just rule (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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just rule in Oregon

14 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1880–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
City of Portland v. Parchengreen
or · 1925 · cited in 4 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1992–2003
2 sentences

2003“It is a substantial and just rule that courts will not hear an appeal while the appellant is fleeing from justice, and this, of itself, would be sufficient reason for dismissing this appeal.” Id. at 210 .

1996See City of Portland v. Parchen, 113 Or 209, 210 , 231 P 980 (1925) (“It is a substantial and just rule that courts will not hear an appeal while the appellant is fleeing from justice.”); State v. Broom, 121 Or 202, 206 , 253 P 1042 (1927) (“[I]n the absence of a statute regulating the procedure, it is within the discretion of the court to hear or not to hear the appeal of a prisoner who escapes pending his appeal.”).

14
State v. Broomgreen
or · 1927 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996See City of Portland v. Parchen, 113 Or 209, 210 , 231 P 980 (1925) (“It is a substantial and just rule that courts will not hear an appeal while the appellant is fleeing from justice.”); State v. Broom, 121 Or 202, 206 , 253 P 1042 (1927) (“[I]n the absence of a statute regulating the procedure, it is within the discretion of the court to hear or not to hear the appeal of a prisoner who escapes pending his appeal.”).

1996See City of Portland v. Parchen, 113 Or 209, 210 , 231 P 980 (1925) (“It is a substantial and just rule that courts will not hear an appeal while the appellant is fleeing from justice.”); State v. Broom, 121 Or 202, 206 , 253 P 1042 (1927) (“[I]n the absence of a statute regulating the procedure, it is within the discretion of the court to hear or not to hear the appeal of a prisoner who escapes pending his appeal.”).

11
Sargent v. American Bank & Trust Co.green
or · 1916 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1917–1917
2 sentences

1917That sum and $78.42, the compensation for the care of the premises, aggregating $290.57, should, therefore, he deducted from $2,614.16 leaving $2,423.57 as due the plaintiff with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the time this opinion is handed down: Baker County v. Huntington, supra; Sargent v. American Bank and Trust Co., 80 Or. 16, 39 ( 154 Pac. 759 , 156 Pac. 431 ); Hayden v. City of Astoria, ante, p. 205 ( 164 Pac. 729 ).

1917That sum and $78.42, the compensation for the care of the premises, aggregating $290.57, should, therefore, he deducted from $2,614.16 leaving $2,423.57 as due the plaintiff with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the time this opinion is handed down: Baker County v. Huntington, supra; Sargent v. American Bank and Trust Co., 80 Or. 16, 39 ( 154 Pac. 759 , 156 Pac. 431 ); Hayden v. City of Astoria, ante, p. 205 ( 164 Pac. 729 ).

11
State ex rel. Booth v. Bryangreen
or · 1894 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1917–1917
2 sentences

1917In other words, the relator must show that the respondent is actually in default in the performance of a legal duty then due at his hands, and no threats or predetermination can take the place of such default before the time arrives when the duty should be performed; nor does the law contemplate such a deg’ree of diligence as the performance of a duty not yet due. ” This court itself has spoken on the same subject in State v. Bryan, 26 Or. 502, 507 ( 38 Pac. 618 ), where Mr. Justice Wolverton writing, uses this language: “It is a just presumption that all public officers will faithfully discha

1917In other words, the relator must show that the respondent is actually in default in the performance of a legal duty then due at his hands, and no threats or predetermination can take the place of such default before the time arrives when the duty should be performed; nor does the law contemplate such a deg’ree of diligence as the performance of a duty not yet due. ” This court itself has spoken on the same subject in State v. Bryan, 26 Or. 502, 507 ( 38 Pac. 618 ), where Mr. Justice Wolverton writing, uses this language: “It is a just presumption that all public officers will faithfully discha

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Portland v. White green
or · 1922
2 sentences

1993But, aside from this, we have held, in the case of Portland v. White, 106 Or 169 ( 211 Pac. 798 ), that no appeal lies from the Circuit Court to this court upon a judgment of conviction in the Circuit Court for a violation of a city ordinance of the City of Portland.

1993But, aside from this, we have held, in the case of Portland v. White, 106 Or 169 ( 211 Pac. 798 ), that no appeal lies from the Circuit Court to this court upon a judgment of conviction in the Circuit Court for a violation of a city ordinance of the City of Portland.

21925–1993
Hollis v. State Insurance green
iowa · 1884
2 sentences

1932In Hollis v. Insurance Co., 65 Iowa 454 , 21 N. W. 774 , a more just rule, in our judgment, is announced by Mr. Justice Reed, who, in speaking of the contention of an insurance company that acts sufficient to constitute a waiver of the conditions of its policy must be in the nature of an equitable estoppel, says: “ * * Neither forfeitures nor estoppels are favored by the law, and it follows necessarily from this consideration that the waiver of a forfeiture may be sustained by circumstances which do not present the strong equities which would be required to create an estoppel.

1932In Hollis v. Insurance Co., 65 Iowa 454 , 21 N. W. 774 , a more just rule, in our judgment, is announced by Mr. Justice Reed, who, in speaking of the contention of an insurance company that acts sufficient to constitute a waiver of the conditions of its policy must be in the nature of an equitable estoppel, says: “ * * Neither forfeitures nor estoppels are favored by the law, and it follows necessarily from this consideration that the waiver of a forfeiture may be sustained by circumstances which do not present the strong equities which would be required to create an estoppel.

21901–1932
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States green
scotus · 1993
1 sentence

2022Id. at 210 (“It is a substantial and just rule that courts will not hear an appeal while the appellant is fleeing from jus- tice, and this, of itself, would be sufficient reason for dismissing this appeal.”). 248 Sills v. State of Oregon applied [by a reviewing court] to a case in which both flight and recapture occur while the case is pending before” the criminal trial court. 507 US at 244 .5 And neither the post- conviction court nor the state has sought to justify the dismissal of petitioner’s case on the basis of one of those rationales.

12022–2022
Hayden v. City of Astoria green
or · 1917
1 sentence

1917That sum and $78.42, the compensation for the care of the premises, aggregating $290.57, should, therefore, he deducted from $2,614.16 leaving $2,423.57 as due the plaintiff with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the time this opinion is handed down: Baker County v. Huntington, supra; Sargent v. American Bank and Trust Co., 80 Or. 16, 39 ( 154 Pac. 759 , 156 Pac. 431 ); Hayden v. City of Astoria, ante, p. 205 ( 164 Pac. 729 ).

11917–1917
Stephenson v. Cady green
ca5 · 1875
1 sentence

1912For appellant, the attempt is made to evade the force of these decisions by the claim that appellee was first in default, whereby appellant was damaged in the amount exceeding the price of the goods received, for which he failed to pay, and from that time until the suit was brought always had a just claim for damages by appellee’s default exceeding the amount for which appellant was in arrears. * * But the question is not whether, upon a fair settlement, offsetting damages against price, appellant really owed anything, but whether, accepting the machines under contract, it performed that contr

11912–1912
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Henshaw neutral
ala · 1889
1 sentence

1909The more just rule, and the one sustained by a preponderance of authority, is believed to be that the bona fide occupant should not be charged with income from his own improvements, where he is so situated as not to be entitled to claim allowance for his expenditures in erecting them. * * That is this case, and we need not at present extend the principle any further.” The cases cited from Iowa, Indiana, and Wisconsin are under very elaborate “occupying claimants” acts, which do not obtain in this State, but we think the law, so fay as it applies to the statutes of our State, is fully and corre

11909–1909
State v. O'Conner neutral
· 1862
1 sentence

1887(Bishop on Stat. Crimes, Sec. 979; State v. O’ Connor, 49 Me. 594 .) The citations upon the hearing upon the part of appellant were mainly from the Massachusetts reports.

11887–1887
Hall v. Arnold neutral
nysupct · 1853
1 sentence

1880It seems to us that this is a just rule to be applied in such cases, as the rights of the landlord and tenant are both secured, and the rights of third parties are not unjustly affected, for the creditors of the tenant should have no claim on the crop greater than the ownership of the tenant in it. ( 10 Pick. 205 ; 15 Barb. 599 .) We have disposed of the questions in this case, and find no substantial error, and the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

11880–1880

Where else courts name it

CA 110 (1873–2025) NY 84 (1857–2022) TX 63 (1874–2021) MT 47 (1888–2026) MO 43 (1869–2015) LA 37 (1882–2025) PA 36 (1832–1974) AZ 34 (1916–2026) AL 30 (1856–2007) CT 28 (1852–2024) MI 25 (1892–2022) IL 22 (1884–1993) IA 20 (1872–1997) KS 19 (1897–2019) NJ 18 (1862–1999) OR 14 (1880–2022) MS 14 (1918–2013) KY 13 (1840–2023) IN 13 (1862–1999) NC 10 (1897–2022) GA 10 (1928–2016) TN 9 (1916–2004) WA 9 (1917–1973) WV 9 (1885–1970) WI 9 (1841–2011) OH 9 (1871–2000) MA 7 (1845–1993) AR 6 (1878–2016) SC 6 (1951–2005) OK 6 (1912–1956) NE 5 (1899–1961) ME 5 (1850–1996) FL 5 (1878–1952) MD 4 (1904–2005) CO 4 (1898–2019) RI 4 (1906–2001) SD 4 (1900–2004) VA 4 (1911–1992) DE 4 (1930–1995) MN 4 (1895–1973) DC 3 (1910–2014) NM 2 (1916–1937) VT 2 (1868–1923) ND 2 (1903–1992) UT 2 (1918–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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