9 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Piedmont Canteen Service, Inc. v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2009Parkdale, as the party “claim[ing] an exemption or exception from tax coverage,” bears the “burden of bringing [itjself within the exemption or exception.” Canteen Service v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 256 N.C. 155, 163 , 123 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1962). 2009Parkdale, as the party “claim[ing] an exemption or exception from tax coverage,” bears the “burden of bringing [itjself within the exemption or exception.” Canteen Service v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 256 N.C. 155, 163 , 123 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1962). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Suggsgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C 2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Flowegreen2 sentences2009At oral argument, DOR conceded that, for purposes of section (23)(b), a Yarn Pak is a “container”; that it is “used as packaging”; that it holds “tangible personal property”; and that it is “required to be returned to [Parkdale] for reuse.” DOR claims, however, that Parkdale is not entitled to the exemption because “[t]he plain language [of the statute] only exempts containers that enclose tangible personal property.” (Emphasis added.) “A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law” and the first principle of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain the intent of the 2009At oral argument, DOR conceded that, for purposes of section (23)(b), a Yarn Pak is a “container”; that it is “used as packaging”; that it holds “tangible personal property”; and that it is “required to be returned to [Parkdale] for reuse.” DOR claims, however, that Parkdale is not entitled to the exemption because “[t]he plain language [of the statute] only exempts containers that enclose tangible personal property.” (Emphasis added.) “A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law” and the first principle of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain the intent of the | 1 | 1 |
Watson Industries, Inc. v. Shawgreen2 sentences2009At oral argument, DOR conceded that, for purposes of section (23)(b), a Yarn Pak is a “container”; that it is “used as packaging”; that it holds “tangible personal property”; and that it is “required to be returned to [Parkdale] for reuse.” DOR claims, however, that Parkdale is not entitled to the exemption because “[t]he plain language [of the statute] only exempts containers that enclose tangible personal property.” (Emphasis added.) “A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law” and the first principle of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain the intent of the 2009At oral argument, DOR conceded that, for purposes of section (23)(b), a Yarn Pak is a “container”; that it is “used as packaging”; that it holds “tangible personal property”; and that it is “required to be returned to [Parkdale] for reuse.” DOR claims, however, that Parkdale is not entitled to the exemption because “[t]he plain language [of the statute] only exempts containers that enclose tangible personal property.” (Emphasis added.) “A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law” and the first principle of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain the intent of the | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. North Carolina State Board of Electionsgreen2 sentences2004Stat. § 126-22 as an exemption to the rule on disclosure of public records); Bd. of Elections, 153 N.C. 2004App. at 806 , 570 S.E.2d at 898 (upholding exception to Public Records Act based on specific statutory provision limiting access to election ballots). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sabine v. . Gill, Comr. of Revenue
green
2 sentences1974Canteen Service v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 256 N.C. 155 , 123 S.E. 2d 582 (1962) ; Sabine v. Gill, Comr. of Revenue, 229 N.C. 599 , 51 S.E. 2d 1 (1948). 1974Canteen Service v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue, 256 N.C. 155 , 123 S.E. 2d 582 (1962) ; Sabine v. Gill, Comr. of Revenue, 229 N.C. 599 , 51 S.E. 2d 1 (1948). | 2 | 1962–1974 |
PARKDALE AMERICA, LLC v. Hinton
green
2 sentences2016A party claiming a statutory exemption bears the burden "of bringing [it]self within the exemption or exception." Parkdale America, LLC v. Hinton, 200 N.C.App. 275 , 278, 684 S.E.2d 458 , 461 (2009). 2016A party claiming a statutory exemption bears the burden "of bringing [it]self within the exemption or exception." Parkdale America, LLC v. Hinton, 200 N.C.App. 275 , 278, 684 S.E.2d 458 , 461 (2009). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Melvin
green
2 sentences2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C 2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Overton
green
2 sentences2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C 2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Food House, Inc. v. Coble, SEC. of Revenue
green
1 sentence1995Therefore, we concluded that because natural orange juice met the exemption requirement under the statute when sold bottled, “it follows that frozen concentrated orange juice, as an ingredient of natural orange juice, cannot be taxed under the Act.” Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Motor Co. v. . Maxwell, Comr. of Revenue
neutral
2 sentences1962Sabine v. Gill, 229 N.C. 599 , 51 S.E. 2d 1 ; Henderson v. Gill, supra; Motor Co. v. Maxwell, 210 N.C. 725 , 188 S.E. 389 ; Smoky Mountain Canteen Co. v. Kizer, 247 S.W. 2d 69 (Tenn. 1952). 1962Sabine v. Gill, 229 N.C. 599 , 51 S.E. 2d 1 ; Henderson v. Gill, supra; Motor Co. v. Maxwell, 210 N.C. 725 , 188 S.E. 389 ; Smoky Mountain Canteen Co. v. Kizer, 247 S.W. 2d 69 (Tenn. 1952). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Smoky Mountain Canteen Co. v. Kizer
green
1 sentence1962Sabine v. Gill, 229 N.C. 599 , 51 S.E. 2d 1 ; Henderson v. Gill, supra; Motor Co. v. Maxwell, 210 N.C. 725 , 188 S.E. 389 ; Smoky Mountain Canteen Co. v. Kizer, 247 S.W. 2d 69 (Tenn. 1952). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Valentine v. . Gill, Comr. of Revenue
green
1 sentence1948We are reminded in appellee’s brief that the burden is on the taxpayer to show that she conies within the exemption or exception, Henderson v. Gill, ante, 313, 49 S. E. (2) 754; Valentine v. Gill, 223 N. C. 396 , 27 S. E. (2) 2 : Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751 , 185 S. E. 6 ; and it is also true that the taxing law as to its coverage must be construed more strictly in favor of the taxpayer; and it seems to be especially pertinent to the problem under consideration that the state is never presumed to surrender or relinquish its taxing power unless the intention “to relinquish it is de | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Town of Benson v. County of Johnston
green
2 sentences1948We are reminded in appellee’s brief that the burden is on the taxpayer to show that she conies within the exemption or exception, Henderson v. Gill, ante, 313, 49 S. E. (2) 754; Valentine v. Gill, 223 N. C. 396 , 27 S. E. (2) 2 : Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751 , 185 S. E. 6 ; and it is also true that the taxing law as to its coverage must be construed more strictly in favor of the taxpayer; and it seems to be especially pertinent to the problem under consideration that the state is never presumed to surrender or relinquish its taxing power unless the intention “to relinquish it is de 1948We are reminded in appellee’s brief that the burden is on the taxpayer to show that she conies within the exemption or exception, Henderson v. Gill, ante, 313, 49 S. E. (2) 754; Valentine v. Gill, 223 N. C. 396 , 27 S. E. (2) 2 : Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751 , 185 S. E. 6 ; and it is also true that the taxing law as to its coverage must be construed more strictly in favor of the taxpayer; and it seems to be especially pertinent to the problem under consideration that the state is never presumed to surrender or relinquish its taxing power unless the intention “to relinquish it is de | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Mitchell v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co.
neutral
1 sentence1921An appeal from a refusal to dismiss an action is not appealable, but “our decisions are to the effect that the refusal to dismiss a warrant of attachment is an appealable order, and unless appealed. from, the questions involved become res judicata.” Hoke, J., in Mitchell v. Lumber Co., 169 N. C., 397 , citing Judd v. Mining Co., 120 N. C., 397 , and other cases. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Judd v. Crawford Gold Mining Co.
neutral
1 sentence1921An appeal from a refusal to dismiss an action is not appealable, but “our decisions are to the effect that the refusal to dismiss a warrant of attachment is an appealable order, and unless appealed. from, the questions involved become res judicata.” Hoke, J., in Mitchell v. Lumber Co., 169 N. C., 397 , citing Judd v. Mining Co., 120 N. C., 397 , and other cases. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.