day hearing in New York

2016Indeed, the court “erred by failing to ask even a single question about the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” (Sides, 75 NY2d at 825 ). “[H]ad the court conducted that inquiry, it might well have determined that, despite the defendant’s allegedly having filed a grievance, the grievance was merely a delaying tactic or that the defense counsel was, despite the grievance, fully capable of providing the defendant with effective representation” (Smith, 25 AD3d at 575-576 ).

2016Indeed, the court “erred by failing to ask even a single question about the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” (Sides, 75 NY2d at 825 ). “[H]ad the court conducted that inquiry, it might well have determined that, despite the defendant’s allegedly having filed a grievance, the grievance was merely a delaying tactic or that the defense counsel was, despite the grievance, fully capable of providing the defendant with effective representation” (Smith, 25 AD3d at 575-576 ).

2016Indeed, the court “erred by failing to ask even a single question about the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” (Sides, 75 NY2d at 825 ). “[H]ad the court conducted that inquiry, it might well have determined that, despite the defendant’s allegedly having filed a grievance, the grievance was merely a delaying tactic or that the defense counsel was, despite the grievance, fully capable of providing the defendant with effective representation” (Smith, 25 AD3d at 575-576 ).

2016Indeed, the court “erred by failing to ask even a single question about the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” (Sides, 75 NY2d at 825 ). “[H]ad the court conducted that inquiry, it might well have determined that, despite the defendant’s allegedly having filed a grievance, the grievance was merely a delaying tactic or that the defense counsel was, despite the grievance, fully capable of providing the defendant with effective representation” (Smith, 25 AD3d at 575-576 ).

2016Furthermore, the court failed to set forth in its order why it found the offending conduct of the plaintiff or his counsel to be frivolous, and why the amount imposed was appropriate (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.2; Vogel v Vogel, 128 AD3d 681, 685 [2015]; Hamilton v Cordero, 10 AD3d 702 [2004]).

2016Furthermore, the court failed to set forth in its order why it found the offending conduct of the plaintiff or his counsel to be frivolous, and why the amount imposed was appropriate (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.2; Vogel v Vogel, 128 AD3d 681, 685 [2015]; Hamilton v Cordero, 10 AD3d 702 [2004]).

2016These events took place on the day of the hearing, and the court, sua sponte, imposed sanctions based on those events that same day without giving the plaintiff or his counsel notice that they could be sanctioned for such conduct, and without giving them an opportunity to be heard on such allegations (see Matter of Griffin v Panzarin, 305 AD2d 601 [2003]).

2016These events took place on the day of the hearing, and the court, sua sponte, imposed sanctions based on those events that same day without giving the plaintiff or his counsel notice that they could be sanctioned for such conduct, and without giving them an opportunity to be heard on such allegations (see Matter of Griffin v Panzarin, 305 AD2d 601 [2003]).

2022The mother failed to provide a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear on the day the hearing was scheduled to resume ( see Matter of Goldstein v Goldstein , 190 AD3d at 972-973 ; Matter of Hines v Baptiste , 178 AD3d 825 , 826; Matter of Abella v Szileszky , 177 AD3d at 730).

2022The mother had discharged her attorney on the eve of the continued hearing, and the court had denied her request for an adjournment, which was a provident exercise of discretion, particularly since the mother had previously discharged counsel under similar circumstances ( see Greenberg v Greenberg , 144 AD3d 625, 630-631 ; Matter of Wiley v Musabyemariya , 118 AD3d 898, 899-900 ).

2022The mother had discharged her attorney on the eve of the continued hearing, and the court had denied her request for an adjournment, which was a provident exercise of discretion, particularly since the mother had previously discharged counsel under similar circumstances ( see Greenberg v Greenberg , 144 AD3d 625, 630-631 ; Matter of Wiley v Musabyemariya , 118 AD3d 898, 899-900 ).

2020"The right of an indigent party to assigned counsel under the Family Court Act is not absolute," and a party seeking the appointment of substitute counsel "must establish that good cause for release existed necessitating dismissal of assigned counsel" ( Matter of Destiny V. [Mark V.] , 107 AD3d 1468 , 1469 [4th Dept 2013]; see generally Matter of Biskupski v McClellan , 278 AD2d 912, 912 [*2][4th Dept 2000]).

2019On the final day of the hearing, upon invalidating certain voter signatures on the designating petition of Larraine S. Feiden (hereinafter the candidate) that had been made in print rather than script, the Supreme Court, at the request of the candidate and over the appellant's objection, afforded the candidate an opportunity to submit affidavits from the voters in question attesting to their identity ( see LaMarca v Quirk , 110 AD3d 808, 810 ; Matter of Quercia v Bernstein , 87 AD3d 652, 653 ; Matter of Henry v Trotto , 54 AD3d 424, 426 ).

2019On the final day of the hearing, upon invalidating certain voter signatures on the designating petition of Larraine S. Feiden (hereinafter the candidate) that had been made in print rather than script, the Supreme Court, at the request of the candidate and over the appellant's objection, afforded the candidate an opportunity to submit affidavits from the voters in question attesting to their identity ( see LaMarca v Quirk , 110 AD3d 808, 810 ; Matter of Quercia v Bernstein , 87 AD3d 652, 653 ; Matter of Henry v Trotto , 54 AD3d 424, 426 ).

2019On the final day of the hearing, upon invalidating certain voter signatures on the designating petition of Larraine S. Feiden (hereinafter the candidate) that had been made in print rather than script, the Supreme Court, at the request of the candidate and over the appellant's objection, afforded the candidate an opportunity to submit affidavits from the voters in question attesting to their identity ( see LaMarca v Quirk , 110 AD3d 808, 810 ; Matter of Quercia v Bernstein , 87 AD3d 652, 653 ; Matter of Henry v Trotto , 54 AD3d 424, 426 ).

2018Since the mother failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default, this Court need not reach the issue of whether she presented a meritorious defense ( see Matter of Serenity Victoria M. , 150 AD3d at 486 ; Matter of Lenea'jah F. , 105 AD3d at 514).

2017The determination whether to grant a request for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Matter of Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Latonia W. [Anthony W.], 144 AD3d 1692 , 1692-1693 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 914 [2017]; Matter of Sophia M.G.-K. [Tracy G.-K.], 84 AD3d 1746, 1747 [2011]).

2017The determination whether to grant a request for an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Matter of Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Latonia W. [Anthony W.], 144 AD3d 1692 , 1692-1693 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 914 [2017]; Matter of Sophia M.G.-K. [Tracy G.-K.], 84 AD3d 1746, 1747 [2011]).

2014In any event, it did not excuse her from notifying her attorney or the court, especially since she knew of the date of the fact-finding hearing two months earlier (see Matter of Lisa Marie Ann L. [Melissa L.], 91 AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2012]).

2012However, she failed to notify her counsel, the court, or the agency in advance that she would not appear at the hearings, although her condition did not prevent her from doing so (see Matter of Amirah Nicole A. [Tamika R.], 73 AD3d 428 [2010], lv dismissed 15 NY3d 766 [2010]; Matter of Ciara Lee C. [Lourdes R.], 67 AD3d 437 [2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 756 [2010]).