just claim in Kansas

2019Then, noting that the provision at issue in the case was "obviously designed to defeat recovery on a just claim," the court held that it violated public policy. 189 Kan. at 471 , 370 P.2d 379 .

2019Then, noting that the provision at issue in the case was "obviously designed to defeat recovery on a just claim," the court held that it violated public policy. 189 Kan. at 471 , 370 P.2d 379 .

1992See Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 125, 129-30, 132 , 24 So. 111 (1897); Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 463-64 , 170 S.W. 225 (1914) (“The fact that it was a just claim, or, rather, that the invalidity of it had not been established by evidence, does not affect the question of appellant’s guilt of the crime of forgery.”); Jalbert v. State, 366 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Peakes, 231 Mass. 449, 456 , 121 N.E. 420 (1918) (“His ‘belief’ that he had a right to resort to forgery and other illegal acts in collecting a debt which he claimed the corporation owed him, does not d

1992See Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 125, 129-30, 132 , 24 So. 111 (1897); Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 463-64 , 170 S.W. 225 (1914) (“The fact that it was a just claim, or, rather, that the invalidity of it had not been established by evidence, does not affect the question of appellant’s guilt of the crime of forgery.”); Jalbert v. State, 366 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Peakes, 231 Mass. 449, 456 , 121 N.E. 420 (1918) (“His ‘belief’ that he had a right to resort to forgery and other illegal acts in collecting a debt which he claimed the corporation owed him, does not d

1992See Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 125, 129-30, 132 , 24 So. 111 (1897); Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 463-64 , 170 S.W. 225 (1914) (“The fact that it was a just claim, or, rather, that the invalidity of it had not been established by evidence, does not affect the question of appellant’s guilt of the crime of forgery.”); Jalbert v. State, 366 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Peakes, 231 Mass. 449, 456 , 121 N.E. 420 (1918) (“His ‘belief’ that he had a right to resort to forgery and other illegal acts in collecting a debt which he claimed the corporation owed him, does not d

1992See Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 125, 129-30, 132 , 24 So. 111 (1897); Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 463-64 , 170 S.W. 225 (1914) (“The fact that it was a just claim, or, rather, that the invalidity of it had not been established by evidence, does not affect the question of appellant’s guilt of the crime of forgery.”); Jalbert v. State, 366 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Peakes, 231 Mass. 449, 456 , 121 N.E. 420 (1918) (“His ‘belief’ that he had a right to resort to forgery and other illegal acts in collecting a debt which he claimed the corporation owed him, does not d

1992See Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 125, 129-30, 132 , 24 So. 111 (1897); Quertermous v. State, 114 Ark. 452, 463-64 , 170 S.W. 225 (1914) (“The fact that it was a just claim, or, rather, that the invalidity of it had not been established by evidence, does not affect the question of appellant’s guilt of the crime of forgery.”); Jalbert v. State, 366 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Peakes, 231 Mass. 449, 456 , 121 N.E. 420 (1918) (“His ‘belief’ that he had a right to resort to forgery and other illegal acts in collecting a debt which he claimed the corporation owed him, does not d

1992If one person should owe another, it would not authorize such person to sign his creditor’s name to a check, and obtain money thereon, representing that such instrument had been signed by his employer.”); State v. Christopherson, 36 Wis. 2d 574, 581-82 , 153 N. W.2d 631 (1967).

1992If one person should owe another, it would not authorize such person to sign his creditor’s name to a check, and obtain money thereon, representing that such instrument had been signed by his employer.”); State v. Christopherson, 36 Wis. 2d 574, 581-82 , 153 N. W.2d 631 (1967).

1980In Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272 , 524 P.2d 726 (1974), we stated: “Many years ago this court said the modern tendency is to restrict rather than extend the immunity of one who gains an advantage over another by purposely misleading him. [Citation omitted.] “In Speed v. Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436, 440 , 38 Pac. 496 , the court said: ‘The trend of the decisions of the courts of this and other states is towards the just doctrine, that where a contract is induced by false representations as to material existent facts, which are made with the intent to deceive, and upon which the plaintiff relie

1980In Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272 , 524 P.2d 726 (1974), we stated: “Many years ago this court said the modern tendency is to restrict rather than extend the immunity of one who gains an advantage over another by purposely misleading him. [Citation omitted.] “In Speed v. Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436, 440 , 38 Pac. 496 , the court said: ‘The trend of the decisions of the courts of this and other states is towards the just doctrine, that where a contract is induced by false representations as to material existent facts, which are made with the intent to deceive, and upon which the plaintiff relie

1974(Harvester Co. v. Hardware Co., 101 Kan. 488 , 167 Pac. 1057 .) In Speed v. Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436, 440 , 38 Pac. 496 , the court said: “The trend of the decisions of the courts of this and other states is towards the just doctrine, that where a contract is induced by false representations as to material existent facts, which are made with the Intent to deceive, and upon which the plaintiff relied, it is no defense to an action for rescission or for damages arising out of the deceit, that the party to whom the representations were made might, with due diligence, have discovered their falsi

1974(Harvester Co. v. Hardware Co., 101 Kan. 488 , 167 Pac. 1057 .) In Speed v. Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436, 440 , 38 Pac. 496 , the court said: “The trend of the decisions of the courts of this and other states is towards the just doctrine, that where a contract is induced by false representations as to material existent facts, which are made with the Intent to deceive, and upon which the plaintiff relied, it is no defense to an action for rescission or for damages arising out of the deceit, that the party to whom the representations were made might, with due diligence, have discovered their falsi

1974(Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc., 194 Kan. 386 , 399 P. 2d 822 ; and Jenkins v. McCormick, 184 Kan. 842 , 339 P. 2d 8 .) Many decisions of this court hold the law does not deprive a defrauded party of relief because he had opportunity to investigate when his lack of knowledge was such that the investigation would disclose nothing to him.

1974(Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc., 194 Kan. 386 , 399 P. 2d 822 ; and Jenkins v. McCormick, 184 Kan. 842 , 339 P. 2d 8 .) Many decisions of this court hold the law does not deprive a defrauded party of relief because he had opportunity to investigate when his lack of knowledge was such that the investigation would disclose nothing to him.

1974(Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc., 194 Kan. 386 , 399 P. 2d 822 ; and Jenkins v. McCormick, 184 Kan. 842 , 339 P. 2d 8 .) Many decisions of this court hold the law does not deprive a defrauded party of relief because he had opportunity to investigate when his lack of knowledge was such that the investigation would disclose nothing to him.

1974(Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc., 194 Kan. 386 , 399 P. 2d 822 ; and Jenkins v. McCormick, 184 Kan. 842 , 339 P. 2d 8 .) Many decisions of this court hold the law does not deprive a defrauded party of relief because he had opportunity to investigate when his lack of knowledge was such that the investigation would disclose nothing to him.

1973As long ago as 1894 this court observed: “The trend of the decisions of the courts of this and other states is towards the just doctrine, that where a contract is induced by false representations as *581 to material existent facts, which are made with the intent to deceive, and upon which the plaintiff relied, it is no defense to an action for rescission or for damages arising out of the deceit, that the party to whom the representations were made might, with due diligence, have discovered their falsity, and that he made no searching inquiry into facts.” (Speed v. Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436, 4

1973As long ago as 1894 this court observed: “The trend of the decisions of the courts of this and other states is towards the just doctrine, that where a contract is induced by false representations as *581 to material existent facts, which are made with the intent to deceive, and upon which the plaintiff relied, it is no defense to an action for rescission or for damages arising out of the deceit, that the party to whom the representations were made might, with due diligence, have discovered their falsity, and that he made no searching inquiry into facts.” (Speed v. Hollingsworth, 54 Kan. 436, 4

1966(Goetz v. Goetz, 180 Kan. 569, 576 , 306 P. 2d 167 ; Bremer v. Bremer, 187 Kan. 225, 228 , 356 P. 2d 672 .) There is nothing in the record to justify an assumption that Mr. Saint had forgiven his spouse for past mistreatment.

1966(Goetz v. Goetz, 180 Kan. 569, 576 , 306 P. 2d 167 ; Bremer v. Bremer, 187 Kan. 225, 228 , 356 P. 2d 672 .) There is nothing in the record to justify an assumption that Mr. Saint had forgiven his spouse for past mistreatment.

1966(Goetz v. Goetz, 180 Kan. 569, 576 , 306 P. 2d 167 ; Bremer v. Bremer, 187 Kan. 225, 228 , 356 P. 2d 672 .) There is nothing in the record to justify an assumption that Mr. Saint had forgiven his spouse for past mistreatment.

1966(Goetz v. Goetz, 180 Kan. 569, 576 , 306 P. 2d 167 ; Bremer v. Bremer, 187 Kan. 225, 228 , 356 P. 2d 672 .) There is nothing in the record to justify an assumption that Mr. Saint had forgiven his spouse for past mistreatment.

1939In Collamore v. Wilder, 19 Kan. 67 , it was held: “The formal and general language in a will, requiring that all the just debts of a deceased should be paid by his executors out of his estate, cannot be successfully invoked in behalf of a person who, having a just claim against such testator, neglects the legal proof of his demand until more than three years have elapsed after the issuance of letters testamentary, and until after the estate has been finally settled according to the provisions of law, and the administration closed.” (Syl.

1935In the case of Henley v. Myers, 76 Kan. 723 , 93 Pac. 168 , it was said the word “creditor . . . may mean one having any character of claim against another.” (p. 728.) But this very statute and this amendment thereto was fully considered and discussed in the case of Conrad v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 120 , 4 P. 2d 767 , where it was held; “Under R.

1935In the case of Henley v. Myers, 76 Kan. 723 , 93 Pac. 168 , it was said the word “creditor . . . may mean one having any character of claim against another.” (p. 728.) But this very statute and this amendment thereto was fully considered and discussed in the case of Conrad v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 120 , 4 P. 2d 767 , where it was held; “Under R.

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935In the case of Henley v. Myers, 76 Kan. 723 , 93 Pac. 168 , it was said the word “creditor . . . may mean one having any character of claim against another.” (p. 728.) But this very statute and this amendment thereto was fully considered and discussed in the case of Conrad v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 120 , 4 P. 2d 767 , where it was held; “Under R.

1935In the case of Henley v. Myers, 76 Kan. 723 , 93 Pac. 168 , it was said the word “creditor . . . may mean one having any character of claim against another.” (p. 728.) But this very statute and this amendment thereto was fully considered and discussed in the case of Conrad v. Johnson, 134 Kan. 120 , 4 P. 2d 767 , where it was held; “Under R.

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1935(City of Frankfort v. Warders, 119 Kan. 652, 654 , 240 Pac. 652 ; Nemaha County Comm’rs v. City of Seneca, 138 Kan. 895, 898 , 28 P. 2d 1034 ; Woodson County Comm’rs v. City of Yates Center, 139 Kan. 519 , 32 P. 2d 209 ; Greenwood County Comm’rs v. School District, 139 Kan. 297 , 31 P. 2d 723 .) On the right of protesting taxpayers to recover moneys unlawfully exacted from them when the illegality is determined, regardless of what disposition the county treasurer may have made of such moneys, see Hodgins v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 123 Kan. 246 , syl. ¶ 3, 255 Pac. 46 ; Bank of Holyrood v. Kott

1934Of course the persons who threw these bombs and negligently left them where children could get hold of them are liable to plaintiff (Clark v. Powder Co., 94 Kan. 268 , 146 Pac. 320 ), but there is no statute imposing such a liability on a city, and it would be difficult to develop a just rule of law to subject the city to such liability.

1934Of course the persons who threw these bombs and negligently left them where children could get hold of them are liable to plaintiff (Clark v. Powder Co., 94 Kan. 268 , 146 Pac. 320 ), but there is no statute imposing such a liability on a city, and it would be difficult to develop a just rule of law to subject the city to such liability.

1934This appears to be a just principle and was the procedure adopted in State, ex rel., v. Davis, 114 Kan. 270 , 217 Pac. 905 .

1934This appears to be a just principle and was the procedure adopted in State, ex rel., v. Davis, 114 Kan. 270 , 217 Pac. 905 .

1920On appeal to this court this question was pot presented in the briefs nor discussed in the opinion, Harvey v. Wasson, 91 Kan. 70 , 136 Pac. 919 .

1920On appeal to this court this question was pot presented in the briefs nor discussed in the opinion, Harvey v. Wasson, 91 Kan. 70 , 136 Pac. 919 .

1913In Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528 , a town supervisor was sued for a refusal to perform the duty of presenting to the county board the plaintiff’s claim for damages reassessed for the laying out of a road through his land.