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12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hopkins v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1979See Hopkins v. United States, 4 App.D.C. 430, 439 (1894) (year and a day rule does not absolve one from liability for “homicide or murder” if death occurs within a year and a day, although proper treatment may have prolonged life beyond that time). 1979See Hopkins v. United States, 4 App.D.C. 430, 439 (1894) (year and a day rule does not absolve one from liability for "homicide or murder" if death occurs within a year and a day, although proper treatment may have prolonged life beyond that time). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1998In Jackson , the court so characterized, and prospectively abrogated the "year and a day rule,” under which a defendant could be prosecuted for homicide only if the victim died within a year and a day of the injury which the defendant had inflicted. 528 A.2d at 1216-20 . . 1998United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211 (D.C.1987), related to the application of a law abrogating the "year and a day rule,” a rule that, at the time the crime for which the defendant was charged took place, granted him total immunity from prosecution for murder. 5 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences1979See State v. Brown, 21 Md.App. 91 , 318 A.2d 257 (Ct.Spec.App.1974) (year and a day rule, as part of the common law of England, adopted by Maryland in 1776; see also Louisville, Evansville and St. 1979App. 91 , 318 A.2d 257 (Ct.Spec.App.1974) (year and a day rule, as part of the common law of England, adopted by Maryland in 1776; see also Louisville, Evansville and St. | 1 | 2 |
Matter of Coopergreen1 sentence1994See In re Cooper, 613 A.2d 938 (D.C.1992) (six-month suspension with requirement of fitness for negligent misappropriation of client funds by attorney who admitted cocaine addiction); In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378 (D.C. 1984) (two-year suspension with requirement of fitness for reckless disregard resulting in the commingling and misappropriation of funds of two clients); In re Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034 (D.C.1983) (suspension of a year and a day with requirement of fitness for unintentional commingling and misappropriation of client’s funds aggravated by attorney’s initial evasion of client’s request | 1 | 1 |
In Re Choroszejgreen1 sentence1994See In re Choroszej, 624 A.2d 434 (D.C.1992) (per curiam) (six-month *343 suspension for negligent misappropriation where numerous mitigating factors were cited); In re Evans, 578 A.2d 1141 (D.C.1990) (per curiam) (six-month suspension for negligent misappropriation where court concluded that “greater sanction [was] not required”); In re Hessler, 549 A.2d 700 (D.C.1988) (six-month suspension for negligent commingling and misappropriation where six mitigating factors were taken into account). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Tuckergreen1 sentence1989As a consequence, at times we have declined to retain a common law rule, having concluded that D.C.Code § 49-301 “is not a bar to the exercise of our inherent power to alter or amend the common law.” United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1216 (D.C.1987) (prospectively abolishing year and a day rule in murder prosecutions); see also Tucker, 407 A.2d at 1069-70 (declining to follow common law rule that one reaches a given age on day preceding anniversary of one’s birth). | 1 | 1 |
Mead v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1987See also Mead v. Phillips, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 371 , 135 F.2d 819, 825 (1943) (District of Columbia *1216 Code amplified and defined by common law to extent subject not covered therein). 1987See also Mead v. Phillips, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 371 , 135 F.2d 819, 825 (1943) (District of Columbia *1216 Code amplified and defined by common law to extent subject not covered therein). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pinegreen1 sentence1987See, e.g., State v. Pine, supra, 524 A.2d at 1107 (describing murder as a common law crime and year and a day rule as a judicial creation). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brengardgreen2 sentences1987See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854, §§ 798-800, 31 Stat. 1189 , 1321 (1901) (codified as amended at D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -2403 (1981)). 12 That codification did not “abrogat[e] or alter[ ] any feature of murder at common law in the absence of an express intention on the part of Congress to do so.” O’Connor, supra, 399 A.2d at 26 ; compare id. with State v. Hudson, 56 Or.App. 462 , 642 P.2d 331 (1982) (year and a day rule did not survive codification of criminal code based on Model Penal Code and New York statute) and People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 10 1987See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854, §§ 798-800, 31 Stat. 1189 , 1321 (1901) (codified as amended at D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -2403 (1981)). 12 That codification did not “abrogat[e] or alter[ ] any feature of murder at common law in the absence of an express intention on the part of Congress to do so.” O’Connor, supra, 399 A.2d at 26 ; compare id. with State v. Hudson, 56 Or.App. 462 , 642 P.2d 331 (1982) (year and a day rule did not survive codification of criminal code based on Model Penal Code and New York statute) and People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 10 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hudsongreen2 sentences1987See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854, §§ 798-800, 31 Stat. 1189 , 1321 (1901) (codified as amended at D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -2403 (1981)). 12 That codification did not “abrogat[e] or alter[ ] any feature of murder at common law in the absence of an express intention on the part of Congress to do so.” O’Connor, supra, 399 A.2d at 26 ; compare id. with State v. Hudson, 56 Or.App. 462 , 642 P.2d 331 (1982) (year and a day rule did not survive codification of criminal code based on Model Penal Code and New York statute) and People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 10 1987See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854, §§ 798-800, 31 Stat. 1189 , 1321 (1901) (codified as amended at D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -2403 (1981)). 12 That codification did not “abrogat[e] or alter[ ] any feature of murder at common law in the absence of an express intention on the part of Congress to do so.” O’Connor, supra, 399 A.2d at 26 ; compare id. with State v. Hudson, 56 Or.App. 462 , 642 P.2d 331 (1982) (year and a day rule did not survive codification of criminal code based on Model Penal Code and New York statute) and People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 10 | 1 | 1 |
O'CONNOR v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854, §§ 798-800, 31 Stat. 1189 , 1321 (1901) (codified as amended at D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -2403 (1981)). 12 That codification did not “abrogat[e] or alter[ ] any feature of murder at common law in the absence of an express intention on the part of Congress to do so.” O’Connor, supra, 399 A.2d at 26 ; compare id. with State v. Hudson, 56 Or.App. 462 , 642 P.2d 331 (1982) (year and a day rule did not survive codification of criminal code based on Model Penal Code and New York statute) and People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 10 1987See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854, §§ 798-800, 31 Stat. 1189 , 1321 (1901) (codified as amended at D.C.Code §§ 22-2401, -2403 (1981)). 12 That codification did not “abrogat[e] or alter[ ] any feature of murder at common law in the absence of an express intention on the part of Congress to do so.” O’Connor, supra, 399 A.2d at 26 ; compare id. with State v. Hudson, 56 Or.App. 462 , 642 P.2d 331 (1982) (year and a day rule did not survive codification of criminal code based on Model Penal Code and New York statute) and People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 10 | 1 | 1 |
American Insurance Co. v. Smithgreen1 sentence1985American Insurance Co. v. Smith, 472 A.2d 872, 874 (D.C.1984). [2] The Arpads contend that because the Launays did not file a supporting affidavit until the day of the hearing, that affidavit was not properly before the court under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(c) ("adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits"). | 1 | 1 |
Jacobson v. Jacobsongreen1 sentence1972“What constitutes duress depends on the facts of the particular case.” (Footnote omitted.) Jacobson v. Jacobson, D.C.App., 277 A.2d 280, 283 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Louisville, Evansville, & St. Louis Railroad v. Clarke
green
2 sentences1979Louis R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 239 , 14 S.Ct. 579, 581 , 38 L.Ed. 422 (1894) (year and a day rule is in force "in this country" unless statutorily modified). 1979Louis R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 239 , 14 S.Ct. 579, 581 , 38 L.Ed. 422 (1894) (year and a day rule is in force "in this country" unless statutorily modified). | 2 | 1979–1979 |
United States v. Charmaine Y. Zeigler
green
2 sentences2005Zeigler, supra, 301 U.S.App.D.C. at 302 , 994 F.2d at 849 . 2005Zeigler, supra, 301 U.S.App.D.C. at 302 , 994 F.2d at 849 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1997The trial court granted Mr. Day’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of the government’s (1) “undue delay in returning an indictment,” citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); and (2) “gross negligence” in destroying the *33 Oldsmobile and thus depriving Mr. Day of an opportunity to inspect it after the accident. 1997The trial court granted Mr. Day’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of the government’s (1) “undue delay in returning an indictment,” citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); and (2) “gross negligence” in destroying the *33 Oldsmobile and thus depriving Mr. Day of an opportunity to inspect it after the accident. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In Re Hines
green
1 sentence1994See In re Cooper, 613 A.2d 938 (D.C.1992) (six-month suspension with requirement of fitness for negligent misappropriation of client funds by attorney who admitted cocaine addiction); In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378 (D.C. 1984) (two-year suspension with requirement of fitness for reckless disregard resulting in the commingling and misappropriation of funds of two clients); In re Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034 (D.C.1983) (suspension of a year and a day with requirement of fitness for unintentional commingling and misappropriation of client’s funds aggravated by attorney’s initial evasion of client’s request | 1 | 1994–1994 |
In Re Evans
green
1 sentence1994See In re Choroszej, 624 A.2d 434 (D.C.1992) (per curiam) (six-month *343 suspension for negligent misappropriation where numerous mitigating factors were cited); In re Evans, 578 A.2d 1141 (D.C.1990) (per curiam) (six-month suspension for negligent misappropriation where court concluded that “greater sanction [was] not required”); In re Hessler, 549 A.2d 700 (D.C.1988) (six-month suspension for negligent commingling and misappropriation where six mitigating factors were taken into account). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
In Re Hessler
green
1 sentence1994See In re Choroszej, 624 A.2d 434 (D.C.1992) (per curiam) (six-month *343 suspension for negligent misappropriation where numerous mitigating factors were cited); In re Evans, 578 A.2d 1141 (D.C.1990) (per curiam) (six-month suspension for negligent misappropriation where court concluded that “greater sanction [was] not required”); In re Hessler, 549 A.2d 700 (D.C.1988) (six-month suspension for negligent commingling and misappropriation where six mitigating factors were taken into account). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
In Re Harrison
green
1 sentence1994See In re Cooper, 613 A.2d 938 (D.C.1992) (six-month suspension with requirement of fitness for negligent misappropriation of client funds by attorney who admitted cocaine addiction); In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378 (D.C. 1984) (two-year suspension with requirement of fitness for reckless disregard resulting in the commingling and misappropriation of funds of two clients); In re Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034 (D.C.1983) (suspension of a year and a day with requirement of fitness for unintentional commingling and misappropriation of client’s funds aggravated by attorney’s initial evasion of client’s request | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Minster
green
1 sentence1987State v. Minster, supra, 486 A.2d at 1200 & nn. 4 & 5. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1972V, 1972). [11] It appears that prior to the factfinding hearing in this case the parties had agreed to the entry of a consent decree but on the day of the hearing the juvenile changed his mind. [12] Hearings on S. 2981 Before the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1803 (1969). [13] See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 , 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). 1972V, 1972). [11] It appears that prior to the factfinding hearing in this case the parties had agreed to the entry of a consent decree but on the day of the hearing the juvenile changed his mind. [12] Hearings on S. 2981 Before the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1803 (1969). [13] See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 , 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.