just claim in New York

1937It was said in Matter of Weston ( 91 N. Y. 502 ) that ' Where no modifying facts are shown to shorten or lengthen the reasonable time, the period of eighteen months may serve as a just standard,’ although it was also held that ‘ While such period furnishes a convenient guide where no special circumstances exist, it must, after all, not be taken as a fixed or arbitrary standard.’ ” Again, in Matter of Kohler ( 231 N. Y. 353, at p. 365 ) it is written “ The duties of executors, as the personal representatives named by a deceased in his will and appointed as such by the court, are primarily and g

1934Surrogate Delehanty, in Matter of Beadleston ( 146 Misc. 548, 550 ), said that “ whatever may be said in retrospect of the judgment of these executors in retaining speculative securities for a period of over two years, and in a generally declining market, it is also a matter of common knowledge that scores of individuals of wide business experience have dealt with their own securities in precisely the same way.” In Matter of Weston ( 91 N. Y. 502, 511 ) the court said: “ Where no modifying facts are shown to shorten or lengthen the reasonable time [meaning the time in which to sell securities]

1983A just claim for damages for a serious injury should not be forfeited for failure to give notice where the basic purpose of the statute is not offended and where no substantial prejudice exists (Matter of Ziecker v Town of Orchard Park, 70 AD2d 422,427-428 , affd 51 NY2d 957 ).

1980This court has consistently ruled that a just claim for damages should not be forfeited for failure to give notice where the basic purpose of the statute is not offended and where no substantial prejudice exists (Matter of Ziecker v Town of Orchard Park, 70 AD2d 422, 427-428 ; Matter of Wemett v County of Onondaga, 64 AD2d 1025 ).

1980This court has consistently ruled that a just claim for damages should not be forfeited for failure to give notice where the basic purpose of the statute is not offended and where no substantial prejudice exists (Matter of Ziecker v Town of Orchard Park, 70 AD2d 422, 427-428 ; Matter of Wemett v County of Onondaga, 64 AD2d 1025 ).

1979This court has consistently ruled that a just claim for damages for . a serious injury should not be forfeited for failure to give notice where the basic purpose of the statute is not offended and where no substantial prejudice exists (Matter of Wemett v County of Onondaga, 64 AD2d 1025 ).

1908All that the court in that case held was that neither of these corporations was a religious corporation, and in that case, as well as in the case of Matter of Huntington, 168 N. Y. 399 , 61 N. E. 643 , the Court of Appeals expresses its conviction that such corporations had been overlooked in the codification of the statutes relating to taxable transfers, and indulges in the hope that the inequities and inconsistencies of the latter might give way to a more liberal and just rule.

1908All that the court in that case held was that neither of these corporations was a religious corporation, and in that case, as well as in the case of Matter of Huntington, 168 N. Y. 399 , 61 N. E. 643 , the Court of Appeals expresses its conviction that such corporations had been overlooked in the codification of the statutes relating to taxable transfers, and indulges in the hope that the inequities and inconsistencies of the latter might give way to a more liberal and just rule.

1894Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153 .

1894Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153 .

1888The statute was so construed in Baucus v. Stover, 89 N. Y. 1 .

1888The statute was so construed in Barcus v. Stover, 89 N. Y. 1 .

1874If the plaintiff has not commenced the action within a reasonable time, then he should be limited to the value at the time of conversion, with interest; but it may be questioned how far the rule of the increased value at the time of trial can be applied in this State, since the decision of the Court of Appeals in Scott v. Rogers ( 31 N. Y. 676 ), which will be hereafter referred to.

1874Suydam v. Jenkins, 3 Sandf. 614 ; Scott v. Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676 ; Matthews v. Coe, 49 id. 57; Baker v. Drake, 53 id. 211, 219.

2005The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” (Railroad Telegraphers v Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US 342, 348-349 [1944].) Under Appellate Division case law, joinder is greatly disfavored where the statute of limitations has expired (see Matter of Mount Pleasant Cottage School Union Free School Dist. v Sobol, 163 AD2d 715, 716 [1990], affd for reasons stated below 78 NY2d 935 [1991]; see also

1983(Thompson v Taylor, 72 NY 32, 34 ; see, also, Leghorn v Ross, 53 AD2d 560 , affd 42 NY2d 1043 .) Concur — Murphy, P. J., Ross, Carro, Silverman and Fein, JJ.

1983A just claim for damages for a serious injury should not be forfeited for failure to give notice where the basic purpose of the statute is not offended and where no substantial prejudice exists (Matter of Ziecker v Town of Orchard Park, 70 AD2d 422,427-428 , affd 51 NY2d 957 ).

1982I think a more just rule for cases involving errors or omissions in the charge with respect to the presumption of innocence is that which the United States Supreme Court has adopted for such cases, i.e., that even “the failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution * * * [Sjuch a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances — including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors — to determine whet

1982(Cf. Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501 .) In People v Thomas ( 50 NY2d 467, 473 ), the Court of Appeals said with respect to a claim of constitutional error: “The Supreme Court has recently indicated that when the defendant claims, for the first time on appeal, that the court’s charge erroneously shifted the burden of proof, the State courts are free to enforce ‘the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ (Hankerson v North Carolina, 432 US 233, 244, n 8 ).” Errors or omissions in a charge as to the presumption of innocence are merely

1982(Cf. Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501 .) In People v Thomas ( 50 NY2d 467, 473 ), the Court of Appeals said with respect to a claim of constitutional error: “The Supreme Court has recently indicated that when the defendant claims, for the first time on appeal, that the court’s charge erroneously shifted the burden of proof, the State courts are free to enforce ‘the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ (Hankerson v North Carolina, 432 US 233, 244, n 8 ).” Errors or omissions in a charge as to the presumption of innocence are merely

1976Co. v Yung Hsing Trading Corp., 238 App Div 264, 265 .) In the situation of service on an agent of a foreign corporation, Judge Cardozo said: "If the persons named are true agents, and if their positions are such as to lead to a just presumption that notice to them will be notice to the principal, the corporation must submit” (Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 NY 259, 269 ).

1964Accordingly, a cause of action on plaintiff’s part, against either or both defendants, exists (Daniel-Morris Co. v. Glens Falls Ind. Co., 308 N. Y. 464, 469 ; New York Plumbers Specialties Co. v. Columbia Cas.

1959Co., 246 N. Y. 519 .) Moreover, while the court cannot make a new contract for the parties, the courts of this State are the leading exponents of the just doctrine that ‘ ‘ in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” (Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N. Y. 79, 87 ) and that ‘ ‘ A contract includes not only what the parties said but also what is necessarily to be implied from what they said. ’ ’ (Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 469 ; Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88 .) Accordingly, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff restraining t

1959Co., 246 N. Y. 519 .) Moreover, while the court cannot make a new contract for the parties, the courts of this State are the leading exponents of the just doctrine that ‘ ‘ in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” (Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N. Y. 79, 87 ) and that ‘ ‘ A contract includes not only what the parties said but also what is necessarily to be implied from what they said. ’ ’ (Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 469 ; Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88 .) Accordingly, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff restraining t