just rule in Michigan

2020It is also worth noting, in this regard, that the taxpayers would be free to conduct a private sale of the property during the redemption period prior to title vesting in the government and, by failing to do so, might be considered to have agreed to the value produced by the tax- foreclosure sale.86 83 See note 52 of this opinion. 84 See State Theft, 54 Real Prop Tr & Est L J at 126 (noting that limiting the taxpayer to the surplus might cause him or her to lose some equity but arguing that this result might be consistent with the “just compensation” requirement). 85 See United States v Commod

2020It is also worth noting, in this regard, that the taxpayers would be free to conduct a private sale of the property during the redemption period prior to title vesting in the government and, by failing to do so, might be considered to have agreed to the value produced by the tax- foreclosure sale.86 83 See note 52 of this opinion. 84 See State Theft, 54 Real Prop Tr & Est L J at 126 (noting that limiting the taxpayer to the surplus might cause him or her to lose some equity but arguing that this result might be consistent with the “just compensation” requirement). 85 See United States v Commod

1954It will do this' not only .to sustain a just claim, but to- defeat an unlawful demand.’ :. ' “In Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Building Securities Corp., 280 Mich 144, 156 , we said: “ ‘The intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made, as gathered from the entire instrument, controls despite literal terms in derogation of the interior sense of the transaction.’ ” Foster v. Ypsilanti Savings Bank, 299 Mich 258, 268, 269 .

1941It will do this not only to sustain a just claim, hut to defeat an unlawful demand. ’ ’ In Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Building Securities Corp., 280 Mich. 144, 156 , we said: “The intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made, as gathered from the entire instrument, controls despite literal terms in derogation of the interior sense of the transaction.” Maladministration of this trust by the bank is claimed by plaintiffs incident to the following transaction.

1915In other words, we think the only just rule which can be laid down, upon this point is that such a bill must be brought within a reasonable time, having reference to the nature and all the circumstances of the particular case." See, also, Harlow v. Iron Co., 41 Mich. 583 ( 2 N. W. 913 ); Birdsall v. Johnson, 44 Mich. 134 ( 6 N. W. 226 ); Douglass v. Douglass, 72 Mich. 86 ( 40 N. W. 177 ); and Corby v. Trombley, 110 Mich. 292 ( 68 N. W. 139 ).

1915In other words, we think the only just rule which can be laid down, upon this point is that such a bill must be brought within a reasonable time, having reference to the nature and all the circumstances of the particular case." See, also, Harlow v. Iron Co., 41 Mich. 583 ( 2 N. W. 913 ); Birdsall v. Johnson, 44 Mich. 134 ( 6 N. W. 226 ); Douglass v. Douglass, 72 Mich. 86 ( 40 N. W. 177 ); and Corby v. Trombley, 110 Mich. 292 ( 68 N. W. 139 ).

1915In other words, we think the only just rule which, can be laid down upon this point is that such a bill must be brought within a reasonable time; having reference to the nature and all the circumstances of the particular case.” The language in this case was cited with approval in the case of Corby v. Trombley, 110 Mich. 292 ( 68 N. W. 139 ), where the delay by an heir for nearly 20 years after learning of the probate of a will was held to constitute such laches as to prevent him from maintaining a suit to set aside the will on the ground that the testator was not competent to make it and that

1915In other words, we think the only just rule which, can be laid down upon this point is that such a bill must be brought within a reasonable time; having reference to the nature and all the circumstances of the particular case.” The language in this case was cited with approval in the case of Corby v. Trombley, 110 Mich. 292 ( 68 N. W. 139 ), where the delay by an heir for nearly 20 years after learning of the probate of a will was held to constitute such laches as to prevent him from maintaining a suit to set aside the will on the ground that the testator was not competent to make it and that

1909In Porter v. Steel Co., 122 U. S. 267 (7 Sup. Ct. 1206), it is said: “ It is claimed on behalf of the Smith Bridge Company, that the contracts between it and the railway company, for the construction of the bridges, provided that the bridges should remain the property of the Smith Bridge Company until the contract price for them should have been fully paid, and that, in default of such payment, the Smith Bridge Company should have the right to remove the bridges and bridge material; that the mortgages became a lien on the bridges only as the bridges became the rightful and legal property of th

1897Haven v. Emery, 33 N. H. 69; Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 278 ; Taylor v. Collins, 51 Wis. 123 ; Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Gallentine, 99 Ind. 525 ; Jenks v. Colwell, 66 Mich. 428 ; Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546 ; Ewell, Fixt. 316 et seq.; Porter v. Steel Co., 122 U. S. 267 ; Fryatt v. Sullivan Co., 5 Hill, 116 ; Hunt v. Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 .

1909In Wickes Bros. v. Hill, supra, it is said: “When, however, the vendor sells machinery which it is well understood may, and in the absence of agreement does, become part of the realty by being so attached that it cannot be removed without injury, and thereby places it in the power of his vendee to so attach it and sell or mortgage to innocent third parties, the better and more just rule is that he must suffer.” In support of this conclusion, the court cite, among other cases, Porter v. Steel Co., Hunt v. Iron Co., and Brass Foundry & Machine Works v. Gallentine, supra, which were cases where t

1897Haven v. Emery, 33 N. H. 69; Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 278 ; Taylor v. Collins, 51 Wis. 123 ; Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Gallentine, 99 Ind. 525 ; Jenks v. Colwell, 66 Mich. 428 ; Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546 ; Ewell, Fixt. 316 et seq.; Porter v. Steel Co., 122 U. S. 267 ; Fryatt v. Sullivan Co., 5 Hill, 116 ; Hunt v. Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 .

2004Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation, whether the actual trial is conducted in the form of a class action, as a joint suit, or as a principal suit with additional interveners. [ Id. at 554-555 , 94 S.Ct. 756 (citations omitted; emphasis added).] Both defendant and the trial court interpret the ruling in American Pipe to require notification of specific causes of action before the period of limitations on those claims expires.

2004Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation, whether the actual trial is conducted in the form of a class action, as a joint suit, or as a principal suit with additional interveners. [ Id. at 554-555 , 94 S.Ct. 756 (citations omitted; emphasis added).] Both defendant and the trial court interpret the ruling in American Pipe to require notification of specific causes of action before the period of limitations on those claims expires.

2002Likewise, in East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent Co Tax Allocation Bd, 415 Mich 381, 395-396 ; 330 NW2d 7 (1982), our Supreme Court echoed its earlier statement in Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v Bds of Supervisors of Five Counties, 304 Mich 328 ; 8 NW2d 84 (1943), in construing the language of Const 1963, art 9, § 3 before its amendment in 1994. “ ‘What is meant by the words ‘taxing by a uniform rule?’ And to what is the rule applied by the constitution?

2002Likewise, in East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent Co Tax Allocation Bd, 415 Mich 381, 395-396 ; 330 NW2d 7 (1982), our Supreme Court echoed its earlier statement in Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v Bds of Supervisors of Five Counties, 304 Mich 328 ; 8 NW2d 84 (1943), in construing the language of Const 1963, art 9, § 3 before its amendment in 1994. “ ‘What is meant by the words ‘taxing by a uniform rule?’ And to what is the rule applied by the constitution?

2002See also Williams v Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich 560, 570 (1853) (state constitution “enjoins a just principle of equality in regard to all public burdens, and prescribes as a limit to the exercise of the taxing power, that common burdens should be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and apportioned according to some uniform ratio of equality”) (emphasis in original); Wood v Rockwood, 328 Mich 507, 511 ; 44 NW2d 163 (1950) (recognizing that to satisfy the Uniformity of Taxation Clause, a tax must be “levied in accordance with some definite plan designed to bring

2002See also Williams v Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich 560, 570 (1853) (state constitution “enjoins a just principle of equality in regard to all public burdens, and prescribes as a limit to the exercise of the taxing power, that common burdens should be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and apportioned according to some uniform ratio of equality”) (emphasis in original); Wood v Rockwood, 328 Mich 507, 511 ; 44 NW2d 163 (1950) (recognizing that to satisfy the Uniformity of Taxation Clause, a tax must be “levied in accordance with some definite plan designed to bring

2002Likewise, in East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent Co Tax Allocation Bd, 415 Mich 381, 395-396 ; 330 NW2d 7 (1982), our Supreme Court echoed its earlier statement in Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v Bds of Supervisors of Five Counties, 304 Mich 328 ; 8 NW2d 84 (1943), in construing the language of Const 1963, art 9, § 3 before its amendment in 1994. “ ‘What is meant by the words ‘taxing by a uniform rule?’ And to what is the rule applied by the constitution?

2002Likewise, in East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent Co Tax Allocation Bd, 415 Mich 381, 395-396 ; 330 NW2d 7 (1982), our Supreme Court echoed its earlier statement in Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v Bds of Supervisors of Five Counties, 304 Mich 328 ; 8 NW2d 84 (1943), in construing the language of Const 1963, art 9, § 3 before its amendment in 1994. “ ‘What is meant by the words ‘taxing by a uniform rule?’ And to what is the rule applied by the constitution?

2002See also Williams v Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich 560, 570 (1853) (state constitution “enjoins a just principle of equality in regard to all public burdens, and prescribes as a limit to the exercise of the taxing power, that common burdens should be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and apportioned according to some uniform ratio of equality”) (emphasis in original); Wood v Rockwood, 328 Mich 507, 511 ; 44 NW2d 163 (1950) (recognizing that to satisfy the Uniformity of Taxation Clause, a tax must be “levied in accordance with some definite plan designed to bring

2002See also Williams v Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich 560, 570 (1853) (state constitution “enjoins a just principle of equality in regard to all public burdens, and prescribes as a limit to the exercise of the taxing power, that common burdens should be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and apportioned according to some uniform ratio of equality”) (emphasis in original); Wood v Rockwood, 328 Mich 507, 511 ; 44 NW2d 163 (1950) (recognizing that to satisfy the Uniformity of Taxation Clause, a tax must be “levied in accordance with some definite plan designed to bring

2002See also Williams v Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich 560, 570 (1853) (state constitution “enjoins a just principle of equality in regard to all public burdens, and prescribes as a limit to the exercise of the taxing power, that common burdens should be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and apportioned according to some uniform ratio of equality”) (emphasis in original); Wood v Rockwood, 328 Mich 507, 511 ; 44 NW2d 163 (1950) (recognizing that to satisfy the Uniformity of Taxation Clause, a tax must be “levied in accordance with some definite plan designed to bring

2002See also Williams v Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich 560, 570 (1853) (state constitution “enjoins a just principle of equality in regard to all public burdens, and prescribes as a limit to the exercise of the taxing power, that common burdens should be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and apportioned according to some uniform ratio of equality”) (emphasis in original); Wood v Rockwood, 328 Mich 507, 511 ; 44 NW2d 163 (1950) (recognizing that to satisfy the Uniformity of Taxation Clause, a tax must be “levied in accordance with some definite plan designed to bring

1993The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to he free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. [Order of It Telegraphers v Railway Express Agency, 321 US 342, 349 ; 64 S a 582; 88 L Ed 788 (1944).] Contrary to the dissent’s claim, the majority’s approach does not advocate prematurely filing suit, instead it advocates, in harmony with the statute of limitations, diligently pursuing and investigating a possible cause of action, once the plaintiff’s c

1993The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to he free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. [Order of It Telegraphers v Railway Express Agency, 321 US 342, 349 ; 64 S a 582; 88 L Ed 788 (1944).] Contrary to the dissent’s claim, the majority’s approach does not advocate prematurely filing suit, instead it advocates, in harmony with the statute of limitations, diligently pursuing and investigating a possible cause of action, once the plaintiff’s c

1980The basic rule in this area was enunciated by People v Ormsby, 310 Mich 291, 302-303 ; 17 NW2d 187 (1945): " 'The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them, upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. * * * But when the object and purpose is apparent to prosecute the respondent * * * for separate felonies by means of one information o

1980The basic rule in this area was enunciated by People v Ormsby, 310 Mich 291, 302-303 ; 17 NW2d 187 (1945): " 'The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them, upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. * * * But when the object and purpose is apparent to prosecute the respondent * * * for separate felonies by means of one information o

1963Hess v. Haas, 230 Mich 646, 652 , cited in Foster v. Ypsilanti Savings Bank, 299 Mich 258, 268 .

1954Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill App 508 ( 101 NE2d 604 ).

1953It is a proceeding calculated to promote justice, and cannot confuse or prejudice the defense of the accused.’” People v. Aikin, 66 Mich 460, 470 (11 Am St Rep 512), as quoted with approval in People v. Larco, 331 Mich 420, 428 .

1951The situation presented is well within the statement of the general principle in People v. Aikin, 66 Mich 460, 470 (11 Am St Rep 512), cited by counsel for defendant: “The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them,- upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. • It is a proceeding calculated to promote justice, and cannot confuse or pr

1951The situation presented is well within the statement of the general principle in People v. Aikin, 66 Mich 460, 470 (11 Am St Rep 512), cited by counsel for defendant: “The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them,- upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. • It is a proceeding calculated to promote justice, and cannot confuse or pr

1951The situation presented is well within the statement of the general principle in People v. Aikin, 66 Mich 460, 470 (11 Am St Rep 512), cited by counsel for defendant: “The true and only just rule as regards the joinder of counts in an information or indictment seems to be, if the different counts are drawn and used with a view to one and the same transaction, so that one of them,- upon the trial, may be found to meet the evidence, the court will not interfere with the proceeding, as such an object is a legitimate one. • It is a proceeding calculated to promote justice, and cannot confuse or pr

1945(Mo.) 808, the court said: “Where a defendant is charged in the indictment with two or more different and distinct offenses, a general verdict, without designating of which offense he is found guilty, cannot stand.” See, also, People v. Powers, 272 Mich. 303 ; People v. Marks, 255 Mich. 271 ; In re Henry Franklin, 77 Mich. 615 ; People v. McKinney, supra; Driver v. State, 112 Ga. 229 ( 37 S. E. 400 ); Whisnant v. State, 39 Okla.

1945(Mo.) 808, the court said: “Where a defendant is charged in the indictment with two or more different and distinct offenses, a general verdict, without designating of which offense he is found guilty, cannot stand.” See, also, People v. Powers, 272 Mich. 303 ; People v. Marks, 255 Mich. 271 ; In re Henry Franklin, 77 Mich. 615 ; People v. McKinney, supra; Driver v. State, 112 Ga. 229 ( 37 S. E. 400 ); Whisnant v. State, 39 Okla.

1945(Mo.) 808, the court said: “Where a defendant is charged in the indictment with two or more different and distinct offenses, a general verdict, without designating of which offense he is found guilty, cannot stand.” See, also, People v. Powers, 272 Mich. 303 ; People v. Marks, 255 Mich. 271 ; In re Henry Franklin, 77 Mich. 615 ; People v. McKinney, supra; Driver v. State, 112 Ga. 229 ( 37 S. E. 400 ); Whisnant v. State, 39 Okla.

1945(Mo.) 808, the court said: “Where a defendant is charged in the indictment with two or more different and distinct offenses, a general verdict, without designating of which offense he is found guilty, cannot stand.” See, also, People v. Powers, 272 Mich. 303 ; People v. Marks, 255 Mich. 271 ; In re Henry Franklin, 77 Mich. 615 ; People v. McKinney, supra; Driver v. State, 112 Ga. 229 ( 37 S. E. 400 ); Whisnant v. State, 39 Okla.