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34 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1916–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rudinsky v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2019Rudinsky v. Harris , 231 Ariz. 95 , ¶ 27, 290 P.3d 1218 (App. 2012). 9 Section 12-341.01 allows attorney fees for the successful party "[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract" in order to "mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense." The phrase "arising out of a contract" in § 12-341.01 must be read broadly, and "an action is considered to have arisen out of contract when the plaintiff asserted a contract and the defendant successfully proved that no contract existed." *528 ML Servicing Co. v. Coles , 235 Ariz. 562 , ¶ 30, 334 P.3d 2019Rudinsky v. Harris , 231 Ariz. 95 , ¶ 27, 290 P.3d 1218 (App. 2012). 9 Section 12-341.01 allows attorney fees for the successful party "[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract" in order to "mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense." The phrase "arising out of a contract" in § 12-341.01 must be read broadly, and "an action is considered to have arisen out of contract when the plaintiff asserted a contract and the defendant successfully proved that no contract existed." *528 ML Servicing Co. v. Coles , 235 Ariz. 562 , ¶ 30, 334 P.3d | 3 | 4 |
Vortex v. denkewicz/engelhardgreen2 sentences2025Indeed, only “when a case ‘involve[s] multiple claims and varied success’ and the ‘net judgment rule’ is inapplicable” should the superior court look to “a ‘percentage of success’ factor or a ‘totality of the litigation’ rubric to determine which party prevailed.” Sourant, 229 Ariz. at 134 ¶ 36 (emphasis added; citing cases); accord Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551 , 562 ¶ 40 (App. 2012) (quoting Sourant; stating that “[b]ecause each side recovered less than the amounts sought, we conclude the net judgment rule is applicable”). ¶31 Recognizing the primacy of the “net judgment rule” in 2025Indeed, only “when a case ‘involve[s] multiple claims and varied success’ and the ‘net judgment rule’ is inapplicable” should the superior court look to “a ‘percentage of success’ factor or a ‘totality of the litigation’ rubric to determine which party prevailed.” Sourant, 229 Ariz. at 134 ¶ 36 (emphasis added; citing cases); accord Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551 , 562 ¶ 40 (App. 2012) (quoting Sourant; stating that “[b]ecause each side recovered less than the amounts sought, we conclude the net judgment rule is applicable”). ¶31 Recognizing the primacy of the “net judgment rule” in | 2 | 2 |
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warnergreen2 sentences2017Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570-71 , 694 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1985) (listing non- exclusive factors bearing on attorney fee awards under § 12-341.01); A.R.S. § 12- 341.01(B) (providing that an award of reasonable fees under the statute “should be made to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense”). ¶25 Regarding American’s attorney fees incurred before CSK’s offer of judgment, this opinion does not alter the trial court’s determination that American was the prevailing party up to that point. 2017Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570-71 , 694 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1985) (listing non- exclusive factors bearing on attorney fee awards under § 12-341.01); A.R.S. § 12- 341.01(B) (providing that an award of reasonable fees under the statute “should be made to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense”). ¶25 Regarding American’s attorney fees incurred before CSK’s offer of judgment, this opinion does not alter the trial court’s determination that American was the prevailing party up to that point. | 2 | 2 |
Ahwatukee Custom Estates Management Ass'n v. Bachgreen2 sentences2016Ass’n, Inc. v. Bach, 193 Ariz. 401 , 402 ¶ 5, 973 P.2d 106, 107 (1999). ¶35 Section 12–341.01(A) provides that a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the successful party in “any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied.” When questions of contract are combined with other questions, judicial analysis whether the action is sufficiently contractual to invoke A.R.S. § 12–341.01(A) “has aptly focused on the substance of the action and the statutory policy to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or defense.” A.H. 2016Ass’n, Inc. v. Bach, 193 Ariz. 401 , 402 ¶ 5, 973 P.2d 106, 107 (1999). ¶35 Section 12–341.01(A) provides that a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the successful party in “any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied.” When questions of contract are combined with other questions, judicial analysis whether the action is sufficiently contractual to invoke A.R.S. § 12–341.01(A) “has aptly focused on the substance of the action and the statutory policy to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or defense.” A.H. | 2 | 2 |
New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v: State, 144 Ariz. 95, 111 , 696 P.2d 185, 201 (1985) (legislative intent of § 12-341.01 to “mitigat[e] the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or just defense, and discourag[e] frivolous lawsuits”); see also Zeagler v. Buckley, 223 Ariz. 37, ¶ 9 , 219 P.3d 247, 249 (App.2009) (“[W]hen ... claims are so interrelated that identical or substantially overlapping discovery would occur, there is no sound reason to deny recovery of such legal fees.”). ¶ 24 Baxter brought claims on several tort theories in addition to its claim for breach o 2010See New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v: State, 144 Ariz. 95, 111 , 696 P.2d 185, 201 (1985) (legislative intent of § 12-341.01 to “mitigat[e] the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or just defense, and discourag[e] frivolous lawsuits”); see also Zeagler v. Buckley, 223 Ariz. 37, ¶ 9 , 219 P.3d 247, 249 (App.2009) (“[W]hen ... claims are so interrelated that identical or substantially overlapping discovery would occur, there is no sound reason to deny recovery of such legal fees.”). ¶ 24 Baxter brought claims on several tort theories in addition to its claim for breach o | 2 | 2 |
Zeagler v. Buckleygreen2 sentences2010See New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v: State, 144 Ariz. 95, 111 , 696 P.2d 185, 201 (1985) (legislative intent of § 12-341.01 to “mitigat[e] the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or just defense, and discourag[e] frivolous lawsuits”); see also Zeagler v. Buckley, 223 Ariz. 37, ¶ 9 , 219 P.3d 247, 249 (App.2009) (“[W]hen ... claims are so interrelated that identical or substantially overlapping discovery would occur, there is no sound reason to deny recovery of such legal fees.”). ¶ 24 Baxter brought claims on several tort theories in addition to its claim for breach o 2010See New Pueblo Constructors, Inc. v: State, 144 Ariz. 95, 111 , 696 P.2d 185, 201 (1985) (legislative intent of § 12-341.01 to “mitigat[e] the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or just defense, and discourag[e] frivolous lawsuits”); see also Zeagler v. Buckley, 223 Ariz. 37, ¶ 9 , 219 P.3d 247, 249 (App.2009) (“[W]hen ... claims are so interrelated that identical or substantially overlapping discovery would occur, there is no sound reason to deny recovery of such legal fees.”). ¶ 24 Baxter brought claims on several tort theories in addition to its claim for breach o | 2 | 2 |
Mariposa Development Co. v. Stoddardgreen2 sentences2015The statute is intended to “mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or defense.” Id. 1990Co. v. Stoddard, 147 Ariz. 561, 565 , 711 P.2d 1234, 1238 (App.1985), the trial court may consider the same factors that are considered in determining whether to award attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. section 12-341.01. | 1 | 3 |
California Food Service Corp. v. Great American Insurancegreen2 sentences1995More importantly, the indemnitor should not be given the incentive to avoid paying a just claim in hopes that the claimant will obtain payment from the co-indemnitor. [Citations omitted.] California Food Service Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., 130 Cal.App.3d 892, 901 , 182 Cal.Rptr. 67, 72-73 (1982). 1995More importantly, the indemnitor should not be given the incentive to avoid paying a just claim in hopes that the claimant will obtain payment from the co-indemnitor. [Citations omitted.] California Food Service Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., 130 Cal.App.3d 892, 901 , 182 Cal.Rptr. 67, 72-73 (1982). | 1 | 3 |
Marcus v. Foxgreen2 sentences2023See Marcus v. Fox, 150 Ariz. 333, 335-36 (1986) (explaining that matter arises from contract when there is “causal link between [a] claim and the underlying contract”); § 12-341.01(B) (“The award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this section should be made to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense.”). 2023See Marcus v. Fox, 150 Ariz. 333, 335-36 (1986) (explaining that matter arises from contract when there is “causal link between [a] claim and the underlying contract”); § 12-341.01(B) (“The award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this section should be made to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense.”). | 1 | 1 |
Blanchard v. Bergerongreen2 sentences2020Cf. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (rejecting strict limitation on fee awards in civil rights litigation). ¶17 Another consequence of the State’s argument, if accepted, would be to curtail public interest litigation where individuals band together and retain contingent fee counsel to pursue contract-related injunctive and declaratory relief, but have no money damages. 2020Cf. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (rejecting strict limitation on fee awards in civil rights litigation). ¶17 Another consequence of the State’s argument, if accepted, would be to curtail public interest litigation where individuals band together and retain contingent fee counsel to pursue contract-related injunctive and declaratory relief, but have no money damages. | 1 | 1 |
Lisa v. Stromgreen2 sentences2016It need not equal or relate to the attorney fees actually paid or contracted, but the award may not exceed the amount paid or agreed to be paid. 2 Neither FICA nor FIE appear to dispute that another Farmers entity paid at least a portion of the fees. 4 CHASAN v. FARMERS Decision of the Court 341.01(B)”); see also Journal-Minter Publ’g Co. v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280 , 282–83 (1927) (explaining that when services are rendered to a client, the obligation to pay for those services arises regardless of whether a written agreement exists). ¶13 Chasan cites Lisa v. Strom, 183 Ariz. 415 (App. 1995), to s 2016It need not equal or relate to the attorney fees actually paid or contracted, but the award may not exceed the amount paid or agreed to be paid. 2 Neither FICA nor FIE appear to dispute that another Farmers entity paid at least a portion of the fees. 4 CHASAN v. FARMERS Decision of the Court 341.01(B)”); see also Journal-Minter Publ’g Co. v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280 , 282–83 (1927) (explaining that when services are rendered to a client, the obligation to pay for those services arises regardless of whether a written agreement exists). ¶13 Chasan cites Lisa v. Strom, 183 Ariz. 415 (App. 1995), to s | 1 | 1 |
Chaurasia v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2016Motors Corp., 212 Ariz. 18, ¶ 43 , 126 P.3d 165, 176 (App.2006). 2016Motors Corp., 212 Ariz. 18, ¶ 43 , 126 P.3d 165, 176 (App.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Journal-Miner Publishing Co. v. Curleygreen2 sentences2016It need not equal or relate to the attorney fees actually paid or contracted, but the award may not exceed the amount paid or agreed to be paid. 2 Neither FICA nor FIE appear to dispute that another Farmers entity paid at least a portion of the fees. 4 CHASAN v. FARMERS Decision of the Court 341.01(B)”); see also Journal-Minter Publ’g Co. v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280 , 282–83 (1927) (explaining that when services are rendered to a client, the obligation to pay for those services arises regardless of whether a written agreement exists). ¶13 Chasan cites Lisa v. Strom, 183 Ariz. 415 (App. 1995), to s 2016It need not equal or relate to the attorney fees actually paid or contracted, but the award may not exceed the amount paid or agreed to be paid. 2 Neither FICA nor FIE appear to dispute that another Farmers entity paid at least a portion of the fees. 4 CHASAN v. FARMERS Decision of the Court 341.01(B)”); see also Journal-Minter Publ’g Co. v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280 , 282–83 (1927) (explaining that when services are rendered to a client, the obligation to pay for those services arises regardless of whether a written agreement exists). ¶13 Chasan cites Lisa v. Strom, 183 Ariz. 415 (App. 1995), to s | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Murphy Farrell Development, LLLP v. Sourant
green
2 sentences2025Indeed, only “when a case ‘involve[s] multiple claims and varied success’ and the ‘net judgment rule’ is inapplicable” should the superior court look to “a ‘percentage of success’ factor or a ‘totality of the litigation’ rubric to determine which party prevailed.” Sourant, 229 Ariz. at 134 ¶ 36 (emphasis added; citing cases); accord Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551 , 562 ¶ 40 (App. 2012) (quoting Sourant; stating that “[b]ecause each side recovered less than the amounts sought, we conclude the net judgment rule is applicable”). ¶31 Recognizing the primacy of the “net judgment rule” in 2025Indeed, only “when a case ‘involve[s] multiple claims and varied success’ and the ‘net judgment rule’ is inapplicable” should the superior court look to “a ‘percentage of success’ factor or a ‘totality of the litigation’ rubric to determine which party prevailed.” Sourant, 229 Ariz. at 134 ¶ 36 (emphasis added; citing cases); accord Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551 , 562 ¶ 40 (App. 2012) (quoting Sourant; stating that “[b]ecause each side recovered less than the amounts sought, we conclude the net judgment rule is applicable”). ¶31 Recognizing the primacy of the “net judgment rule” in | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Hall v. READ DEVELOPMENT, INC.
green
2 sentences2017As the court in Hall pointed out, “[t]he purposes of § 12-341.01(A) include: (1) mitigating ‘the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense’; (2) encouraging ‘more careful analysis prior to filing suit’ by imposing the risk of paying the opposing party’s attorneys’ fees where legitimate settlement offers are rejected; and (3) promoting settlement and thus reducing caseloads involving contractual matters.” Hall, 229 Ariz. at 282 ¶ 18, 274 P.3d at 1216 . 2017As the court in Hall pointed out, “[t]he purposes of § 12-341.01(A) include: (1) mitigating ‘the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense’; (2) encouraging ‘more careful analysis prior to filing suit’ by imposing the risk of paying the opposing party’s attorneys’ fees where legitimate settlement offers are rejected; and (3) promoting settlement and thus reducing caseloads involving contractual matters.” Hall, 229 Ariz. at 282 ¶ 18, 274 P.3d at 1216 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
American Continental Insurance v. American Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1996As Division Two noted, such a result would give the insurer an incentive "to avoid paying a just claim in hopes that the claimant will obtain payment from the co-[insurer]." Id. (quoting California Food Serv. 1996As Division Two noted, such a result would give the insurer an incentive “to avoid paying a just claim in hopes that the claimant will obtain payment from the co-[insurer].” Id. (quoting California Food Serv. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Shirley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1986Co., 125 Ariz. at 71 , 607 P.2d at 390 ; Nationwide Mutual Ins. 1986Co., 125 Ariz. at 71 , 607 P.2d at 390 ; Nationwide Mutual Ins. | 2 | 1983–1986 |
ML Servicing Co. v. Coles
green
2 sentences2019Rudinsky v. Harris , 231 Ariz. 95 , ¶ 27, 290 P.3d 1218 (App. 2012). 9 Section 12-341.01 allows attorney fees for the successful party "[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract" in order to "mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense." The phrase "arising out of a contract" in § 12-341.01 must be read broadly, and "an action is considered to have arisen out of contract when the plaintiff asserted a contract and the defendant successfully proved that no contract existed." *528 ML Servicing Co. v. Coles , 235 Ariz. 562 , ¶ 30, 334 P.3d 2019Rudinsky v. Harris , 231 Ariz. 95 , ¶ 27, 290 P.3d 1218 (App. 2012). 9 Section 12-341.01 allows attorney fees for the successful party "[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract" in order to "mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense." The phrase "arising out of a contract" in § 12-341.01 must be read broadly, and "an action is considered to have arisen out of contract when the plaintiff asserted a contract and the defendant successfully proved that no contract existed." *528 ML Servicing Co. v. Coles , 235 Ariz. 562 , ¶ 30, 334 P.3d | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences2014Such an award is consistent with the policy underlying section 12-341.01(B) to “mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense.” Rudinsky, 231 Ariz. at 101, ¶ 26 , 290 P.3d at 1224 . ¶ 36 Weighing the factors whether to award fees, Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 394 , 710 P.2d at 1049 , we conclude that an award of fees is appropriate. 2014Such an award is consistent with the policy underlying section 12-341.01(B) to “mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense.” Rudinsky, 231 Ariz. at 101, ¶ 26 , 290 P.3d at 1224 . ¶ 36 Weighing the factors whether to award fees, Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 394 , 710 P.2d at 1049 , we conclude that an award of fees is appropriate. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Amphitheater Public Schools v. Eastman
green
2 sentences1982We think the statute is broad enough — bearing in mind its stated purpose ‘to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense’ — to afford relief for a defendant where the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on the contract on which his action is based.” See also Amphitheater Public Schools v. Eastman, 117 Ariz. 559 , 574 P.2d 47 (App.1977). 1982We think the statute is broad enough — bearing in mind its stated purpose ‘to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense’ — to afford relief for a defendant where the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on the contract on which his action is based.” See also Amphitheater Public Schools v. Eastman, 117 Ariz. 559 , 574 P.2d 47 (App.1977). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Tyler County State Bank
green
1 sentence1970This maxim was well described as: “ * * * equity looks to the substance and not the shadow, to the spirit and not the letter, in a case made appropriate by the facts, * * * It seeks justice rather than technicality, truth rather than evasion, common sense rather than quibbling.” —State v. Tyler County State Bank (Tex.Com.App.) 282 S.W. 211 , on rehearing of 277 S.W. 625 It is a mathematical fact here that the tax allowance in the sum of $196,498.12, which was based on the same deficiency which compelled Van Ness to abide by his warranty, when added to the payment made by Van Ness, brings the w | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State v. Tyler County State Bank
green
1 sentence1970This maxim was well described as: “ * * * equity looks to the substance and not the shadow, to the spirit and not the letter, in a case made appropriate by the facts, * * * It seeks justice rather than technicality, truth rather than evasion, common sense rather than quibbling.” —State v. Tyler County State Bank (Tex.Com.App.) 282 S.W. 211 , on rehearing of 277 S.W. 625 It is a mathematical fact here that the tax allowance in the sum of $196,498.12, which was based on the same deficiency which compelled Van Ness to abide by his warranty, when added to the payment made by Van Ness, brings the w | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Merryweather v. Pendleton
green
2 sentences1970It will do this not only to sustain a just claim but to defeat an unlawful demand.’ ” See also Merryweather v. Pendleton, 91 Ariz. 334 , 372 P.2d 335 . 1970It will do this not only to sustain a just claim but to defeat an unlawful demand.’ ” See also Merryweather v. Pendleton, 91 Ariz. 334 , 372 P.2d 335 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Harper v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence1966An Illinois appellate court has expressed this distinction as follows: “Appellees rely upon Harper v. Industrial Commission, 24 I11.2d 103, 107, 180 N.E.2d 480 (1962), a workman’s compensation case which allowed recovery for a death benefit where a compensable industrial injury was followed by a suicide. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Butane Corporation v. Kirby
green
2 sentences1959We believe the just test to be: What would an ordinary prudent person have done under the circumstances as they then appeared to exist? * * *” Our rejection of the rule was made explicit in Butane Corporation v. Kirby, 66 Ariz. 272 , 187 P.2d 325 . 1959We believe the just test to be: What would an ordinary prudent person have done under the circumstances as they then appeared to exist? * * *” Our rejection of the rule was made explicit in Butane Corporation v. Kirby, 66 Ariz. 272 , 187 P.2d 325 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Murphy v. Hawthorne
green
2 sentences1946Murphy v. Hawthorne, 117 Or. 319 , 244 P. 79 , 44 A.L.R. 1397 , and annotation at page 1403 under title of “Driving automobile at a speed which prevents stopping within length of vision as negligence.” We are thoroughly satisfied that the facts are that defendant was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct; that the accident would not have occurred but for such conduct; and that the plaintiff’s want of due care, if any, did not directly and proximately contribute to his injuries, and at most was a remote cause. 1946Murphy v. Hawthorne, 117 Or. 319 , 244 P. 79 , 44 A.L.R. 1397 , and annotation at page 1403 under title of “Driving automobile at a speed which prevents stopping within length of vision as negligence.” We are thoroughly satisfied that the facts are that defendant was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct; that the accident would not have occurred but for such conduct; and that the plaintiff’s want of due care, if any, did not directly and proximately contribute to his injuries, and at most was a remote cause. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Johnson v. Wright
green
2 sentences1939J In Johnson v. Wright, 20 Ariz. 255 , 179 Pac. 958 , and in Pacheco v. Delgardo, 46 Ariz. 401 , 52 Pac. (2d) 479 , 103 A. L. 1939J In Johnson v. Wright, 20 Ariz. 255 , 179 Pac. 958 , and in Pacheco v. Delgardo, 46 Ariz. 401 , 52 Pac. (2d) 479 , 103 A. L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Pacheco v. Delgardo
green
2 sentences1939J In Johnson v. Wright, 20 Ariz. 255 , 179 Pac. 958 , and in Pacheco v. Delgardo, 46 Ariz. 401 , 52 Pac. (2d) 479 , 103 A. L. 1939J In Johnson v. Wright, 20 Ariz. 255 , 179 Pac. 958 , and in Pacheco v. Delgardo, 46 Ariz. 401 , 52 Pac. (2d) 479 , 103 A. L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Welsch v. Charles Frusch Light & Power Co.
neutral
1 sentence1925Although such inside wiring and appliances were defective, this would not excuse the company for injuries arising from its sending into the house a dangerous current of electricity, and without which the defects in the inside wiring and apparatus would have been harmless.” In Welsch v. Frusch Light & Power Co., 197 Iowa, 1012 , 193 N. W. 427 , appears the following language: “While no court goes to the extent of holding that an electric company is an insurer of its patrons or others against all danger of accident or injury from *146 its operations, they all agree that it is bound to a very hig | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Smith's Administratrix v. Middlesboro Electric Co.
green
1 sentence1925Cas. 1917A, 1164, 174 S. W. 773 , the court says, discussing the duty of an electric light company: “The just rule seems to be that the electric light company should not be responsible for injuries received by persons arising solely from the defects in the wiring and appliances used for electric lighting purposes within their own houses, and which are owned by them, and over which they have entire control. . . . | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Oates v. National Bank green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.