Taylor rule (District of Columbia) · Go Syfert
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Taylor rule in District of Columbia

8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
In Re Alethea W.green
mdctspecapp · 2000 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011See In re Alethea W., 130 Md.App. 635 , 747 A.2d 736, 739 (2000) (determining that during a court-ordered mental evaluation "the professional's services are performed for the benefit of the court rather than the individual; any benefit to the individual is incidental.

2011See In re Alethea W., 130 Md.App. 635 , 747 A.2d 736, 739 (2000) (determining that during a court-ordered mental evaluation "the professional's services are performed for the benefit of the court rather than the individual; any benefit to the individual is incidental.

22
Howard University v. Good Food Services, Inc.green
dc · 1992 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008See Good Food Servs., Inc., supra note 17, 608 A.2d at 120 ("Undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, and undue prejudice to the opposing party are all valid grounds for refusing to allow [an] amendment [to a pleading].”). 21 .

11
McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co.green
dc · 1979 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004See, e.g., McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.1979). 3 ."The foundation of modern negligence law is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.

11
Head v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1985 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000According to the motion, a new trial should be granted because “[i]f evidence is unreliable for the defense, surely it is equally unreliable for the government.” [M] The court denied Taylor’s motion for new trial, deeming it a collateral attack on his conviction and holding that Taylor failed to meet the “cause and prejudice” standard set forth in Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985).

2000“Relief under § 23-110 is appropriate only for serious defects in the trial which were not correctable on direct appeal or which appellant was prevented by exceptional circumstances from raising on direct appeal.” Head, 489 A.2d at 451 .

11
Watts v. United Statesgreen
dc · 1976 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
1 sentence

1992Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc).

11
Dalo v. Kivitzgreen
dc · 1991 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
1 sentence

1992See Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 37 (D.C.1991).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
EARLY SETTLERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. Schweid green
dc · 1966
1 sentence

1992Early Settlers, 221 A.2d at 923 .

11992–1992
Alonzo Wayne Taylor v. The Washington Terminal Company green
cadc · 1969
2 sentences

1991D.C. at 114, 409 F.2d at 149 . [4] I see nothing in the majority opinion that would reject this conclusion under the Taylor test if —as the record makes clear—plaintiff did not in closing argument waive damages as to the sexual and chemical assaults.

1991Given our required close scrutiny with due deference to the jury’s, as well as the trial court’s, view of the evidence, I believe the jury’s $1,000,000 verdict for pain and suffering during that period under the Survival Act claim, see supra note 2, must stand because it “was clearly within ‘the maximum limit of a reasonable range.’ ” Taylor, 133 U.S.App.D.C. at 114, 409 F.2d at 149 . 4 I see nothing in the majority opinion that would reject this conclusion under the Taylor test if — as the record makes clear — plaintiff did not in closing argument waive damages as to the sexual and chemical a

11991–1991

Where else courts name it

TX 39 (1976–2026) OH 38 (1999–2025) GA 36 (1914–2025) CA 35 (1969–2025) IL 33 (1867–2026) FL 32 (1961–2022) AL 21 (1988–2025) IN 21 (1981–2024) PA 21 (1944–2026) MO 20 (1981–2019) NY 17 (1979–2025) MD 13 (1995–2021) DE 12 (2003–2023) VA 12 (1988–2020) WI 11 (2004–2024) IA 11 (1996–2024) WA 10 (1911–2025) KY 10 (1957–2026) MI 10 (1970–2023) MS 9 (1998–2026) CO 9 (1994–2024) KS 9 (2004–2024) OK 8 (1995–2019) LA 8 (1975–2022) DC 8 (1991–2011) UT 8 (1995–2024) AZ 7 (2008–2026) SC 5 (2007–2024) NV 5 (2020–2024) WY 5 (2000–2025) AR 4 (1998–2015) HI 4 (2007–2023) ID 4 (2017–2019) NC 4 (2006–2026) MT 4 (1998–2009) CT 3 (2011–2017) WV 3 (1981–2024) AK 3 (1977–2017) MA 3 (1976–2008) RI 2 (1987–2023) TN 2 (2010–2013) ME 2 (1983–2010) NM 2 (1994–1995) MN 2 (2017–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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