exemption clause in Missouri

1980Second, the jury panel was unconstitutionally structured because reliance solely on voter registration lists for its source of names per se prevented it from containing a fair representation of all distinctive groups in the community, e. g., blacks, females, various age groups, etc. As reaffirmed in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), “the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” The Supreme Court in Taylor, 95 S.Ct. at 702 , by way of elabor

1980Second, the jury panel was unconstitutionally structured because reliance solely on voter registration lists for its source of names per se prevented it from containing a fair representation of all distinctive groups in the community, e. g., blacks, females, various age groups, etc. As reaffirmed in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), “the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” The Supreme Court in Taylor, 95 S.Ct. at 702 , by way of elabor

1980Second, the jury panel was unconstitutionally structured because reliance solely on voter registration lists for its source of names per se prevented it from containing a fair representation of all distinctive groups in the community, e. g., blacks, females, various age groups, etc. As reaffirmed in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), “the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” The Supreme Court in Taylor, 95 S.Ct. at 702 , by way of elabor

1980Second, the jury panel was unconstitutionally structured because reliance solely on voter registration lists for its source of names per se prevented it from containing a fair representation of all distinctive groups in the community, e. g., blacks, females, various age groups, etc. As reaffirmed in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692, 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), “the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” The Supreme Court in Taylor, 95 S.Ct. at 702 , by way of elabor

1976“The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ . . . ‘[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

1976“The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ . . . ‘[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

1959In the case of Travelers Insurance Company v. Ohio Farmers Indemnity Company, D.C., 157 F.Supp. 54 , loc. cit. 60, the facts and policy provisions were similar in most respects to those presented in our case.

1958Co., 121 Neb. 447 , 237 N.W. 392 , the term ‘truck’ is defined as ‘a wheeled vehicle for carrying heavy weight; an automobile for transporting heavy loads.’ * * * .Certainly a light Ford pickup cab, with a maximum capacity of only 1,000 pounds which is used by an electrician or mechanic to transport the light tools with which he is employed, or which is used to convey light loads, or for family convenience or pleasure, may not be said to be an ‘automobile truck’ ”.

1958Co., 121 Neb. 447 , 237 N.W. 392 , the term ‘truck’ is defined as ‘a wheeled vehicle for carrying heavy weight; an automobile for transporting heavy loads.’ * * * .Certainly a light Ford pickup cab, with a maximum capacity of only 1,000 pounds which is used by an electrician or mechanic to transport the light tools with which he is employed, or which is used to convey light loads, or for family convenience or pleasure, may not be said to be an ‘automobile truck’ ”.

1925The law of Illinois is so written and we are bound by it." *Page 67 After reviewing a number of decisions from the supreme and appellate courts of Illinois, the learned opinion proceeds: "In Kiesewetter v. Knights of Maccabees, 227 Ill. 48 , the insurance contract provides that the defendant should not be liable in case of the `suicide of the insured, whether sane or insane.' The evidence showed that the insured committed suicide by hanging.

1920So this court in the Malone case, supra, speaking of the Miller case, and distinguishing; it from the case in hand, said: “Our attention is called to the case of Miller v. Illinois Banker’s Life Association (Ark.), 212 S. W. 310 , not yet officially reported.

1920Co. (Wis.), 172 N. W. 152 , the court evidently regarded an exemption clause of this character as valid, since it was careful to point out that the particular clause then in question restricted non-liability to deaths occurring while in military service and resulting from such service.

1911We have held that the homestead right does not rise to the dignity of an estate or interest in land. [Snodgrass v. Copple, 203 Mo. 480 .] Under this case the husband has practically only an exemption privilege accorded to him by the Legislature.

1905This agreement was not satisfied by a change in the routing and was a clear breach of the contract. [Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 310; Goodrich v. Thompson, 44 N. Y. 324 .] And the defendant is liable notwithstanding the exemption clause in the bill of lading. [G.

1905We so construed the contract on the former appeal ( 72 Mo. App. 296 ) and think this construction is supported by the case of Harp v. Grand Era, 1 Woods (U. S. C.

1905(Pa.) 261; Harris v. Howe, Receiver, 74 Texas 534 .] The contract of shipment expressly provides: “This contract is. accomplished and the liability "of the companies as common carriers thereunder, terminates on the arrival of the goods or property at the station or depot of delivery.” And if there was nothing in the waybill itself and no evidence to qualify the exemption clause, we would without hesitation, hold that the defendant’s liability ceased when, without reasonable delay, it delivered the car to the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company.

1904Now, while it was decided in City of Westport ex rel. v. McGee, supra, that the exemption clause aforesaid in section 1580, Revised Statutes 1889, was unconstitutional and void, it was also held that that clause was separable from the remainder of the section, whose-constitutionality was not affected thereby, and which, without this clause, constituted a valid and subsisting law authorizing cities of the fourth class to extend their limits, and so it must be held in this case that sec. 4932, Revised Statutes 1879, as amended by the act of 1883, constituted a valid and subsisting law, under whi

1903Co. v. Davey, supra, and of the fact that the law disfavors the forfeiture of life insurance policies of every hind, we feel authorized to interpolate into the exemption clause of the present certificate the qualification asserted in plaintiff’s instruction.

1893State v. Sutton, 24 Mo. 377 .