day hearing in Illinois

2015Id. at 66 .

2014Id. at 66 .

2009We find defendant's reliance on Day to be misplaced because the Day defendant was unaware of the undercover activities that had transpired and the court concluded that his immediate apprehension was not necessary to prevent flight or the destruction of evidence ( Day, 165 Ill.App.3d at 268 , 116 Ill.Dec. 525 , 519 N.E.2d 115 ).

2009We find defendant's reliance on Day to be misplaced because the Day defendant was unaware of the undercover activities that had transpired and the court concluded that his immediate apprehension was not necessary to prevent flight or the destruction of evidence ( Day, 165 Ill.App.3d at 268 , 116 Ill.Dec. 525 , 519 N.E.2d 115 ).

2006With regard to this argument, we note that the circuit court allowed Baldwin to file the Marconi affidavit on the day it heard arguments on the motion, but then failed to make reference to the affidavit in its written order and memorandum opinion and, in fact, stated that Coglianese's motion was made "in the absence of contradictory affidavits." Whether to consider affidavits filed after a hearing on a motion to dismiss is within the discretion of the trial court since " '[i]t is not intended cases should be heard piecemeal.' " Tomlen Group, Ltd. v. Goldfarb, 101 Ill.

2006With regard to this argument, we note that the circuit court allowed Baldwin to file the Marconi affidavit on the day it heard arguments on the motion, but then failed to make reference to the affidavit in its written order and memorandum opinion and, in fact, stated that Coglianese’s motion was made “in the absence of contradictory affidavits.” Whether to consider affidavits filed after a hearing on a motion to dismiss is within the discretion of the trial court since “ ‘[i]t is not intended cases should be heard piecemeal.’ ” Tomlen Group, Ltd. v. Goldfarb, 101 Ill.

1991(James, 157 Ill.

1989App. 3d 450, 456-57 , 510 N.E.2d 531 , plaintiffs filed a report of an expert in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the same day hearing of the motion for summary judgment was held, but after a deadline for disclosure of expert witnesses set by the court at a pretrial conference.

1988Respondent finds this amount of preparation to be analogous to his having been appointed on the day of the hearing, as was the case in Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45 , 77 L.

1988Respondent finds this amount of preparation to be analogous to his having been appointed on the day of the hearing, as was the case in Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45 , 77 L.

2026B.K., 362 Ill.

2026“We will not overturn the trial court’s decision absent manifest abuse or palpable injustice.” Id. ¶ 20 Given respondent was represented by counsel, respondent and his grandmother were given notice of the hearing, reminded of the hearing the day it was held, indicated the day of the hearing they would join the hearing via Zoom, and were sent a link to participate in the hearing, we agree with appellate counsel that any argument error arose when the trial court did not grant respondent’s attorney a continuance would be without arguable merit. ¶ 21 As a result, we agree with appellate counsel th

2024Further, the plain language of section 2-1005(c) clearly allows for an expert affidavit to be filed the day of the hearing. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2022). ¶ 34 However, in light of Chicago Park District v. Richardson, 220 Ill.

2022Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729 , holding that Public Act 99-0258 (eff.

2017As to the late disclosure, the trial court noted that the documents were tendered in rebuttal to the argument raised the previous day by the defense, which had “opened the door.” The trial court -6- 2017 IL App (2d) 160589 also questioned whether the basic premise of this argument—that the CAs did not have any right to the rental proceeds unless they had obtained orders of possession for the units—was a valid defense, commenting that, even if the CAs had not properly perfected their legal interest in the rental proceeds, “that does not mean that [Walker] had any right to abscond with the proce

1994(See Intini v. Schwartz (1979), 78 Ill.

1992Defendant cites several cases in support of his thesis that delay cannot be attributed to the defendant where the record is silent as to whether the defendant agreed to the delay ( People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 949, 951 , 33 Ill.Dec. 349, 350 , 396 N.E.2d 876, 877 ); that delays caused by docket crowding and prosecutorial overloads are attributable to the prosecution and not to the defendant ( People v. DeCarlis (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 634, 638 , 43 Ill.Dec. 677, 680 , 410 N.E.2d 677, 680 ); and that discharge is a proper remedy for failure to afford to defendant a speedy trial ( Pe

1992Defendant cites several cases in support of his thesis that delay cannot be attributed to the defendant where the record is silent as to whether the defendant agreed to the delay ( People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 949, 951 , 33 Ill.Dec. 349, 350 , 396 N.E.2d 876, 877 ); that delays caused by docket crowding and prosecutorial overloads are attributable to the prosecution and not to the defendant ( People v. DeCarlis (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 634, 638 , 43 Ill.Dec. 677, 680 , 410 N.E.2d 677, 680 ); and that discharge is a proper remedy for failure to afford to defendant a speedy trial ( Pe

1992Defendant cites several cases in support of his thesis that delay cannot be attributed to the defendant where the record is silent as to whether the defendant agreed to the delay ( People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 949, 951 , 33 Ill.Dec. 349, 350 , 396 N.E.2d 876, 877 ); that delays caused by docket crowding and prosecutorial overloads are attributable to the prosecution and not to the defendant ( People v. DeCarlis (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 634, 638 , 43 Ill.Dec. 677, 680 , 410 N.E.2d 677, 680 ); and that discharge is a proper remedy for failure to afford to defendant a speedy trial ( Pe

1992Defendant cites several cases in support of his thesis that delay cannot be attributed to the defendant where the record is silent as to whether the defendant agreed to the delay (People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill.

1992Defendant cites several cases in support of his thesis that delay cannot be attributed to the defendant where the record is silent as to whether the defendant agreed to the delay ( People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 949, 951 , 33 Ill.Dec. 349, 350 , 396 N.E.2d 876, 877 ); that delays caused by docket crowding and prosecutorial overloads are attributable to the prosecution and not to the defendant ( People v. DeCarlis (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 634, 638 , 43 Ill.Dec. 677, 680 , 410 N.E.2d 677, 680 ); and that discharge is a proper remedy for failure to afford to defendant a speedy trial ( Pe

1992Defendant cites several cases in support of his thesis that delay cannot be attributed to the defendant where the record is silent as to whether the defendant agreed to the delay ( People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 949, 951 , 33 Ill.Dec. 349, 350 , 396 N.E.2d 876, 877 ); that delays caused by docket crowding and prosecutorial overloads are attributable to the prosecution and not to the defendant ( People v. DeCarlis (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 634, 638 , 43 Ill.Dec. 677, 680 , 410 N.E.2d 677, 680 ); and that discharge is a proper remedy for failure to afford to defendant a speedy trial ( Pe

1990After going over with counsel the chain of ownership from AMCO to First United I to First United II, the trial court granted the motion as to the Holding Group (Hamer Holding Group, Inc.) and First United I (First United Property Management Company, Inc.) but denied the motion as to First United II (Studio 2, Inc., which pursuant to a name change on December 5, 1988, three days after the complaint was filed, became known as First United Property Management Company, Inc.). 4 At the close of the final day of hearing evidence, the court found that the restrictive covenant itself was “clear and un

1990App. 3d 717 , 451 N.E.2d 1338 , the judge held that any special circumstances which would permit enforcement were lacking.

1988She cites in support People v. Bell (1987), 152 Ill.

1982App. 3d 941, 954 , 399 N.E.2d 623 .) In the case at bar, the respondent did not ask for a continuance until the day of the hearing.

1978(See Vollentine v. Christoff, 24 Ill.

1978App. 3d 1025, 1028-29 , 333 N.E.2d 674 .) In the instant case, although counsel was appointed on the day of the hearing and played essentially a passive role in the proceeding, we do not see how the children were substantially prejudiced by that representation.

1976This was proper as noted in Varap v. Varap (1st Dist. 1966), 76 Ill.

1973(Radford v. Withrow, 401 Ill. 14 , 81 N.E.2d 417 ; Frye v. Hunt, 365 Ill. 32 , 5 N.E.2d 398 .) This right applies not only to questions of substance regarding the need for such a Unit District but also to the sufficiency of the petition itself.

1973(Radford v. Withrow, 401 Ill. 14 , 81 N.E.2d 417 ; Frye v. Hunt, 365 Ill. 32 , 5 N.E.2d 398 .) This right applies not only to questions of substance regarding the need for such a Unit District but also to the sufficiency of the petition itself.

1973(Radford v. Withrow, 401 Ill. 14 , 81 N.E.2d 417 ; Frye v. Hunt, 365 Ill. 32 , 5 N.E.2d 398 .) This right applies not only to questions of substance regarding the need for such a Unit District but also to the sufficiency of the petition itself.

1973(Radford v. Withrow, 401 Ill. 14 , 81 N.E.2d 417 ; Frye v. Hunt, 365 Ill. 32 , 5 N.E.2d 398 .) This right applies not only to questions of substance regarding the need for such a Unit District but also to the sufficiency of the petition itself.

1941(DeCarrion v. Industrial Com. 370 Ill. 474 .) The testimony recounted, together with Girardi’s occupation and his hospitalization from November 22, 1938, to and including December 15, 1939, the day of the hearing before the Industrial Commission, tend to corroborate the opinions of Dr. Lang and Dr. Magnolia.

1919The rule forbidding such a practice is too well settled to admit of question, and must have the approval of all persons interested in judicial records.” In Cameron v. Clinton, 259 Ill. 599 , the Supreme Court at page 601 says: ‘ ‘ This decree bears the signature of the judge who presided at the hearing, and the notation, ‘Filed August 2, 1911, as of May 3, 1911.’ From this record it appears, that no decree was entered of record during the April term, but that the draft of the decree was presented for record to the clerk of the court on the 2d day of August, which was in vacation, and was by hi

1918Section 13 of the Levee act provides that after the appointment of the commissioners and the filing of their report the court shall fix a day for the hearing thereon, and when the case was here on the former appeal, following the case of Merkle Drainage District v. Hathaway, 260 Ill. 186 , we held that the plea was insufficient because it failed to show that the county court had continued the case to a day certain for a hearing on the commissioners’ report.

1914The organization of a drainage district is a statutory proceeding, and every essential step- required by statute is necessary to the jurisdiction of the court organizing such district and must appear affirmatively of record.—Aldridge v. Clear Creek Drainage District, 253 Ill. 251 .” A judgment entered after the court has lost jurisdiction in the cause is, a nullity and may be attacked at any time by any person and in any court or proceeding.