just defense in Connecticut

2024The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 5 The petitioner initially proceeded at trial on the original petition, but the court later permitted him to amend the petition in part to conform with the evidence that had thus far been presented at trial. 6 General Statutes § 53-21 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person who . . . (2) has contact with the intimate parts . . . of a child under the

2024The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 5 The petitioner initially proceeded at trial on the original petition, but the court later permitted him to amend the petition in part to conform with the evidence that had thus far been presented at trial. 6 General Statutes § 53-21 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person who . . . (2) has contact with the intimate parts . . . of a child under the

2022Co., 282 Conn. 594 , 601–603, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007) (discussing public policy exception to claim preclusion); we conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred.

2022Co., 282 Conn. 594 , 601–603, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007) (discussing public policy exception to claim preclusion); we conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred.

2017"The want of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend is ground for a new trial only when the movant also establishes that a just defense in whole or in part existed ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (84-1) , 1 Conn.App. 298 , 301, 471 A.2d 662 (1984). "[A] motion for a new trial will not be granted ... on the ground of lack of opportunity to defend unless a good defense existed." Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick , 190 Conn. 707 , 712, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983).

2017"The want of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend is ground for a new trial only when the movant also establishes that a just defense in whole or in part existed ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (84-1) , 1 Conn.App. 298 , 301, 471 A.2d 662 (1984). "[A] motion for a new trial will not be granted ... on the ground of lack of opportunity to defend unless a good defense existed." Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick , 190 Conn. 707 , 712, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983).

2016Third, the plaintiff argues that the remedy provided by § 12-119is "cumulative and not exclusive of equitable remedies, and a party may elect to proceed under either or both." On the contrary, "as [§ 12-119] was clearly intended to take the place of the remedy in equity based on an overvaluation of the property and as all the relief can be obtained under it which could be afforded by equity, it precludes a resort to equity generally in such a case as the one before us." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norwich v. Lebanon , 200 Conn. 697 , 706, 513 A.2d 77 (1986); see also Crystal Lake Clean

2016Third, the plaintiff argues that the remedy provided by § 12-119is "cumulative and not exclusive of equitable remedies, and a party may elect to proceed under either or both." On the contrary, "as [§ 12-119] was clearly intended to take the place of the remedy in equity based on an overvaluation of the property and as all the relief can be obtained under it which could be afforded by equity, it precludes a resort to equity generally in such a case as the one before us." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norwich v. Lebanon , 200 Conn. 697 , 706, 513 A.2d 77 (1986); see also Crystal Lake Clean

2015The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 3 The plaintiffs also briefed a third claim, arguing that ‘‘Savalle v. Hilzinger, 123 Conn. App. 174 [ 1 A.3d 1098 ] (2010), was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled.’’ In support of this claim, the plaintiffs state that they are ‘‘certainly aware that a request to overrule a prior appellate decision is unusual.’’ The plaintiffs’ position, howev

2015The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 3 The plaintiffs also briefed a third claim, arguing that ‘‘Savalle v. Hilzinger, 123 Conn. App. 174 [ 1 A.3d 1098 ] (2010), was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled.’’ In support of this claim, the plaintiffs state that they are ‘‘certainly aware that a request to overrule a prior appellate decision is unusual.’’ The plaintiffs’ position, howev

2015The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 3 The plaintiffs also briefed a third claim, arguing that ‘‘Savalle v. Hilzinger, 123 Conn. App. 174 [ 1 A.3d 1098 ] (2010), was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled.’’ In support of this claim, the plaintiffs state that they are ‘‘certainly aware that a request to overrule a prior appellate decision is unusual.’’ The plaintiffs’ position, howev

2015The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 3 The plaintiffs also briefed a third claim, arguing that ‘‘Savalle v. Hilzinger, 123 Conn. App. 174 [ 1 A.3d 1098 ] (2010), was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled.’’ In support of this claim, the plaintiffs state that they are ‘‘certainly aware that a request to overrule a prior appellate decision is unusual.’’ The plaintiffs’ position, howev

2015The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 3 The plaintiffs also briefed a third claim, arguing that ‘‘Savalle v. Hilzinger, 123 Conn. App. 174 [ 1 A.3d 1098 ] (2010), was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled.’’ In support of this claim, the plaintiffs state that they are ‘‘certainly aware that a request to overrule a prior appellate decision is unusual.’’ The plaintiffs’ position, howev

2015The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.’’ 3 The plaintiffs also briefed a third claim, arguing that ‘‘Savalle v. Hilzinger, 123 Conn. App. 174 [ 1 A.3d 1098 ] (2010), was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled.’’ In support of this claim, the plaintiffs state that they are ‘‘certainly aware that a request to overrule a prior appellate decision is unusual.’’ The plaintiffs’ position, howev

2014Section 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘The statute applies to criminal as well as civil actions.’’ Thomas v. State, 130 Conn. App. 533, 544 , 24 A.3d 12 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 945 , 30 A.3d 2 (2011). ‘‘Pursuant to § 52-270, a [party] may petition the Supe- rior Court for a new

2014Section 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘The statute applies to criminal as well as civil actions.’’ Thomas v. State, 130 Conn. App. 533, 544 , 24 A.3d 12 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 945 , 30 A.3d 2 (2011). ‘‘Pursuant to § 52-270, a [party] may petition the Supe- rior Court for a new

2014Section 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘The statute applies to criminal as well as civil actions.’’ Thomas v. State, 130 Conn. App. 533, 544 , 24 A.3d 12 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 945 , 30 A.3d 2 (2011). ‘‘Pursuant to § 52-270, a [party] may petition the Supe- rior Court for a new

2014Section 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘The statute applies to criminal as well as civil actions.’’ Thomas v. State, 130 Conn. App. 533, 544 , 24 A.3d 12 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 945 , 30 A.3d 2 (2011). ‘‘Pursuant to § 52-270, a [party] may petition the Supe- rior Court for a new

2010The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.” Under Practice Book § 42-55, “[t]he judicial authority may grant the petition even though an appeal is pending.” The petitioner, who was fifteen years old at the time of the murder but thirty-nine years old at the time of his arrest, raised the following claims in his appeal from the judgment of conviction, each of which we rejected: “(1) his case improp

2010The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action.” Under Practice Book § 42-55, “[t]he judicial authority may grant the petition even though an appeal is pending.” The petitioner, who was fifteen years old at the time of the murder but thirty-nine years old at the time of his arrest, raised the following claims in his appeal from the judgment of conviction, each of which we rejected: “(1) his case improp

2007"In some [states] it is said that where there is no obtainable evidence as to due care on the part of the injured party by reason of his death, a presumption of due care is raised from the natural instinct of self-preservation, and the reason for the rule is said to lie in the injustice of the common-law rule. . . . [W]e have no statutory provision . . . to enforce the obviously just requirement that the burden of proof in this particular class of cases, be put in effect upon the defendant." (Citations omitted.) Id., at 89-90 , 151 A. 433 .

2007"In some [states] it is said that where there is no obtainable evidence as to due care on the part of the injured party by reason of his death, a presumption of due care is raised from the natural instinct of self-preservation, and the reason for the rule is said to lie in the injustice of the common-law rule. . . . [W]e have no statutory provision . . . to enforce the obviously just requirement that the burden of proof in this particular class of cases, be put in effect upon the defendant." (Citations omitted.) Id., at 89-90 , 151 A. 433 .

2007The dissent stated: "To permit the `hit and run driver,' under the circumstances present in this case, to escape civil liability for his wrong because the dead cannot speak is to give him the protection of a rule of law, that the plaintiff to recover must prove that the decedent's own negligence did not materially contribute to her death, which his own conduct has made inapplicable, and a rule which in any relation of life under like circumstances would be repudiated as unjust and inhuman." Id., at 100 , 151 A. 433 ( Wheeler, C.J., dissenting). [7] In 1931, our legislature enacted the predeces

2007The dissent stated: "To permit the `hit and run driver,' under the circumstances present in this case, to escape civil liability for his wrong because the dead cannot speak is to give him the protection of a rule of law, that the plaintiff to recover must prove that the decedent's own negligence did not materially contribute to her death, which his own conduct has made inapplicable, and a rule which in any relation of life under like circumstances would be repudiated as unjust and inhuman." Id., at 100 , 151 A. 433 ( Wheeler, C.J., dissenting). [7] In 1931, our legislature enacted the predeces

2006The fundamental purpose and effect of criminal statutes of limitation are the same as civil statutes of limitation; as the United States Supreme Court has stated in noting the similarities between such statutes, they both “represent a legislative judgment about the balance of equities in a situation involving the tardy assertion of otherwise valid rights: [t]he theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute the

2006The fundamental purpose and effect of criminal statutes of limitation are the same as civil statutes of limitation; as the United States Supreme Court has stated in noting the similarities between such statutes, they both “represent a legislative judgment about the balance of equities in a situation involving the tardy assertion of otherwise valid rights: [t]he theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute the

2004Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Rodriquez, 83 Conn. App. 251 , 257 n.9, 849 A.2d 886 (2004).

2004Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Rodriquez, 83 Conn. App. 251 , 257 n.9, 849 A.2d 886 (2004).

2003The just rule of compensation will give compensation for the period of total incapacity as well as for the loss of the member.” Franko v. Schollhorn Co., 93 Conn. 13, 19 , 104 A. 485 (1918).

2003The just rule of compensation will give compensation for the period of total incapacity as well as for the loss of the member.” Franko v. Schollhorn Co., 93 Conn. 13, 19 , 104 A. 485 (1918).

2002General Statutes § 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. . . .” “We can su

2002General Statutes § 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. . . .” “We can su

2002General Statutes § 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. . . .” “We can su

2002General Statutes § 52-270 (a) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. . . .” “We can su

2000In effect, he thumbed his nose at this court and acted as if he were immune from the exercise of its powers.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court, however, then noted that there was a third “criterion” under § 52-270, that of “other reasonable cause.” Citing Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 565 , 522 A.2d 288 (1987), it opined that the basic test of “reasonable cause” was “whether or not the litigant had been deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard and that an injustice will occur if a new trial is not allowed,” and, quoting Black v. Universal C.I.T.

2000In effect, he thumbed his nose at this court and acted as if he were immune from the exercise of its powers.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court, however, then noted that there was a third “criterion” under § 52-270, that of “other reasonable cause.” Citing Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 565 , 522 A.2d 288 (1987), it opined that the basic test of “reasonable cause” was “whether or not the litigant had been deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard and that an injustice will occur if a new trial is not allowed,” and, quoting Black v. Universal C.I.T.

2000Connecticut General Statutes § 52-570 , provides: "The superior court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or in part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to CT Page 4584 prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause according to the usual rules in such cases." This sta

1999(See Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB v. Barbara A. Whiting 47 Conn. App. 910 (1997); petition cert. denied Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB v. Barbara A. Whiting 243 Conn. 962 (1998).) Section 52-270 (a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which is the statute upon which this petition is brought, provides as follows: The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part ex

1999(See Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB v. Barbara A. Whiting 47 Conn. App. 910 (1997); petition cert. denied Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB v. Barbara A. Whiting 243 Conn. 962 (1998).) Section 52-270 (a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which is the statute upon which this petition is brought, provides as follows: The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part ex

1998State v. Sawyer, [ 95 Conn. 34, 39 , 110 A. 461 (1920)].” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 373-75 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994).

1998State v. Sawyer, [ 95 Conn. 34, 39 , 110 A. 461 (1920)].” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 373-75 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994).

1998State v. Sawyer, [ 95 Conn. 34, 39 , 110 A. 461 (1920)].” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 373-75 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994).

1998State v. Sawyer, [ 95 Conn. 34, 39 , 110 A. 461 (1920)].” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 373-75 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994).