just claim in California

2022Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1293 (Fireman’s Fund).) The purpose of the rule “is to accomplish substantial justice by equalizing the common burden shared by coinsurers, and to prevent one insurer from profiting at the expense of others. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 1293–1294) Equitable contribution is “predicated on the commonsense principle that where multiple insurers or indemnitors share equal contractual liability for the primary indemnification of a loss or the discharge of an obligation, the selection of which indemnitor is to bear the loss should not be left to

2022Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1293 (Fireman’s Fund).) The purpose of the rule “is to accomplish substantial justice by equalizing the common burden shared by coinsurers, and to prevent one insurer from profiting at the expense of others. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 1293–1294) Equitable contribution is “predicated on the commonsense principle that where multiple insurers or indemnitors share equal contractual liability for the primary indemnification of a loss or the discharge of an obligation, the selection of which indemnitor is to bear the loss should not be left to

1996Express Agency (1944) 321 U.S. 342, 348 [ 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 , 64 S.Ct. 582 ].) The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation, and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to *1388 prevail over the right to prosecute them.

1996Express Agency (1944) 321 U.S. 342, 348 [ 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 , 64 S.Ct. 582 ].) The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation, and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to *1388 prevail over the right to prosecute them.

2012(See Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 592 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205 ] [“ ‘even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and . . . the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them’ ”]; Krusesky v. Baugh (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 562, 566 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] [“The policy behind statutes of limitations is as meritorious as the policy of trying cases on their merits.”].) 14 III.

2012(See Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 592 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205 ] [“ ‘even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and . . . the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them’ ”]; Krusesky v. Baugh (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 562, 566 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] [“The policy behind statutes of limitations is as meritorious as the policy of trying cases on their merits.”].) 14 III.

2014(People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 .) This right, established in Pitchess and subsequently codified in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045, is “based on the ‘fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ [Citation.]” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 .) The statutory scheme “carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest i

2014(People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 (Gaines).) This right, established in Pitchess and subsequently codified in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045, is “based on the ‘fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ [Citation.]” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 (Santa Cruz).) The statutory scheme “carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally c

2025“The statutory scheme carefully 3 Further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise stated. 9 balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to the defense.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 53 .) Although Pitchess concerns a “separate strand of law” from Brady and its progeny (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 710 ), the Supreme Court has clarified that to obtain Brady material in confidential police personnel files,

2023We acknowledge that Daniel did not have to “present a factual scenario that is reasonably likely to have occurred[,] . . . persuasive or even credible.” (See People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1318 (Thompson).) Yet, Daniel cannot establish the requisite “ ‘ “plausible factual foundation” ’ for [his] defense” “based on a showing that is merely imaginable or conceivable and, therefore, not patently impossible.” (See id. at pp. 1316, 1318.) Put differently, under the governing standard, “the word ‘plausible’ ” is not “synonymous with ‘possible[.]’ ” (See id. at p. 1318.) This limitat

2023The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”’” (Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 488 .) Because Jeffrey failed to sue Rosalie within three years of his discovery of the facts constituting the alleged fraud (by at least 2016), his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

2022The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’ ” (Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 488 (Romano).) Statute of limitations issues typically turn on resolving disputed facts; however, summary judgment may be appropriate where “ ‘the uncontradicted pleaded or set forth in opposing summary judgment, nor is any such promise too uncertain to be enforced. 6 facts . . . are suscep

2009The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’ ” (Wood v. Elling Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 353, 362 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 696 , 572 R2d 755]; see also Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Internat., Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1156 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 ] [Laches “is an equitable time limitation on a party’s right to bring suit, resting on the maxim that ‘equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on thei

2009The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’ ” (Wood v. Elling Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 353, 362 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 696 , 572 R2d 755]; see also Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Internat., Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1156 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 ] [Laches “is an equitable time limitation on a party’s right to bring suit, resting on the maxim that ‘equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on thei

1999(City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74 .) “The statutory scheme thus carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense.” (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84 ; see also Gremminger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 403-404.) “It is significant that [sections 1043 and 1045] do not limit discovery of [peace officer personnel] records to cases involving altercations between police officers and arrestees, the context in which Pitchess a

1998The in camera review procedure and disclosure guidelines set forth in section 1045 guarantee, in turn, a balancing of the officer’s privacy interests against the defendant’s need for disclosure.” (Ibid.) In People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 680 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ], the California Supreme Court recognized that in adopting the above provisions of the Evidence Code and Penal Code, the Legislature “not only reaffirmed but expanded” the principles of Pitchess .

2021Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045 and Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8 codify Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 , which recognized that “a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge.” (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1219 .) “ ‘The statutory scheme carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling

2021Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045 and Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8 codify Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 , which recognized that “a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge.” (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1219 .) “ ‘The statutory scheme carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling

2020The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and 8. that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” ’ ” (Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1521 .) This principle “has been made applicable to quasi adjudicative proceedings as a common law policy pursuant to the ‘inherent power [of courts] independent of statutory provisions to dismiss an action on motion of the defendant where it is not diligently prosecuted.’ ” (Brown v. State P

2009While a statute of limitations bars proceedings without proof of prejudice, laches ‘requires proof of delay which results in prejudice or change of position.’ ” (Lam v. Bureau of Security & Investigative Services (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 29, 36 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 ] (Lam), quoting Brown v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1161 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 53 ] (Brown).) “Delay alone ordinarily does not constitute laches, as *1522 lapse of time is separately embodied in statutes of limitation.” (Lam, at p. 36.) “What makes the delay unreasonable in the case of laches is that it results in preju

2010As the Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘[statutes of repose are in fact favored in the law The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 756 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 , 958 R2d 1062].) Because Ignatin’s challenge to the validity of the Amendment was asserted more than four years after the Amendment w

2010As the Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘[statutes of repose are in fact favored in the law The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 756 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 , 958 R2d 1062].) Because Ignatin’s challenge to the validity of the Amendment was asserted more than four years after the Amendment w

2004(Brant v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 105 ; Herrera v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1159, 1163 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 742 ].) Our California Supreme Court has further explained, “The statutory scheme thus carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense.

2004(Brant v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 105 ; Herrera v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1159, 1163 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 742 ].) Our California Supreme Court has further explained, “The statutory scheme thus carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense.

2003Defendants seeking discovery of citizen complaints must follow these statutory procedures. 4 These provisions “ ‘carefully balance[] two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense.’ ” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) *360 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ], quoting City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81-84 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 116 P.2d 222 ].) The Pitchess procedure is the sole means by which citizen compla

2003The Pitchess statutory scheme “ ‘carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense.’ ” (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039, quoting City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 81-84.) Therefore, Brady is not violated by requiring disclosure only after an in camera review conditioned upon a showing of materiality.

2020(See Crespin, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 271–272.) “Laches is an equitable time limitation on a party’s right to bring suit, resting on the maxim that ‘equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.’ ” (Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Internat., Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1156 .) “ ‘ “The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” ’ ” (Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2009) 171 C

2015(Id. at p. 1505 ["There being no statute and no rule setting a deadline to move for section 3027.1 sanctions, absent further direction from the Legislature . . . equitable principles apply to determine the timing of a section 3027.1 sanctions motion"].) "Laches is an equitable time limitation on a party's right to bring suit, resting on the maxim that 'equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.' " (Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Int'l Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1156 .) " ' "The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on not

2019Code, § 1043, subd. (b).) “Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both ‘ “materiality” to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ [Citation.]” (Gaines, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 179 .) The statutory scheme that codified Pitchess “ ‘carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to the defense.’ ” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220 .) Thus,

2014(People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179 (Gaines).) This right, established in Pitchess and subsequently codified in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045, is “based on the ‘fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.’ [Citation.]” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 (Santa Cruz).) The statutory scheme “carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally c

2015Such a practice would negate the purpose of the limitations period, which is “‘“to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”’” (Prudential-LMI, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 684 .) “‘“[E]ven if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation . . . .”’” (Ibid.) The next portion of the April 13, 2013 letter advised plaintiffs how to contact the Department of Insurance if they “believe[d] the decis

2015Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 684 (Prudential).) The homeowner’s policy purchased by the Wesslers from Mid-Century plainly created a one-year statute of limitations when it provided that any claim or lawsuit “arising out of the” property coverage of the policy “must be brought within one year after inception of the loss or damage.” Here, the fire damaging the Danville home occurred on January 28, 2011, and the Wesslers filed their claim for damage with Mid- Century the following day.

2000The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."'" ( Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886 , citations omitted; accord, Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 592 , 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205 .) The misapplication of the continuing violation doctrine in this case allowed plaintiff to raise five years of disparate discriminatory incidents, notwithstanding

2000The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."'" ( Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 898 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 705 P.2d 886 , citations omitted; accord, Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 592 , 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205 .) The misapplication of the continuing violation doctrine in this case allowed plaintiff to raise five years of disparate discriminatory incidents, notwithstanding

2018The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put an adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’ ” (Bollinger, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 427 .) The court found, “Under the circumstances of the present case it would be manifestly unjust for this court to prevent a trial on the merits, which the law favors [citations] thereby incurring a technical forfeiture of the insured’s rights, which the law discourages [citations], by enforcing the . . . limitation perio

1980Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 399, 406-407 [ 154 P.2d 399 ].) Permitting deferred accrual of the indemnity action will allow tortfeasors to avoid asserting causes of action against both public and private parties until after "evidence is lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." ( Id. ) It certainly is not unjust to require a defendant to assert his claims for partial indemnity within the statutory period after plaintiff's cause of action or injury occurs.

1976R. 725], this court said: ‘We intended to hold that the maximum rate allowed for loans coming under the act is at the rate of twelve per cent per annum for the full period of the loan, and that within such limit the parties may freely contract in respect thereto, if done in writing.’ While this pronouncement when made may have been open to the observation that it was dictum, yet we based it upon the weight of authority and what was deemed to be the only just rule, [citing Conservative Loan Co. v. Whittington et al., 120 Okl. 137 [ 250 Pac. 485, 487 ]; Easton v. Butterfield Live Stock Co., 48 I

1976R. 725], this court said: ‘We intended to hold that the maximum rate allowed for loans coming under the act is at the rate of twelve per cent per annum for the full period of the loan, and that within such limit the parties may freely contract in respect thereto, if done in writing.’ While this pronouncement when made may have been open to the observation that it was dictum, yet we based it upon the weight of authority and what was deemed to be the only just rule, [citing Conservative Loan Co. v. Whittington et al., 120 Okl. 137 [ 250 Pac. 485, 487 ]; Easton v. Butterfield Live Stock Co., 48 I

2023We acknowledge that Daniel did not have to “present a factual scenario that is reasonably likely to have occurred[,] . . . persuasive or even credible.” (See People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1318 (Thompson).) Yet, Daniel cannot establish the requisite “ ‘ “plausible factual foundation” ’ for [his] defense” “based on a showing that is merely imaginable or conceivable and, therefore, not patently impossible.” (See id. at pp. 1316, 1318.) Put differently, under the governing standard, “the word ‘plausible’ ” is not “synonymous with ‘possible[.]’ ” (See id. at p. 1318.) This limitat

2023We acknowledge that Daniel did not have to “present a factual scenario that is reasonably likely to have occurred[,] . . . persuasive or even credible.” (See People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1318 (Thompson).) Yet, Daniel cannot establish the requisite “ ‘ “plausible factual foundation” ’ for [his] defense” “based on a showing that is merely imaginable or conceivable and, therefore, not patently impossible.” (See id. at pp. 1316, 1318.) Put differently, under the governing standard, “the word ‘plausible’ ” is not “synonymous with ‘possible[.]’ ” (See id. at p. 1318.) This limitat

2022Where such a new and sufficient complaint is filed, the prior judgment on demurrer will not be a bar.” (Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 52 (Goddard), italics added; accord, Keidatz v. Albany (1952) 39 Cal.2d 826, 828 (Keidatz) [“[E]ven though different facts may be alleged in the second action, if the demurrer was sustained in the first action on a ground equally applicable to the second, the former judgment will also be a bar.”].) The reviewing court in Boyd reversed a judgment of dismissal, concluding the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer on res j

2022Where such a new and sufficient complaint is filed, the prior judgment on demurrer will not be a bar.” (Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 52 (Goddard), italics added; accord, Keidatz v. Albany (1952) 39 Cal.2d 826, 828 (Keidatz) [“[E]ven though different facts may be alleged in the second action, if the demurrer was sustained in the first action on a ground equally applicable to the second, the former judgment will also be a bar.”].) The reviewing court in Boyd reversed a judgment of dismissal, concluding the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer on res j