exemption clause in Tennessee

1979Bank v. McCanless, 176 Tenn. 570 , 144 S.W.2d 768 (1940); Farrington v. State of Tenn., 95 U.S. 679 , 24 L.Ed. 558 (1878).” Appellant argues that in the case at bar there exists a “well founded doubt” that is fatal to the exemption claim.

1979Bank v. McCanless, 176 Tenn. 570 , 144 S.W.2d 768 (1940); Farrington v. State of Tenn., 95 U.S. 679 , 24 L.Ed. 558 (1878).” Appellant argues that in the case at bar there exists a “well founded doubt” that is fatal to the exemption claim.

2005Id.

1979Bank v. McCanless, 176 Tenn. 570 , 144 S.W.2d 768 (1940); Farrington v. State of Tenn., 95 U.S. 679 , 24 L.Ed. 558 (1878).” Appellant argues that in the case at bar there exists a “well founded doubt” that is fatal to the exemption claim.

1979Bank v. McCanless, 176 Tenn. 570 , 144 S.W.2d 768 (1940); Farrington v. State of Tenn., 95 U.S. 679 , 24 L.Ed. 558 (1878).” Appellant argues that in the case at bar there exists a “well founded doubt” that is fatal to the exemption claim.

1974In Fell v. Armour, D.C., 355 F.Supp. 1319 (1972), the court held that this provision does not violate due process of law.

1945It is equally plain from the opinion of the Court in Bell v. Town of Pulaski, 179 Tenn. 542 , 167 S. W. (2d) 985 , that the only constitutional objection to this legislation was that the Act of 1939 described it as repealing instead of as amendatory — the exemption clause out of the way.

1945It is equally plain from the opinion of the Court in Bell v. Town of Pulaski, 179 Tenn. 542 , 167 S. W. (2d) 985 , that the only constitutional objection to this legislation was that the Act of 1939 described it as repealing instead of as amendatory — the exemption clause out of the way.

1938Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn., 423 , 95 S. W. (2d), 917, 919 .

1938Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn., 423 , 95 S. W. (2d), 917, 919 .

1933The case was cited with approval, and followed, in Martin v. Guilford County, — N. C., —, 158 S. E., 847 , 76 A. L.

1913Thus, in State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn., 233, 241 , 10 S. W., 284, 286 , where a liberal construction was declared proper to be indulged in respect of a corporation for public welfare, it was said: “The same strictness of construction will not be indulged when the exemption is to religious, scientific, literary, and educational institutions that will be applied in considering exemptions to corporations created and operating for private gain or profit.” In M.

1913Thus, in State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn., 233, 241 , 10 S. W., 284, 286 , where a liberal construction was declared proper to be indulged in respect of a corporation for public welfare, it was said: “The same strictness of construction will not be indulged when the exemption is to religious, scientific, literary, and educational institutions that will be applied in considering exemptions to corporations created and operating for private gain or profit.” In M.

1912This Georgia ¡case is directly contrary to Bank v. Memphis, supra, unless differentiated by the dissimilar constitutional pro-jtiaiona applicable, respectively» But we find that the supreme court of the United States, in the very recent case of Berryman v. Board of Trustees, 222 U. S., 334, 350 , 32 Sup. Ct., 147, 151, 56 L.

1912This Georgia ¡case is directly contrary to Bank v. Memphis, supra, unless differentiated by the dissimilar constitutional pro-jtiaiona applicable, respectively» But we find that the supreme court of the United States, in the very recent case of Berryman v. Board of Trustees, 222 U. S., 334, 350 , 32 Sup. Ct., 147, 151, 56 L.

1897The exemption clause construed in Memphis v. Bank, 91 Tenn., 546 , and held to include privilege taxation, recited that the charter tax named should “be in lieu of all other taxes.” Of the same import were the exemption clauses before the Court in Memphis v. Hernando Insurance Co., 6 Bax., 527 , and in Bank v. State, 9 Yer., 490 , where, like holdings were made.

1884If subsequent to it, the reverse would be true. — Code, 1876, § 2844; Code, 1867, § 2884; Peevey v. Cabaniss, 70 Ala. 258 ; Fearn v. Ward, 65 Ala. 33 ; Nelson v. McCreary, 60 Ala, 301.

1877To the same effect is Philadelphia Railroad Company v. Bayless, 2 Gill, 355 .