just claim in Louisiana

2007The jurisprudence has delineated two circumstances *1234 in which such an abuse has been found in dismissals without prejudice: 1) where substantive rights of the defendant would be lost, or 2) where the defendant would be deprived of a just defense, Oliver v. Davis, 95-1841 (La.App. 1st Cir.8/12/95), 679 So.2d 462 .

1999Our jurisprudence "has delineated two circumstances in which such an abuse has been found in dismissals without prejudice: 1) where substantive rights of the defendant would be lost, or 2) where the defendant would be deprived of a just defense." Martinez at 1098 , citing Oliver v. Davis, 95-1841 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/12/96), 679 So.2d 462 , writ denied, 96-2267 (La.11/15/96), 682 So.2d 773 .

2015There, the court stated that “[rjefusal to adjudicate a dispute over property rights or contractual obligations, even when no interpretation or evaluation of ecclesiastical doctrine or practice is called for, but simply because the litigants are religious organizations, may deny a local church recourse to an impartial body to resolve a just claim.” Fluker, 419 So.2d at 447 .

1996As the Supreme Court commented in Fluker, supra, in adopting the neutral principles approach to this state: "Refusal to adjudicate a dispute over property rights or contractual obligations, even when no interpretation or evaluation of ecclesiastical doctrine or practice is called for, but simply because the litigants are religious organizations, may deny a local church recourse to resolve a just claim, thereby violating its members' rights under the free exercise provision, and also constituting a judicial establishment of the hierarchy's religion." at 447.

1969I.] DuPont [de Nemours & Co.], 207 La. 239 , 21 So.2d 46 , the Supreme Court said: `An employer could not defeat a just claim of an injured employee for workmen's compensation by keeping his name on the payroll at regular wages for a period exceeding a year, because the employee could interrupt the running of prescription by bringing suit on his claim for workmen's compensation at any time. * * * There is no reason why the payment of wages should prevent the running of prescription against a claim for workmen's compensation, because according to the wording of Subsection 1(B) [now LSA-R.S. 23:

1969I.] DuPont [de Nemours & Co.], 207 La. 239 , 21 So.2d 46 , the Supreme Court said: `An employer could not defeat a just claim of an injured employee for workmen's compensation by keeping his name on the payroll at regular wages for a period exceeding a year, because the employee could interrupt the running of prescription by bringing suit on his claim for workmen's compensation at any time. * * * There is no reason why the payment of wages should prevent the running of prescription against a claim for workmen's compensation, because according to the wording of Subsection 1(B) [now LSA-R.S. 23:

2019The "only rule which must be followed by the court in the exercise of its discretion" is that it "cannot dismiss an action without prejudice, after the defendants have made an appearance of record, if substantive rights of the defendant would be lost by the dismissal or if the dismissal would deprive the defendant of a just defense." Mowad v. General Motors Corp. , 02-1189, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1089 , 1091.

2019The "only rule which must be followed by the court in the exercise of its discretion" is that it "cannot dismiss an action without prejudice, after the defendants have made an appearance of record, if substantive rights of the defendant would be lost by the dismissal or if the dismissal would deprive the defendant of a just defense." Mowad v. General Motors Corp. , 02-1189, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1089 , 1091.

2007It is also the rule in this circuit that after appearance by the defendant, a trial judge may either grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice, or deny it; he is not authorized to enter a dismissal with prejudice, Roussell v. Roussell, 94-742, 94-743 (La.App. 5th Cir.1/31/95), 650 So.2d 373 .

1997It is also the rule in this circuit that after appearance by the defendant, a trial judge may either grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice, or deny it; he is not authorized to enter a dismissal with prejudice, Roussell v. Roussell, 94-742, 94-743 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1/31/95), 650 So.2d 373 .

1999Our jurisprudence "has delineated two circumstances in which such an abuse has been found in dismissals without prejudice: 1) where substantive rights of the defendant would be lost, or 2) where the defendant would be deprived of a just defense." Martinez at 1098 , citing Oliver v. Davis, 95-1841 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/12/96), 679 So.2d 462 , writ denied, 96-2267 (La.11/15/96), 682 So.2d 773 .

1996App. 1st Cir. 8/12/96); 679 So.2d 462, 464 , writ denied, 96-2267 (La.11/15/96); 682 So.2d 773 ; City National Bank v. Anlage, 448 So.2d 199, 200 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984); First City Bank v. Lee, 576 So.2d 544, 546 (La.

1955See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .' "We believe that a review of the pertinent decisions establishes the principle that payment of wages subsequent to injury will be construed as gratuities or payments in lieu of or in the nature of compensation,

1951See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D’Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .

1955See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .' "We believe that a review of the pertinent decisions establishes the principle that payment of wages subsequent to injury will be construed as gratuities or payments in lieu of or in the nature of compensation,

1951See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D’Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .

1955See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .' "We believe that a review of the pertinent decisions establishes the principle that payment of wages subsequent to injury will be construed as gratuities or payments in lieu of or in the nature of compensation,

1951See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D’Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .

1955See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .' "We believe that a review of the pertinent decisions establishes the principle that payment of wages subsequent to injury will be construed as gratuities or payments in lieu of or in the nature of compensation,

1951See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D’Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .

1955See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .' "We believe that a review of the pertinent decisions establishes the principle that payment of wages subsequent to injury will be construed as gratuities or payments in lieu of or in the nature of compensation,

1955See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8 , 20 So.2d 407 ; Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., La.App., 33 So.2d 144 ; D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67 , 34 So.2d 378 ; Walker v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 35 So.2d 610 ; Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., La.App., 49 So.2d 38 ; Abshire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., La.App., 50 So.2d 307 .' "We believe that a review of the pertinent decisions establishes the principle that payment of wages subsequent to injury will be construed as gratuities or payments in lieu of or in the nature of compensation,

2025App. 3 Cir. 5/8/19), 271 So. 3d 1276 , 1278, which holds the same. 6 This principle, however, may be limited by the law of the case doctrine, which is not relevant here. 5 provoked by filing the revocatory action and the lis pendens against the appellees.

2021This Court observed that that Article 1671 does not grant a district court “unbridled discretion” and recognized a jurisprudential rule that a district court “cannot dismiss a suit without prejudice if substantive rights acquired by the defendant would thereby be lost or if the dismissal would deprive the defendant of a just defense.” Sizemore, 18-0826, p. 6, 265 So.3d at 44-45 (quoting Oliver v. Davis, 95-1841, p. 4 (La.

2005Tidewater cites Vardaman v. Baker Center, Inc., 96-0831, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97), 689 So.2d 667, 669 , in support of this proposition.

1983Citing: Melancon v. Swift Agricultural Chemical Corp., 289 So.2d 578 (La.App. 3d Cir.1974); City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, Inc., 173 So.2d 43 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965); Betz v. Hearin Tank Lines, 75 So.2d 356 (La.App. 1st Cir.1954).

1971From this fact the Court concluded: “[Wjhen Athena, Inc. paid plaintiff a much higher wage than necessary to get the job done it constituted a recognition by defendants that plaintiff has a just claim and were payments in lieu of compensation which served to interrupt the prescriptive period.” (Aucoin v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, 217 So.2d 506, 509 ) In the Aucoin case the decision in Mella was distinguished by stating: “ * * * In Mella the plaintiff was originally employed as a warehouseman a position involving the performance of manual labor.

1963App.Orl., 59 So.2d 732 , the purpose of the cooperation clause is simply to require the insured to disclose all the facts within his knowledge and otherwise to aid the company to determine its liability under the policy; it is not, however, the obligation of the insured to assist the company to defeat recovery of a just claim or to testify falsely for it.

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S

1954The question is therefore whether the defendant did wrong in addressing its suit against Ira Dunaway without specifying whether the defendant was the father or the son, or “Sr.” or “Jr.” Although we have found no Louisiana case on point, the Courts of Alabama have held that “the suffix Junior, or Jr., is no part of a person’s legal name, but a mere descriptive suffix.” Williams v. State, 33 Ala.App. 119 , 31 So.2d 590, 591 , affirmed 249 Ala. 432 , 31 So.2d 592 ; Maxwell v. State, 11 Ala.App. 53 , 65 So. 732 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 42 , 40 So. 312 ; Windom v. State, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 514 , 72 S