day hearing in Alabama

2007A ‘new and independent obligation’ exists when ‘the insurer, acting independently of its insured, enters into a contract with, or commits a tort against, a third-party claimant.’ 507 So.2d at 450 .” (Second emphasis added.) Thus, if Safeway, in its efforts to negotiate a settlement of Day’s claim, entered into a contract with, or committed a tort against, State Farm, State Farm could bring a direct action against Safeway.

2007A `new and independent obligation' exists when the insurer, acting independently of its insured, enters into a contract with, or commits a tort against, a third-party claimant. ' 507 So.2d at 450 ." (Second emphasis added.) Thus, if Safeway, in its efforts to negotiate a settlement of Day's claim, entered into a contract with, or committed a tort against, State Farm, State Farm could bring a direct action against Safeway.

1988Bank of Mobile , 380 So.2d 797 , 799 (Ala. 1980), this Court stated: "It is clear from the above quoted portions of Rule 12 and 56 that: if a motion *Page 702 under Rule 12(b)(6) is converted into a motion for summary judgment, both parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to submit affidavits and other extraneous proofs to avoid a party being taken by surprise through conversion of the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. [Citations omitted.] It is also clear that the spirit of Rule 56 requires the same notice and hearing where the court contemplates summary judgment on its o

1980Davis v. Howard , 561 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore's Federal Practice , Vol. 2A, ¶ 12.09 (3), N. 25.

2026Gill, 36 So. 3d at 33 (citing Selby, 403 So. 2d at 220)).

2009Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Day's motion for a new trial insofar as that motion was premised on the jury's consideration of tax liability and attorney fees in determining the damages award.3 "3 We have not overlooked Clarke-Mobile Counties Gas District v. Reeves, 628 So.2d 368 (Ala.1993), a plurality decision of this Court, upon which Day relies.

2007Therefore, we conclude that the [defendants] did not waive their objection." 776 So.2d at 78 -79 .

2007"Whether to grant or to deny a motion to continue in a termination-of-parental-rights case is within the discretion of the court and its decision will not be reversed absent a showing that the court has abused its discretion." S.C.D. v. Etowah County Dep't of Human Res. , 841 So.2d 277 , 278 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002). *Page 504 The record contains a lengthy conversation between the juvenile-court judge and the father's counsel regarding a recent snowstorm in New York that the father referenced as the reason for his absence and his need to seek a continuance.

2007Hayes v. Boykin , 271 Ala. 588 , 126 So.2d 91 (1960).

2007Hayes v. Boykin , 271 Ala. 588 , 126 So.2d 91 (1960).

1993Kelly v. Harrison , 547 So.2d 443 (Ala. 1989).

1991This court, in Fortner v. State , 582 So.2d 581 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), cert. denied , 582 So.2d 587 (Ala. 1991), addressed this same question.

1991This court, in Fortner v. State , 582 So.2d 581 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), cert. denied , 582 So.2d 587 (Ala. 1991), addressed this same question.

1991Section 8-6-17 reads: "It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, to: "(1) Employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; "(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or "(3) Engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." The indictment alleged that Day bought stock options withou

1990Murray relies on Nolen v. Peterson , 544 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1989), in which this Court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in rejecting the plaintiff's counter-affidavits filed on the day of the hearing on the pending motion for summary judgment.

1990Bass v. SouthTrust Bank , supra. However, on the day of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted the deposition of L.M.

1989In Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539 , 566 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 2979 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that "an inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." The record before us supports Thompson's contention that the sole reason for the unavailability of the witnesses he sought to call was that they had been transferred, for administrative reasons, to another institution on the day of the hearing.

1989In Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539 , 566 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 2979 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that "an inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." The record before us supports Thompson's contention that the sole reason for the unavailability of the witnesses he sought to call was that they had been transferred, for administrative reasons, to another institution on the day of the hearing.

1988Bank of Mobile , 380 So.2d 797 , 799 (Ala. 1980), this Court stated: "It is clear from the above quoted portions of Rule 12 and 56 that: if a motion *Page 702 under Rule 12(b)(6) is converted into a motion for summary judgment, both parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to submit affidavits and other extraneous proofs to avoid a party being taken by surprise through conversion of the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. [Citations omitted.] It is also clear that the spirit of Rule 56 requires the same notice and hearing where the court contemplates summary judgment on its o

1988Bank of Mobile , 380 So.2d 797 , 799 (Ala. 1980), this Court stated: "It is clear from the above quoted portions of Rule 12 and 56 that: if a motion *Page 702 under Rule 12(b)(6) is converted into a motion for summary judgment, both parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to submit affidavits and other extraneous proofs to avoid a party being taken by surprise through conversion of the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. [Citations omitted.] It is also clear that the spirit of Rule 56 requires the same notice and hearing where the court contemplates summary judgment on its o

1981The notice attached as Exhibit 4 to the bill, issued on the 4th day of April, 1925, directed to the alleged lunatic, purporting to give notice of the filing of the petition and the hour and date of hearing and purporting to have served on the day of the hearing, whether before or after the hour set for the trial it does not appear, was not authorized by the statute, and the probate court was without authority to substitute this for the notice provided by the statute, the service of the writ issued to the sheriff to take the body of the alleged lunatic into his custody, and the service of this

1981The notice attached as Exhibit 4 to the bill, issued on the 4th day of April, 1925, directed to the alleged lunatic, purporting to give notice of the filing of the petition and the hour and date of hearing and purporting to have served on the day of the hearing, whether before or after the hour set for the trial it does not appear, was not authorized by the statute, and the probate court was without authority to substitute this for the notice provided by the statute, the service of the writ issued to the sheriff to take the body of the alleged lunatic into his custody, and the service of this

1981Farina v. Mission Investment Trust, 615 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1980); L.

1930Day v. City of Montgomery, 209 Ala. 609 , 96 So. 894 ; Id., 207 Ala. 644 , 93 So. 609 ; 44 C.

1930Day v. City of Montgomery, 209 Ala. 609 , 96 So. 894 ; Id., 207 Ala. 644 , 93 So. 609 ; 44 C.

1930Day v. City of Montgomery, 209 Ala. 609 , 96 So. 894 ; Id., 207 Ala. 644 , 93 So. 609 ; 44 C.

1930Day v. City of Montgomery, 209 Ala. 609 , 96 So. 894 ; Id., 207 Ala. 644 , 93 So. 609 ; 44 C.

1888Though an error, which may have occurred in a duly certified transcript of judicial proceedings, can not be corrected or amended by parol evidence; yet, when an inspection of the entire record discovers the nature and extent of the error, it corrects itself; and the court will regard it as corrected, when the validity of the proceedings is collaterally impeached.' — King v. Martin, 67 Ala. 177 .