exemption claim in Maryland

1949This statutory rule of construction is in accord with the rule established and applied in the decisions of this court, which defined the rule in Broadbent Mantel Co. v. Baltimore, 134 Md. 90, 93 , 106 A. 250 , 251: ‘The fundamental rule governing the construction of exemptions is that the particular exemption claim cannot be sustained unless it is shown to be within the spirit as well as the letter of the law (United Railways [& Electric] Co. v. Baltimore City, 93 Md. [630], 634 ( 49 A. 655 , 52 L.

1949This statutory rule of construction is in accord with the rule established and applied in the decisions of this court, which defined the rule in Broadbent Mantel Co. v. Baltimore, 134 Md. 90, 93 , 106 A. 250 , 251: ‘The fundamental rule governing the construction of exemptions is that the particular exemption claim cannot be sustained unless it is shown to be within the spirit as well as the letter of the law (United Railways [& Electric] Co. v. Baltimore City, 93 Md. [630], 634 ( 49 A. 655 , 52 L.

1997The only exemption from the requirement that the probable cause for arrest be consummated by an actual arrest is the case where extraordinary steps have to be taken to prevent the destruction of "highly evanescent evidence." Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 , 93 S.Ct. 2000 , 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973).

1997The only exemption from the requirement that the probable cause for arrest be consummated by an actual arrest is the case where extraordinary steps have to be taken to prevent the destruction of "highly evanescent evidence." Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 , 93 S.Ct. 2000 , 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973).

1977Broadbent Mantel Co. v. City of Baltimore, 134 Md. 90 , 106 A. 250 ; Grand Lodge of Maryland, Knights of Pythias v. City of Baltimore, 157 Md. 542 , 146 A. 744 ; Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66 , 272 P. 696 , 62 A. L.

1977Broadbent Mantel Co. v. City of Baltimore, 134 Md. 90 , 106 A. 250 ; Grand Lodge of Maryland, Knights of Pythias v. City of Baltimore, 157 Md. 542 , 146 A. 744 ; Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66 , 272 P. 696 , 62 A. L.

1977Broadbent Mantel Co. v. City of Baltimore, 134 Md. 90 , 106 A. 250 ; Grand Lodge of Maryland, Knights of Pythias v. City of Baltimore, 157 Md. 542 , 146 A. 744 ; Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66 , 272 P. 696 , 62 A. L.

1977Broadbent Mantel Co. v. City of Baltimore, 134 Md. 90 , 106 A. 250 ; Grand Lodge of Maryland, Knights of Pythias v. City of Baltimore, 157 Md. 542 , 146 A. 744 ; Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66 , 272 P. 696 , 62 A. L.

2007Of the roughly half dozen Maryland cases dealing with the state of mind exception, no less than three have been “backward looking.” In Ebert v. Ritchey, 54 Md.App. 388 , 458 A.2d 891 (1983), Charles Ebert, a childless widower, in 1976 placed the name of his youngest brother, Anthony, along with his own, on five joint bank accounts.

2007Of the roughly half dozen Maryland cases dealing with the state of mind exception, no less than three have been “backward looking.” In Ebert v. Ritchey, 54 Md.App. 388 , 458 A.2d 891 (1983), Charles Ebert, a childless widower, in 1976 placed the name of his youngest brother, Anthony, along with his own, on five joint bank accounts.

2005Also by way of dicta, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), and United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), made reference to the earlier footnote in Tateo but elaborated on it to the extent of characterizing the exemption from waiver as something arising out of a defense mistrial request necessitated by “prosecutorial or judicial overreaching.” The phrase was instantly contagious.

2005Also by way of dicta, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), and United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), made reference to the earlier footnote in Tateo but elaborated on it to the extent of characterizing the exemption from waiver as something arising out of a defense mistrial request necessitated by “prosecutorial or judicial overreaching.” The phrase was instantly contagious.

2005Also by way of dicta, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), and United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), made reference to the earlier footnote in Tateo but elaborated on it to the extent of characterizing the exemption from waiver as something arising out of a defense mistrial request necessitated by “prosecutorial or judicial overreaching.” The phrase was instantly contagious.

2005Also by way of dicta, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), and United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), made reference to the earlier footnote in Tateo but elaborated on it to the extent of characterizing the exemption from waiver as something arising out of a defense mistrial request necessitated by “prosecutorial or judicial overreaching.” The phrase was instantly contagious.

1998In Dorman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 187 Md. 678 , 51 A.2d 658 (1947), we were concerned with a property owner’s assertion that he was entitled to utilize his property as a junk business because he had been operating it as such at the time a zoning prohibition against that use was enacted.

1998In Dorman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 187 Md. 678 , 51 A.2d 658 (1947), we were concerned with a property owner’s assertion that he was entitled to utilize his property as a junk business because he had been operating it as such at the time a zoning prohibition against that use was enacted.

1990Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 645 , 197 A. 146 (1938).

1990Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 645 , 197 A. 146 (1938).

1988The Supreme Court of Idaho reached a similar result in Appeal of Sunny Ridge Manor, Inc., 160 Idaho 98 , 675 P.2d 813 (1984), a case we cited with approval in Group Health Ass’n .

1988There the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, considering the exemption claim of a retirement village similar to the Asbury Apartments, held the village subject to taxation, stating that “a private housing facility which for all practical purposes offers its residents no services beyond those which the residents demonstrate an ability to afford” does not achieve a charitable purpose. 455 A.2d at 100 .

1988Moreover, as discussed in Part III above, the controlling principle in cases like this is that state regulatory legislation does not bind the State itself “unless the enactment specifically names the State or manifests a clear and undisputable intent that it is within the provisions of the statute.” In re Arnold M., supra, 298 Md. at 522 , 471 A.2d at 316 .

1988Moreover, as discussed in Part III above, the controlling principle in cases like this is that state regulatory legislation does not bind the State itself “unless the enactment specifically names the State or manifests a clear and undisputable intent that it is within the provisions of the statute.” In re Arnold M., supra, 298 Md. at 522 , 471 A.2d at 316 .

1988The Supreme Court of Idaho reached a similar result in Appeal of Sunny Ridge Manor, Inc., 160 Idaho 98 , 675 P.2d 813 (1984), a case we cited with approval in Group Health Ass’n .

1954Such a holding had been more or less foreshadowed in Agricultural Society of Montgomery County v. State, 130 Md. 474 , 101 A. 139 (1917), in which the prohibitory section (124A) was held valid, regardless of the possible invalidity of the Sections 124B to 124E, and a local law of 1892 applicable to Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties (Chapter 386) was considered repealed.

1954Such a holding had been more or less foreshadowed in Agricultural Society of Montgomery County v. State, 130 Md. 474 , 101 A. 139 (1917), in which the prohibitory section (124A) was held valid, regardless of the possible invalidity of the Sections 124B to 124E, and a local law of 1892 applicable to Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties (Chapter 386) was considered repealed.

1954Section 124E was amended in minor respects in 1902, 1904 and 1906; and under the last of these amendments, Chapter 127 of the Acts of 1906, the exemption clause read as follows: “provided, however, that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to Cecil, Washington or Anne Arundel Counties.” *428 (Sections 124C to 124E were expressly repealed as to Harford and Baltimore Counties in 1912 when racing commissions were established for those counties.) In Close v. Southern Maryland Agricultural Association, 134 Md. 629 , 108 A. 209 (1919), Section 124B to 124E, inclusive, were held unconstitutiona

1954Section 124E was amended in minor respects in 1902, 1904 and 1906; and under the last of these amendments, Chapter 127 of the Acts of 1906, the exemption clause read as follows: “provided, however, that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to Cecil, Washington or Anne Arundel Counties.” *428 (Sections 124C to 124E were expressly repealed as to Harford and Baltimore Counties in 1912 when racing commissions were established for those counties.) In Close v. Southern Maryland Agricultural Association, 134 Md. 629 , 108 A. 209 (1919), Section 124B to 124E, inclusive, were held unconstitutiona

1949This statutory rule of construction is in accord with the rule established and applied in the decisions of this court, which defined the rule in Broadbent Mantel Co. v. Baltimore, 134 Md. 90, 93 , 106 A. 250 , 251: ‘The fundamental rule governing the construction of exemptions is that the particular exemption claim cannot be sustained unless it is shown to be within the spirit as well as the letter of the law (United Railways [& Electric] Co. v. Baltimore City, 93 Md. [630], 634 ( 49 A. 655 , 52 L.

1945Law, 1929 Ed., Sec. 1248, p. 4563, it is said: “It must be admitted, however, that the weight of authority, numerically at least, supports the view that accidental and involuntary inhalation of gas does not come within an exemption from liability in case of death from gas, unless the exemption clause expressly provides otherwise.” The exception suggested by the court itself in the Paul case, i. e., “death caused wholly or in part by gas,” has been held to include breathing gas during sleep in Ferris v. Southern Surety Co., 1925, 157 La. 908 , 103 So. 259 ; and Estabrook v. Eastern Commercial T

1945Law, 1929 Ed., Sec. 1248, p. 4563, it is said: “It must be admitted, however, that the weight of authority, numerically at least, supports the view that accidental and involuntary inhalation of gas does not come within an exemption from liability in case of death from gas, unless the exemption clause expressly provides otherwise.” The exception suggested by the court itself in the Paul case, i. e., “death caused wholly or in part by gas,” has been held to include breathing gas during sleep in Ferris v. Southern Surety Co., 1925, 157 La. 908 , 103 So. 259 ; and Estabrook v. Eastern Commercial T

1945Law, 1929 Ed., Sec. 1248, p. 4563, it is said: “It must be admitted, however, that the weight of authority, numerically at least, supports the view that accidental and involuntary inhalation of gas does not come within an exemption from liability in case of death from gas, unless the exemption clause expressly provides otherwise.” The exception suggested by the court itself in the Paul case, i. e., “death caused wholly or in part by gas,” has been held to include breathing gas during sleep in Ferris v. Southern Surety Co., 1925, 157 La. 908 , 103 So. 259 ; and Estabrook v. Eastern Commercial T

1945Law, 1929 Ed., Sec. 1248, p. 4563, it is said: “It must be admitted, however, that the weight of authority, numerically at least, supports the view that accidental and involuntary inhalation of gas does not come within an exemption from liability in case of death from gas, unless the exemption clause expressly provides otherwise.” The exception suggested by the court itself in the Paul case, i. e., “death caused wholly or in part by gas,” has been held to include breathing gas during sleep in Ferris v. Southern Surety Co., 1925, 157 La. 908 , 103 So. 259 ; and Estabrook v. Eastern Commercial T

1945Co. v. Ayers, 1905, 217 Ill. 390 , 75 N. E. 506 .

1945Co. v. Ayers, 1905, 217 Ill. 390 , 75 N. E. 506 .