exemption clause in Arkansas

2024Id.

2011He cites Garabaldi, Adm’r v. Jones, 48 Ark. 230 , 2 S.W. 844 (1886), where the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a widow can alienate her right to the homestead.

1988Id.

1988This interpretation was first expressed in Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401 , 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).

1988This interpretation was first expressed in Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401 , 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).

1986Rowland v. State, 262 Ark. 783 , 561 S.W.2d 304 (1978); Asher v. City of Little Rock, 248 Ark. 96 , 449 S.W.2d 933 (1970).

1986Rowland v. State, 262 Ark. 783 , 561 S.W.2d 304 (1978); Asher v. City of Little Rock, 248 Ark. 96 , 449 S.W.2d 933 (1970).

1986Rowland v. State, 262 Ark. 783 , 561 S.W.2d 304 (1978); Asher v. City of Little Rock, 248 Ark. 96 , 449 S.W.2d 933 (1970).

1986Rowland v. State, 262 Ark. 783 , 561 S.W.2d 304 (1978); Asher v. City of Little Rock, 248 Ark. 96 , 449 S.W.2d 933 (1970).

1975Section 82-2630; Smith v. United States, 269 F. 2d 217 (D.C.

1969The opinion in Fordyce relied strongly on Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483 (1856), concluding that the latter case established the exemption as a rule of property: We believe that the case of Grissom v. Hill was rightly decided; but, if we thought otherwise, we should think it inexpedient to reverse a rule of property so long acquiesced in.

1956In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dobbs, 128 Tex. 547 , 100 S. W. 2d 349 , the court held that one who was employed by an independent contractor engaged in the business of spraying citrus trees, but who had nothing else to do with the planting and growing of the trees, was not a “farm laborer” within the exemption clause of the Compensation Act.

1956In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dobbs, 128 Tex. 547 , 100 S. W. 2d 349 , the court held that one who was employed by an independent contractor engaged in the business of spraying citrus trees, but who had nothing else to do with the planting and growing of the trees, was not a “farm laborer” within the exemption clause of the Compensation Act.

1955This was the effect of our decision in Wiseman v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 63 , 84 S. W. 2d 91 , where we held the same exemption clause constitutional on the authority of Bollinger v. Watson, 187 Ark. 1044 , 63 S. W. 2d 642 .

1955This was the effect of our decision in Wiseman v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 63 , 84 S. W. 2d 91 , where we held the same exemption clause constitutional on the authority of Bollinger v. Watson, 187 Ark. 1044 , 63 S. W. 2d 642 .

1955This was the effect of our decision in Wiseman v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 63 , 84 S. W. 2d 91 , where we held the same exemption clause constitutional on the authority of Bollinger v. Watson, 187 Ark. 1044 , 63 S. W. 2d 642 .

1955This was the effect of our decision in Wiseman v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 63 , 84 S. W. 2d 91 , where we held the same exemption clause constitutional on the authority of Bollinger v. Watson, 187 Ark. 1044 , 63 S. W. 2d 642 .

1950These are Article II, Section 18 of our State Constitution, which says: "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens [1] "; and also Article II, Section 19 of our State Constitution, which says: "* * * nor shall * * * privileges * * ever be granted or conferred in this State. * * *" In the early case of Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 42 , 51 Am.Rep. 550 (also a liquor case), Mr. Justice Eakin, in considering this constitutional language, said of a privilege: "It is, according to Bur

1945Appellees cite us to Moore v. Farmers’ Mutual Mfg. & Ginning Co., 51 Ariz. 378 , 77 Pac. 209 ; Aurrichio v. U. S., 49 Fed.

1945Appellees cite us to Moore v. Farmers’ Mutual Mfg. & Ginning Co., 51 Ariz. 378 , 77 Pac. 209 ; Aurrichio v. U. S., 49 Fed.

1937In Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907 , 69 S. W. (2d) 1081 , we had before us the phrase in the policy, attempting" to exempt the company, “participating in aviation or submarine operations.” The court there held that the word “aviation” was used in its adjective sense and limited or modified the word “operations.” In that case the court intimated that the language used in cases cited, that is, “participating as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics,” might be sufficient to exempt the insurance company from liability for death of a passenger while in an

1937In Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907 , 69 S. W. (2d) 1081 , we had before us the phrase in the policy, attempting" to exempt the company, “participating in aviation or submarine operations.” The court there held that the word “aviation” was used in its adjective sense and limited or modified the word “operations.” In that case the court intimated that the language used in cases cited, that is, “participating as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics,” might be sufficient to exempt the insurance company from liability for death of a passenger while in an

1929English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212 , 172 S. W. 817 .

1929English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212 , 172 S. W. 817 .

1927In Hindman v. O’Connor, 54 Ark. 627 , 16 S. W. 1052 , 13 L.

1927In Hindman v. O’Connor, 54 Ark. 627 , 16 S. W. 1052 , 13 L.

1920In Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445 , the court said: “The guarded language of the Constitution describing the property to be exempted as ‘buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for public charity,’ leaves no room for doubt that it was not the intention to exempt any other property from taxation save such as is used exclusively for public charity, and that the exemption can not be extended to property leased or rented and from which revenue is derived, though the same be applied solely to support the charity.” And in Hot Springs School District v. Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497 ,

1920In Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445 , the court said: “The guarded language of the Constitution describing the property to be exempted as ‘buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for public charity,’ leaves no room for doubt that it was not the intention to exempt any other property from taxation save such as is used exclusively for public charity, and that the exemption can not be extended to property leased or rented and from which revenue is derived, though the same be applied solely to support the charity.” And in Hot Springs School District v. Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497 ,

1920In Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445 , the court said: “The guarded language of the Constitution describing the property to be exempted as ‘buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for public charity,’ leaves no room for doubt that it was not the intention to exempt any other property from taxation save such as is used exclusively for public charity, and that the exemption can not be extended to property leased or rented and from which revenue is derived, though the same be applied solely to support the charity.” And in Hot Springs School District v. Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497 ,

1919In the case of Harrington v. White, 131 Ark. 291 , this court indulged the presumption of the regularity of the passage of a bill where the House and Senate journals were in conflict as to the inclusion of four counties in an exemption clause contained therein.

1898Our attention has been called to the decision in the case of Randolph v. Little, 62 Ala. 396 , in support of the opposite doctrine; but, on careful'inspection, it will appear that the dissenting opinion in Webb v. Edwards, 46 Ala. 17 , upon which Randolph v. Little is expressly based, was to the effect that evidences of indebtedness owing by a garnishee to the defendant in judgment, and other choses in action, were not the subject of exemption under the peculiar statutes of Alabama.

1898Our attention has been called to the decision in the case of Randolph v. Little, 62 Ala. 396 , in support of the opposite doctrine; but, on careful'inspection, it will appear that the dissenting opinion in Webb v. Edwards, 46 Ala. 17 , upon which Randolph v. Little is expressly based, was to the effect that evidences of indebtedness owing by a garnishee to the defendant in judgment, and other choses in action, were not the subject of exemption under the peculiar statutes of Alabama.