewise, we look to the Taylor factors as we assess the trial court’s exercise of discretion and whether it is indicative of abuse. 41 Id. at 694 . 15 In many instances—and this is one of them—one Taylor factor can weigh so heavily in favor of or against the ordering of a mistrial as to overwhelm the remaining factors. 2023And likewise, we look to the Taylor factors as we assess the trial court’s exercise of discretion and whether it is indicative of abuse. 41 Id. at 694 . 15 In many instances—and this is one of them—one Taylor factor can weigh so heavily in favor of or against the ordering of a mistrial as to overwhelm the remaining factors. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence2021Accordingly, we held that, “[g]iven the lack of factual support for any claimed discovery violation, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor’s motion to suppress.” Id. 19 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 563 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Powell v. State
green
1 sentence2018Apr. 28, 2017) (TRANSCRIPT)). 6 Id. 7 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 2 (4) Before addressing the merits of Taylor’s motion for postconviction relief, we first address the procedural bars.8 Under Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for postconviction relief is barred if it is untimely, repetitive, procedurally defaulted, or formerly adjudicated.9 These bars do not apply, however, if the movant can satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2).10 Under Rule 61(d)(2), a second motion for postconviction relief “shall be summarily dismissed, u | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Norman v. State
green
1 sentence2015Taylor argues that Mi Jung’s husband’s statement that he heard two voices during the fight and that Mumford was allegedly alive and mobile at 11:30 p.m. after the sounds of the fight had ended 34 Norman v. State, 968 A.2d 27 (Del. 2009). 61 substantiates Taylor’s claim that Mumford was alive for a much longer period of time than the State would have had the jury believe. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.