exemption claim in Colorado

2015In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), superseded by statute as stated in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. --, 134 S.C. 2751 , 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014), the Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states.

2015In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), superseded by statute as stated in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. --, 134 S.C. 2751 , 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014), the Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states.

2015In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), superseded by statute as stated in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. --, 134 S.C. 2751 , 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014), the Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states.

2015In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 , 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), superseded by statute as stated in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. --, 134 S.C. 2751 , 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014), the Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states.

2009P'ship 1983-A v. Harrison, 791 P.2d 1139 , *732 1148 (Colo.App.1989) (party asserting affirmative defense of exemption from registration has burden of proving entitlement to exemption).

2003See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 , 117 S.Ct. 1659 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).

2003See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 , 117 S.Ct. 1659 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).

1991These exemptions are construed narrowly against an employer, Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388 , 80 S.Ct. 453 , 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960), and the employer bears the burden of proving that a given employee qualifies for the exemption.

1991These exemptions are construed narrowly against an employer, Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388 , 80 S.Ct. 453 , 4 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960), and the employer bears the burden of proving that a given employee qualifies for the exemption.

1957We must, therefore, be equally cautious to see to it that this exemption be not so restricted, limited and constricted in the interpretation of its terms and provisions as to destroy its effect. * * *” This court also stated, in the case of Maley et al. v. Martin et al., 111 Colo. 545 , 144 P. (2d) 559 : “We cannot extend the rule of liberal construction to a case that is removed by the statute itself.” The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to vacate the award of the commission and deny the claim.

1934Co. , 49 Colo. 475 , 113 Pac. 1010 . [3] It is beyond reason to construe the conditions of these contracts, relied on by Otis company for exemption, so that they will mean that Oil Exchange Building contracted to excuse and exempt Otis company from its own negligence, and the language of the exemption clause does not, in unequivocal terms, so relieve it.

1906Afterwards, by the act of 1892, the legislature of New’ York, for the purpose-, as the courts held, of compelling a different construction of the act from that theretofore adhered to by them, expressly provided that the word “estate” and “property” when used in the succession tax law shall be taken to mean the property or interest therein of the testator, intestate, grantor, etc., and not as the property or interest therein passing or transferred to- individual legatees, devisees, etc. In obedience to the legislative mandate, the courts thereafter, and so long as the statute was ip force, have

1906Afterwards, by the act of 1892, the legislature of New’ York, for the purpose-, as the courts held, of compelling a different construction of the act from that theretofore adhered to by them, expressly provided that the word “estate” and “property” when used in the succession tax law shall be taken to mean the property or interest therein of the testator, intestate, grantor, etc., and not as the property or interest therein passing or transferred to- individual legatees, devisees, etc. In obedience to the legislative mandate, the courts thereafter, and so long as the statute was ip force, have

1906In State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495 , under a statute providing that “All propertys * * * which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state, * * * other, than to or for the use of the father, mother, * * # ■ shall be liable to a tax of two and a half per cent, of its value, above the sum of five hundred dollars. ’ ’ It was held that the exemption of five hundred dollars is not an exemption from the corpus of the estate, but a several exemption of that sum from each portion of the estate passing by will or descent to persons outside of the exempted classes.