exemption bar in Rhode Island

2004It would be terribly unfair to read an exemption statute, which was created to protect a pension for the benefit of a retired employee’s family, in such a way that the exemption would bar children or a former spouse from receiving support from the very fund created for their benefit, and would once again deny them the benefits of the income they sacrificed to a pension years before.” Id. (quoting Young v. Young, 507 Pa. 40 , 488 A.2d 264, 269 (1985)).

2004It would be terribly unfair to read an exemption statute, which was created to protect a pension for the benefit of a retired employee's family, in such a way that the exemption would bar children or a former spouse from receiving support from the very fund created for their benefit, and would once again deny them the benefits of the income they sacrificed to a pension years before." Id. (quoting Young v. Young, 507 Pa. 40 , 488 A.2d 264, 269 (1985)).

2008In determining whether the conduct at issue is exempt from the RIDTPA, "step one of the exemption analysis requires the party claiming the exemption to demonstrate that the general activities complained of are subject to monitoring or regulation by a state or federal government agency." Lynch v. Conley , 853 A.2d 1212 , 1214 (R.I. 2004).

2004If a court determines that the activities are so regulated, the burden shifts to the party seeking to enforce the DTPA to establish that “the specific acts at issue are not covered by the exemption.” Id.

1982The same issue was recently addressed by this court in State v. Ballard, R.I., 439 A.2d 1375 (1982).

1897As to the defendant’s contention that the rule of caveat emptor applies as to the fitness of the leased premises for the use to which the tenant puts them — that is, that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a store or warehouse that the building is well built or fit for any particular use, we reply that, admitting this to be the law — and the cases are substantially to that effect — see Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89 ; McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. 313 ; Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316 ; Lucas v. Coulter, 104 Ind. 81 ; Tayl.

1897As to the defendant’s contention that the rule of caveat emptor applies as to the fitness of the leased premises for the use to which the tenant puts them — that is, that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a store or warehouse that the building is well built or fit for any particular use, we reply that, admitting this to be the law — and the cases are substantially to that effect — see Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89 ; McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. 313 ; Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316 ; Lucas v. Coulter, 104 Ind. 81 ; Tayl.

1897As to the defendant’s contention that the rule of caveat emptor applies as to the fitness of the leased premises for the use to which the tenant puts them — that is, that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a store or warehouse that the building is well built or fit for any particular use, we reply that, admitting this to be the law — and the cases are substantially to that effect — see Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89 ; McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. 313 ; Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316 ; Lucas v. Coulter, 104 Ind. 81 ; Tayl.