just rule in Washington

1955We said in In re Quick's Estate, 33 Wn. (2d) 568, 573, 206 P. (2d) 489 (1949), that "It is a well-settled and just rule that the law favors the early vesting of estates." [4] And in Horton v. Board of Education of the Methodist Protestant Church, 32 Wn. (2d) 99, 109, 201 P. (2d) 163 (1948), we said: "In construing a will, the supreme purpose is to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, and that should be ascertained whenever possible from the language of the will itself, unaided by extrinsic facts." See, also, Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253 , 227 Pac. 6 (1924).

1955We said in In re Quick's Estate, 33 Wn. (2d) 568, 573, 206 P. (2d) 489 (1949), that "It is a well-settled and just rule that the law favors the early vesting of estates." [4] And in Horton v. Board of Education of the Methodist Protestant Church, 32 Wn. (2d) 99, 109, 201 P. (2d) 163 (1948), we said: "In construing a will, the supreme purpose is to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, and that should be ascertained whenever possible from the language of the will itself, unaided by extrinsic facts." See, also, Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253 , 227 Pac. 6 (1924).

1955We said in In re Quick’s Estate, 33 Wn. (2d) 568, 573, 206 P. (2d) 489 (1949), that “It is a well-settled and just rule that the law favors the early vesting of estates.” And in Horton v. Board of Education of the Methodist Protestant Church, 32 Wn. (2d) 99, 109, 201 P. (2d) 163 (1948), we said: “In construing a will, the supreme purpose is to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, and that should be ascertained whenever possible from the language of the will itself, unaided by extrinsic facts.” See, also, Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253 , 227 Pac. 6 (1924).

1955We said in In re Quick's Estate, 33 Wn. (2d) 568, 573, 206 P. (2d) 489 (1949), that "It is a well-settled and just rule that the law favors the early vesting of estates." [4] And in Horton v. Board of Education of the Methodist Protestant Church, 32 Wn. (2d) 99, 109, 201 P. (2d) 163 (1948), we said: "In construing a will, the supreme purpose is to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, and that should be ascertained whenever possible from the language of the will itself, unaided by extrinsic facts." See, also, Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253 , 227 Pac. 6 (1924).

1955We said in In re Quick’s Estate, 33 Wn. (2d) 568, 573, 206 P. (2d) 489 (1949), that “It is a well-settled and just rule that the law favors the early vesting of estates.” And in Horton v. Board of Education of the Methodist Protestant Church, 32 Wn. (2d) 99, 109, 201 P. (2d) 163 (1948), we said: “In construing a will, the supreme purpose is to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, and that should be ascertained whenever possible from the language of the will itself, unaided by extrinsic facts.” See, also, Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253 , 227 Pac. 6 (1924).

1955We said in In re Quick's Estate, 33 Wn. (2d) 568, 573, 206 P. (2d) 489 (1949), that "It is a well-settled and just rule that the law favors the early vesting of estates." [4] And in Horton v. Board of Education of the Methodist Protestant Church, 32 Wn. (2d) 99, 109, 201 P. (2d) 163 (1948), we said: "In construing a will, the supreme purpose is to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, and that should be ascertained whenever possible from the language of the will itself, unaided by extrinsic facts." See, also, Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253 , 227 Pac. 6 (1924).

1973Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wn.2d 143 , 437 P.2d 908 , 449 P.2d 800 , 450 P.2d 815 (1968-69).

1973Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wn.2d 143 , 437 P.2d 908 , 449 P.2d 800 , 450 P.2d 815 (1968-69).

1951App. 43 , 69 S. W. 246 ) as saying: “ ‘In Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Texas Civil Appeals, 315, Justice Head, in his discussion of the principles under which the putative wife acting in good faith might have her just *568 rights secured, to her, entered into a thorough review of the authorities and held that the tendency of our courts, as evidenced by the decisions involving kindred questions, justified the conclusion that she should be treated as a partner as to all property shown to have been acquired by their joint efforts’ and then said, “That is the just rule, and is the one applied by the lower

1951App. 43 , 69 S. W. 246 ) as saying: “ ‘In Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Texas Civil Appeals, 315, Justice Head, in his discussion of the principles under which the putative wife acting in good faith might have her just *568 rights secured, to her, entered into a thorough review of the authorities and held that the tendency of our courts, as evidenced by the decisions involving kindred questions, justified the conclusion that she should be treated as a partner as to all property shown to have been acquired by their joint efforts’ and then said, “That is the just rule, and is the one applied by the lower

1951App. 43 , 69 S. W. 246 ) as saying: “ ‘In Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Texas Civil Appeals, 315, Justice Head, in his discussion of the principles under which the putative wife acting in good faith might have her just *568 rights secured, to her, entered into a thorough review of the authorities and held that the tendency of our courts, as evidenced by the decisions involving kindred questions, justified the conclusion that she should be treated as a partner as to all property shown to have been acquired by their joint efforts’ and then said, “That is the just rule, and is the one applied by the lower

1938It may be that a strict application of the statute in some cases will operate to defeat a just claim, but that is not a sufficient reason for attempting to remove those cases from the operation of the statute.” In Farrell v. Mentzer, 102 Wash. 629 , 174 Pac. 482 , we observed that a great deal of the confusion in the *609 classification of trusts arises from the fact that some courts mistakenly hold that the breach of a contract constitutes fraud, and thereby attempt to convert the breach of an express contract which would raise an-express into a constructive trust created by fraud.

1938It may be that a strict application of the statute in some cases will operate to defeat a just claim, but that is not a sufficient reason for attempting to remove those cases from the operation of the statute.” In Farrell v. Mentzer, 102 Wash. 629 , 174 Pac. 482 , we observed that a great deal of the confusion in the *609 classification of trusts arises from the fact that some courts mistakenly hold that the breach of a contract constitutes fraud, and thereby attempt to convert the breach of an express contract which would raise an-express into a constructive trust created by fraud.

1917And this, in our opinion, is a just rule, for while it is true that a party who has the custody of a written instrument should be held to a reasonably strict care of it, and care should be taken to prevent him from declaring on an altered instrument, and then simply curing it if the fraud be discovered, yet more abuses, in our judgment, would occur if, by the spoliation of an instrument by a stranger, the party entitled to it should thereby be deprived of his relief.” The reason for the rule is nowhere better stated than in Bigelow v. Stilphen, supra: “Clearly, it is not just that a man should