37 New Jersey opinions name it 4 courts 1900–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Kimmelmangreen2 sentences2003After reviewing the history of the constitutional provisions, particularly the Uniformity Clause, the Court concluded that the Uniformity Clause prevailed over the exemption clause: Given that the constitutional focus of the delegates on the taxation of real estate was upon a judicial decision that had sustained the power of the Legislature, prior to the 1947 Constitutional Convention, to allow for the preferential taxation of real estate based on the classification of the industry, and given that the single galvanizing event that brought about agreement on a tax article was a compromise that 1989The Supreme Court, in Kimmelman , stated: Given ... the apparent purpose of providing that real property dedicated to municipal tax purposes should never be taxed at an unequal burden, we cannot conclude that the delegates intended that the Legislature could achieve, by the exemption clause, what could not be done under the constitutional restraints imposed upon it. [Id. at 436, 522 A.2d 430 ] Attempts by the Legislature to adversely affect the uniformity of assessment and taxation of real property by exemption or classification of property have generally been nullified. | 3 | 3 |
Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillsidegreen2 sentences2025Pingry Corp. v. Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 463 (1966). 1. 2019Pingry Corp. v. Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 463 (1966). 1. | 2 | 2 |
2nd Roc-Jersey Associates v. Town of Morristowngreen2 sentences2023Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 133 N.J. 482, 503 (1993); see also 2nd Roc- Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 158 N.J. 581, 590 (1999) (concluding that the “Legislature may exempt certain property from the Uniformity Clause either by general laws or for the specified purposes enumerated in the exemption clause.”). 2023Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 133 N.J. 482, 503 (1993); see also 2nd Roc- Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 158 N.J. 581, 590 (1999) (concluding that the “Legislature may exempt certain property from the Uniformity Clause either by general laws or for the specified purposes enumerated in the exemption clause.”). | 1 | 2 |
New Jersey Carpenters Apprentice Training & Education Fund v. Borough of Kenilworthgreen2 sentences2022The conundrum faced by the taxpayer in this case is that while the comingling of the housing and treatment supports the establishment of the exemption in the first instance, the same comingling may be fatal to an exemption claim when it involves excessive entanglement with a profit- making endeavor. 4 Id. at 24 . 4 To be clear, this case does not address the scenario in which CSLRs such as those operated by Hansen House operate in conjunction with a not-for-profit treatment provider. -7- As to benefitting a for-profit endeavor, another decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, New Jersey Carpe 2020Fund v. Borough of Kenilworth , 147 N.J. 171, 173-74 (1996), involved the exemption claim for the building owned and operated by a carpenters training and education fund. | 1 | 2 |
Switz v. Kingsleygreen2 sentences1996Legislature could achieve, by the exemption clause, what could not be done under the constitutional restraints imposed upon it Lby the Uniformity Clause]”); Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 585 , 182 A.2d 841 (1962) (“[w]e need not delay to consider the suggestion that this provision creates but a ‘rebuttable’ presumption, or that the Legislature had in mind such ‘... value’ as could not be considered in any event.”); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Washington Tp., 16 N.J. 38, 45 , 106 A.2d 4 (1954) (“classification^] ... for exemption ... based ... upon the status or vocation or avocation of [the 1996Legislature could achieve, by the exemption clause, what could not be done under the constitutional restraints imposed upon it Lby the Uniformity Clause]”); Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 585 , 182 A.2d 841 (1962) (“[w]e need not delay to consider the suggestion that this provision creates but a ‘rebuttable’ presumption, or that the Legislature had in mind such ‘... value’ as could not be considered in any event.”); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Washington Tp., 16 N.J. 38, 45 , 106 A.2d 4 (1954) (“classification^] ... for exemption ... based ... upon the status or vocation or avocation of [the | 1 | 2 |
Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Board of Taxationgreen2 sentences2023Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 133 N.J. 482, 503 (1993); see also 2nd Roc- Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 158 N.J. 581, 590 (1999) (concluding that the “Legislature may exempt certain property from the Uniformity Clause either by general laws or for the specified purposes enumerated in the exemption clause.”). 2023Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 133 N.J. 482, 503 (1993); see also 2nd Roc- Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 158 N.J. 581, 590 (1999) (concluding that the “Legislature may exempt certain property from the Uniformity Clause either by general laws or for the specified purposes enumerated in the exemption clause.”). | 1 | 1 |
Blair Academy v. Blairstown Tp.green1 sentence2019See Blair Academy v. Blairstown Twp., 95 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Chester Theatre Group v. Bor. of Chestergreen1 sentence2019The cluster of abstract concepts themselves suggests that, at most, only a descriptive definition is contemplated.” Chester Theatre Grp. of Black River Playhouse v. Borough of Chester, 115 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Wellington v. Township of Hillsboroughgreen1 sentence2017Tax 264, 267-268 (Tax 1980)(holding that with respect to N.J.S.A. 54:4-4.4, “the assessor’s failure to obtain the statement does not vitiate the exemption otherwise allowable.”); accord Wellington v. Township of Hillsborough, 27 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Emanuel Missionary Baptist Church v. City of Newarkgreen1 sentence2017Tax 192, 197 (Tax 1981)(holding that the filing of an exemption claim under N.J.S.A. 54:4-4.4 “is not a condition precedent to the allowance of an exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.”) Emanuel Missionary Baptist Church v. City of Newark, 1 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Burglar & Fire Alarm Co. v. Director, Division of Taxationgreen1 sentence2012As a general rule, “[e]ourts have recognized the Director’s expertise in the highly specialized and technical area of taxation.” Aetna Burglar & Fire Alarm Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 16 N.J.Tax 584, 589 (Tax 1997) (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327 , 478 A.2d 742 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Paper Mill Playhouse v. Township of Millburngreen1 sentence2001It reasoned that the exemption at bar was consistent with the policy behind N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, in that it would not interfere with the preparation of the municipal budget. 6 Id. at 86-87. | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Township of Washingtongreen2 sentences1996Legislature could achieve, by the exemption clause, what could not be done under the constitutional restraints imposed upon it Lby the Uniformity Clause]”); Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 585 , 182 A.2d 841 (1962) (“[w]e need not delay to consider the suggestion that this provision creates but a ‘rebuttable’ presumption, or that the Legislature had in mind such ‘... value’ as could not be considered in any event.”); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Washington Tp., 16 N.J. 38, 45 , 106 A.2d 4 (1954) (“classification^] ... for exemption ... based ... upon the status or vocation or avocation of [the 1996Legislature could achieve, by the exemption clause, what could not be done under the constitutional restraints imposed upon it Lby the Uniformity Clause]”); Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 585 , 182 A.2d 841 (1962) (“[w]e need not delay to consider the suggestion that this provision creates but a ‘rebuttable’ presumption, or that the Legislature had in mind such ‘... value’ as could not be considered in any event.”); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Washington Tp., 16 N.J. 38, 45 , 106 A.2d 4 (1954) (“classification^] ... for exemption ... based ... upon the status or vocation or avocation of [the | 1 | 1 |
| Christy v. City of Newarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maplewood v. Tannenhausgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Smallbonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sisters of Charity v. Cory
green
2 sentences2015In granting the exemption, the court employed a liberal application of the exemption standard that it would later question and distinguish in Sisters of Charity v. Thompson, 72 N.J.L. 426 , 61 A. 387 (Sup.Ct.1905), which it ultimately retracted in Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699 , 65 A. 500 (E. & A.1907). 2015In granting the exemption, the court employed a liberal application of the exemption standard that it would later question and distinguish in Sisters of Charity v. Thompson, 72 N.J.L. 426 , 61 A. 387 (Sup.Ct.1905), which it ultimately retracted in Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699 , 65 A. 500 (E. & A.1907). | 2 | 1977–2015 |
The Presbyterian Homes v. Division of Tax Appeals
green
2 sentences2007Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has soundly rejected a similar assertion made in support of the exemption claim of another facility for the elderly that provided “luxurious retirement facilities to those who are able to pay.” Presbyterian Homes, supra, 55 N.J. at 289 , 261 A.2d 143 . 2007Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has soundly rejected a similar assertion made in support of the exemption claim of another facility for the elderly that provided “luxurious retirement facilities to those who are able to pay.” Presbyterian Homes, supra, 55 N.J. at 289 , 261 A.2d 143 . | 2 | 1970–2007 |
International Schools Services, Inc. v. West Windsor Township
green
1 sentence2022The conundrum faced by the taxpayer in this case is that while the comingling of the housing and treatment supports the establishment of the exemption in the first instance, the same comingling may be fatal to an exemption claim when it involves excessive entanglement with a profit- making endeavor. 4 Id. at 24 . 4 To be clear, this case does not address the scenario in which CSLRs such as those operated by Hansen House operate in conjunction with a not-for-profit treatment provider. -7- As to benefitting a for-profit endeavor, another decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, New Jersey Carpe | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mega Care, Inc. v. Union Township
green
1 sentence2018Tax 174, 181 (Tax 1996) (rejecting a view “that to determine whether a claimant is organized for an exempt purpose, its operations are to be reviewed,” since an entity’s organization purpose is “plainly distinct” from its “operations,” and the statute does not mandate an “entity-level operational test in the hospital . . . exemptions”). 11 The court granted partial summary judgment denying the exemption claim because the non-profit subsidiary nursing home’s “certificate of incorporation did not specifically limit its activities to those conducted in support of and integration with the [parent] | 1 | 2018–2018 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
1 sentence2018It applied the exemption to the analysis for LAD claims stated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and concluded that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth v. Thompson
neutral
2 sentences2015In granting the exemption, the court employed a liberal application of the exemption standard that it would later question and distinguish in Sisters of Charity v. Thompson, 72 N.J.L. 426 , 61 A. 387 (Sup.Ct.1905), which it ultimately retracted in Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699 , 65 A. 500 (E. & A.1907). 2015In granting the exemption, the court employed a liberal application of the exemption standard that it would later question and distinguish in Sisters of Charity v. Thompson, 72 N.J.L. 426 , 61 A. 387 (Sup.Ct.1905), which it ultimately retracted in Sisters of Charity v. Cory, 73 N.J.L. 699 , 65 A. 500 (E. & A.1907). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation
green
2 sentences2012As a general rule, “[e]ourts have recognized the Director’s expertise in the highly specialized and technical area of taxation.” Aetna Burglar & Fire Alarm Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 16 N.J.Tax 584, 589 (Tax 1997) (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327 , 478 A.2d 742 (1984)). 2012As a general rule, “[e]ourts have recognized the Director’s expertise in the highly specialized and technical area of taxation.” Aetna Burglar & Fire Alarm Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 16 N.J.Tax 584, 589 (Tax 1997) (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327 , 478 A.2d 742 (1984)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Township
green
2 sentences2009In her opinion, the judge examined PHP’s exemption claim in accordance with the three criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 and Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millbum Township, 95 N.J. 503 , 472 A.2d 517 (1984). 23 N.J. 2009In her opinion, the judge examined PHP’s exemption claim in accordance with the three criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 and Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millbum Township, 95 N.J. 503 , 472 A.2d 517 (1984). 23 N.J. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hunterdon Medical Center v. Readington Township
green
1 sentence2009Id. at 334-41 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v. Pennington Borough
green
1 sentence2009In her opinion, the judge examined PHP’s exemption claim in accordance with the three criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 and Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millbum Township, 95 N.J. 503 , 472 A.2d 517 (1984). 23 N.J. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Alpine Country Club v. Borough of Demarest
green
2 sentences2007Therefore, the Tax Court judge, using his "special expertise", Alpine Country Club v. Borough of Demarest, 354 N.J.Super. 387, 390 , 807 A. 2d 257 (App.Div.2002), formulated a logical, practical and viable standard, which is well-reasoned, supported by case law, and which we expressly endorse. 2007Therefore, the Tax Court judge, using his "special expertise", Alpine Country Club v. Borough of Demarest, 354 N.J.Super. 387, 390 , 807 A. 2d 257 (App.Div.2002), formulated a logical, practical and viable standard, which is well-reasoned, supported by case law, and which we expressly endorse. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment
green
2 sentences2005Clubs of California for Fair Competition v. Kroger, 7 Cal.App. 4th 709 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 247 (1992); City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 69 , 564 A.2d 1026 (1989). 2005Clubs of California for Fair Competition v. Kroger, 7 Cal.App. 4th 709 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 247 (1992); City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 69 , 564 A.2d 1026 (1989). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Clubs of California for Fair Competition v. Kroger
green
2 sentences2005Clubs of California for Fair Competition v. Kroger, 7 Cal.App. 4th 709 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 247 (1992); City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 69 , 564 A.2d 1026 (1989). 2005Clubs of California for Fair Competition v. Kroger, 7 Cal.App. 4th 709 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 247 (1992); City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 69 , 564 A.2d 1026 (1989). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
YMCA v. Dept. of Rev.
green
2 sentences2005The Oregon Supreme Court denied the exemption claim, Young Men's Christian Association of Columbia-Willamette v. Department of Revenue, 308 Or. 644 , 784 P.2d 1086 (1989), but courts in California and Pennsylvania have granted the exemption to facilities similar to that at issue in the Oregon decision. 2005The Oregon Supreme Court denied the exemption claim, Young Men's Christian Association of Columbia-Willamette v. Department of Revenue, 308 Or. 644 , 784 P.2d 1086 (1989), but courts in California and Pennsylvania have granted the exemption to facilities similar to that at issue in the Oregon decision. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Schizophrenia Foundation v. Township of Montgomery
green
1 sentence1998It relies on the decision in Schizophrenia Foundation of N.J. v. Montgomery Tp., 6 N.J.Tax 439 (App.Div.1984), to the effect that the use of the property as of completion is determinative when an exemption claim is made with respect to an added assessment. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Board of Taxation
neutral
2 sentences1993Both the trial court and the Appellate Division found N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 to have violated the uniformity clause, although for different reasons. supra, 255 N.J. 1993Both the trial court and the Appellate Division found N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 to have violated the uniformity clause, although for different reasons, supra, 255 N.J.Super. at 669 , 605 A.2d 1151 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club
green
2 sentences1993The Court, however, has declined to take the listing of the exemption clause literally (i.e., confined to property used exclusively for religious, educational, charitable, or cemetery purposes, by non-profit organizations), and instead has looked to "whether the exemption is based on a permissible classification and if so, whether the classification serves a public purpose." Morristown, supra, 124 N.J. at 614 , 592 A. 2d 216 . 1993The Court, however, has declined to take the listing of the exemption clause literally (i.e., confined to property used exclusively for religious, educational, charitable, or cemetery purposes, by non-profit organizations), and instead has looked to "whether the exemption is based on a permissible classification and if so, whether the classification serves a public purpose." Morristown, supra, 124 N.J. at 614 , 592 A. 2d 216 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Institute of Holy Angels v. Borough of Fort Lee green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Heyer neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Stone v. Ward green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Stone v. Stone green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Sisters of Charity of Saint Elizabeth green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Monmouth Medical Center v. City of Long Branch green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| International Missions, Inc. v. Lincoln Park green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Bor. Cresskill v. Nor. Val. Evan. Church green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| City of Long Branch v. Monmouth Medical Center green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Princeton Tp. v. Tenacre Foundation green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States v. Jeffers green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| McDonald v. United States green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Stein v. Felden green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Glidear v. Charles green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Densel v. Atlanta Mercantile Co. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| United States Trust Co. v. Helvering green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Bailey v. Wood green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Bailey v. Wood green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Matter of Estate of Prime green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.