exemption claim in Oklahoma

2023The court rejected the defense and found that the Commission's authority was "limited primarily to regulating licensing matters." Id. ¶31, 291 P.3d at 635 .

2023The court rejected the defense and found that the Commission's authority was "limited primarily to regulating licensing matters." Id. ¶31, 291 P.3d at 635 .

1998The appellate court held that "injunction is a proper remedy to prevent enforcement of a tax upon exempt property,” relying on Cox v. Dillingham, which we explain in this opinion, and Walker v. Hays, 127 Okla. 123 , 260 P. 15 (1927), which is also cited in Cox .

1998The appellate court held that "injunction is a proper remedy to prevent enforcement of a tax upon exempt property,” relying on Cox v. Dillingham, which we explain in this opinion, and Walker v. Hays, 127 Okla. 123 , 260 P. 15 (1927), which is also cited in Cox .

2017Furthermore, “the trial court has the power to allocate the exemptions and the power to order the custodial parent to execute the exemption waiver....” Wilson, 1991 OK CIV APP 79 at ¶ 7, 831 P.2d 1 . ¶8 For modification of child support, 43 O.S.

2009The Court of Civil Appeals secondly held that, in ruling on an exemption claim, the trial court might modify or stay a garnishment because "[i]t is entirely foreseeable that a question of the seope of modification, especially [as to] retroactive refunds, will arise, as here, in cases where the proceedings are by motion." Hillcrest, 2002 OK CIV APP 10, ¶ 23 , 38 P.3d at 936 . {11 So, said Division IV, "in cases where the judgment debtor has delayed making a request for exemption," i.e., by motion, the trial court must determine when the hardship accrued because: [The statute [12 O.S.

2009The Court of Civil Appeals secondly held that, in ruling on an exemption claim, the trial court might modify or stay a garnishment because "[i]t is entirely foreseeable that a question of the seope of modification, especially [as to] retroactive refunds, will arise, as here, in cases where the proceedings are by motion." Hillcrest, 2002 OK CIV APP 10, ¶ 23 , 38 P.3d at 936 . {11 So, said Division IV, "in cases where the judgment debtor has delayed making a request for exemption," i.e., by motion, the trial court must determine when the hardship accrued because: [The statute [12 O.S.

2004The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the exemption did bar the action, because, although the law had originally only applied to injuries sustained in interscholastie contests, the legislature had amended the provision to also apply to “other athletic contest[s].” Id. at ¶ 9, 914 P.2d at 659. ¶ 8 The second case cited by the Trial Court is Evans v. Oaks Mission Public School, 1997 OK 97 , 945 P.2d 492 .

2004The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the exemption did bar the action, because, although the law had originally only applied to injuries sustained in interscholastie contests, the legislature had amended the provision to also apply to “other athletic contest[s].” Id. at ¶ 9, 914 P.2d at 659. ¶ 8 The second case cited by the Trial Court is Evans v. Oaks Mission Public School, 1997 OK 97 , 945 P.2d 492 .

2001Dr. Gutierrez asserts that this exemption to immunity applies only to the individuals described at the beginning of the paragraph, to-wit: physician faculty members and staff of the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center and the College of Osteopathic Medicine of Oklahoma State University who are not acting in an administrative capacity or engaged in teaching duties. ¶ 8 We foreshadowed today's decision in Anderson v. Eichner, 1994 OK 136 , 890 P.2d 1329 , wherein we held faculty physicians were not immune from liability for torts that occurred while they practiced medicine.

2001Dr. Gutierrez asserts that this exemption to immunity applies only to the individuals described at the beginning of the paragraph, to-wit: physician faculty members and staff of the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center and the College of Osteopathic Medicine of Oklahoma State University who are not acting in an administrative capacity or engaged in teaching duties. ¶ 8 We foreshadowed today's decision in Anderson v. Eichner, 1994 OK 136 , 890 P.2d 1329 , wherein we held faculty physicians were not immune from liability for torts that occurred while they practiced medicine.

1980In Nelson v. State, Okl.Cr., 355 P.2d 413 (1960), the court said: [T]he purpose of the Act ... is to protect the public against blue-sky promotions, and promoters, and other stock transactions not otherwise covered by law.

1958In Gerlach Livestock Corporation v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 87 , at page 93, 111 Ct.Cl. 1 , the court said: “The condition of the deed reads, the grantor ‘reserves’ the right.

1958In Gerlach Livestock Corporation v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 87 , at page 93, 111 Ct.Cl. 1 , the court said: “The condition of the deed reads, the grantor ‘reserves’ the right.

1945The Supreme Court of that state, in Lowe v. North Dakota Compensation Bureau, 66 N. D. 246 , 264 N.W. 837 , 107 A.L.R. 973 , considered the claim of one injured .while working at and with a combine in harvesting and threshing grain.

1945The Supreme Court of that state, in Lowe v. North Dakota Compensation Bureau, 66 N. D. 246 , 264 N.W. 837 , 107 A.L.R. 973 , considered the claim of one injured .while working at and with a combine in harvesting and threshing grain.

1945In Wyoming, the Workmen’s Compensation Act exempts “ranch, farm, agricultural or horticultural labor.” While the language is slightly different, we think -the exemption of ■ “agricultural labor” is-similar to our own provision exempting or excluding employees “engaged in agriculture.” The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of In re Roby, 54 Wyo. 439 , 93 P. 2d 940 , held that a person em-r ployed to work at and with a tractor-driven hay baler was engaged in agricultural labor notwithstanding the fact that his employer owned the machinery and operated it under commercial contract with the la

1945In Wyoming, the Workmen’s Compensation Act exempts “ranch, farm, agricultural or horticultural labor.” While the language is slightly different, we think -the exemption of ■ “agricultural labor” is-similar to our own provision exempting or excluding employees “engaged in agriculture.” The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of In re Roby, 54 Wyo. 439 , 93 P. 2d 940 , held that a person em-r ployed to work at and with a tractor-driven hay baler was engaged in agricultural labor notwithstanding the fact that his employer owned the machinery and operated it under commercial contract with the la

1945In Ganzer v. Chapman & Barnard, 157 Okla. 99 , 11 P. 2d 115 , one Ganzer was employed “. . . to operate a dredging machine to dig ponds or. tanks used for watering stock on the ranch operated by the respondents.” Therein we said: “Section 7283, supra, when construed as a whole, and in connection with the other sections cited, means that if any of the instrumentalities or machinery or occupations therein designated are used in connection with farming, or in the construction of farm improvements, such hazardous employment is specifically exempted from the act.” The sections of the statute there

1945In Ganzer v. Chapman & Barnard, 157 Okla. 99 , 11 P. 2d 115 , one Ganzer was employed “. . . to operate a dredging machine to dig ponds or. tanks used for watering stock on the ranch operated by the respondents.” Therein we said: “Section 7283, supra, when construed as a whole, and in connection with the other sections cited, means that if any of the instrumentalities or machinery or occupations therein designated are used in connection with farming, or in the construction of farm improvements, such hazardous employment is specifically exempted from the act.” The sections of the statute there

1929Stuckey et al., decided Feb. 26, 1929, modified opinion filed July 2, 1929, 140 Okla. 178 , 282 Pac. 611 , the assessment of a hornet-stead allotment of a Cherokee is involved, and while the exemption clause in the treaty with the Cherokee is somewhat different from that involved in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Agreement, it was there held that a tax for special improvements upon, the homestead of an unrestricted Cherokee was illegal and void.

1929Stuckey et al., decided Feb. 26, 1929, modified opinion filed July 2, 1929, 140 Okla. 178 , 282 Pac. 611 , the assessment of a hornet-stead allotment of a Cherokee is involved, and while the exemption clause in the treaty with the Cherokee is somewhat different from that involved in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Agreement, it was there held that a tax for special improvements upon, the homestead of an unrestricted Cherokee was illegal and void.