16 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DePineda v. Pricegreen2 sentences2024See People v. Smith, slip op. at ¶ 20 (Colo. App. No. 19CA1834, July 7, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Smith III); see also DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996) (“Issues not raised before the district court in a motion for postconviction relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.”). 7 • A CMHIP psychologist deemed Smith competent, and nobody disputed Smith’s competency at the time of his waiver. • Mr. Brennan had “an incredibly long history” with Smith, was attentive to Smith’s mental health issues, and believed that Smith was competen 2024See People v. Smith, slip op. at ¶ 20 (Colo. App. No. 19CA1834, July 7, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Smith III); see also DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996) (“Issues not raised before the district court in a motion for postconviction relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.”). 7 • A CMHIP psychologist deemed Smith competent, and nobody disputed Smith’s competency at the time of his waiver. • Mr. Brennan had “an incredibly long history” with Smith, was attentive to Smith’s mental health issues, and believed that Smith was competen | 2 | 2 |
People in Interest of EAgreen2 sentences1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). 1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
People Ex Rel. Jasgreen1 sentence2026J.A.S., 160 P.3d at 262. ¶ 19 Further, mother doesn’t explain why she wasn’t able to secure the PCI evaluator’s appearance in the nine months between the setting of the initial APR hearing and the final day of the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
People v. DAKgreen1 sentence2025Id. at ¶ 18; see also People v. D.A.K., 596 P.2d 747 , 3 749-50 (Colo. 1979) ( “[T]he child’s situation on the day of the hearing cannot be viewed in a vacuum” and the evidence must be “considered in the context of the child’s history as well as the respondent parent’s prior behavior.”). ¶ 10 We review the juvenile court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Allan Rossgreen1 sentence2013United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir.1994). 9 Most federal courts hold that a court may not impanel an anonymous jury unless the court first finds there is a specific reason rooted in the case before it and concludes that the jury needs protection from interference or harm. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2013See Smith, 182 Colo. at 34 , 510 P.2d at 895 . 2013See Smith, 182 Colo. at 34 , 510 P.2d at 895 . | 1 | 1 |
Singletary, Charles v. DC Bd Pargreen1 sentence2008See Singletary v. Reilly, 452 F.3d 868, 874-15 (D.C.Cir.2006) (revocation order reversed where the identities of the hearsay declarants were not "revealed for purposes of evaluating their credibility"). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Weisbardgreen1 sentence2002See In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo.2001); E-470 Public Highway Authority v. 455 Co., supra. As pertinent here, § 13-16-102 provides: If [a civil} action [by a nonresident] is commenced without filing such instrument *511 of writing ... it is the duty of the court, on motion of the defendant or any officer of the court, ... to rule the plaintiff, on or before the day in such rule named, to give security for the payment of costs in such suit. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Proposed Initiated Const. Amend.green1 sentence2000Concerning The "Fair Treatment II, 877 P.2d 329, 333 (Colo.1994) (holding that the twelve-day notice requirement of section 1-40-106(1) refers to a draft of the text of the proposed measure, not the titles and summary; section 106(1) was not violated when the proponents submitted a proposed amendment to the titles and summary on the day of the hearing). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People in Interest of HAC v. DCC
green
2 sentences1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). 1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). | 2 | 1983–1983 |
D. C. C. v. Colorado
green
2 sentences1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). 1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Johnson v. Howerton
green
2 sentences1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). 1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Marsh v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). 1983See People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d 278 (Colo.1981); People in Interest of H.A.C., 198 Colo. 260 , 599 P.2d 881 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., D.C.C. v. Colorado, 444 U.S. 1022 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). | 2 | 1983–1983 |
v. Carter
green
1 sentence2026“We have an independent, affirmative obligation to determine 2 whether a claim of error was preserved . . . notwithstanding the parties’ respective positions or concessions . . . .” People v. Carter, 2021 COA 29, ¶ 13 . ¶7 Prior to the final day of the hearing on the GAL’s motion for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR), father filed a proposed order requesting joint decision-making responsibility and family time on an increasing schedule. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
in Interest of M.H-K
green
1 sentence2025People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶ 60 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
of Hogsett
green
1 sentence2020Trial counsel further 10 testified that he did not ask for a continuance or take a position at the termination hearing because (1) he had had no direct contact with father as to how father wanted to proceed at the termination hearing; (2) father had never informed counsel that he wanted to contest termination; and (3) on the day of the hearing, counsel was told that father had refused to come to court. ¶22 Father’s expert then testified that trial counsel was ineffective at the termination hearing by (1) not seeking a continuance to ensure father’s presence at the hearing; (2) making no openin | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People in Interest of A.R
green
1 sentence2020Trial counsel further 10 testified that he did not ask for a continuance or take a position at the termination hearing because (1) he had had no direct contact with father as to how father wanted to proceed at the termination hearing; (2) father had never informed counsel that he wanted to contest termination; and (3) on the day of the hearing, counsel was told that father had refused to come to court. ¶22 Father’s expert then testified that trial counsel was ineffective at the termination hearing by (1) not seeking a continuance to ensure father’s presence at the hearing; (2) making no openin | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Salerno
green
2 sentences2013But at the end of the day the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately, ourselves." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 25 "An anonymous jury raises the specter that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom the jurors must be protected" and undermines the accused's right to the presumption of innocence. 2013But at the end of the day the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately, ourselves." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 25 "An anonymous jury raises the specter that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom the jurors must be protected" and undermines the accused's right to the presumption of innocence. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Allied Oil Corp.
green
1 sentence2013But at the end of the day the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and, ultimately, ourselves." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 25 "An anonymous jury raises the specter that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom the jurors must be protected" and undermines the accused's right to the presumption of innocence. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Rogers v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences2013Rogers, 532 U.S. at 453 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 . 2013Rogers, 532 U.S. at 453 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Young
green
1 sentence1992On October 11,1991, the same day as the hearing, the governor signed House Bill 91S2-1038 which expressed the intent of the “General Assembly that there be no hiatus in the imposition of the death penalty ... as a result of the holding of the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo.1991).” The new law makes imposition of the death penalty applicable to crimes committed after July 1, 1988 and prior to September 20, 1991. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
J. L. Enochs, District Director of Internal Revenue v. T. U. Sisson
green
1 sentence1976It is essential that in order to avoid surprise and to allow for a full and considered response, the party against whom the motion is directed be allowed the full period in which to serve his affidavits, see Enochs v. Sisson, 301 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1962). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Trujillo v. People
green
1 sentence1953Counsel for relator in their brief contend that the initial petition must show a substantial compliance with the provisions of paragraph 1, supra, before the court may take jurisdiction, and in this connection say that the initial petition “must in this case have had the signatures of owners of at least five per cent of non-irrigated lands and five per qpnt of the municipalities involved.” This is counsel’s construction of the conjunctions “and/or.” With this contention we do not agree for it is a complete elimination of the conjunction “or.” We do not approve of the conjunctions thus used (Bo | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Boulderado Motors, Inc. v. Peterson
neutral
2 sentences1953Counsel for relator in their brief contend that the initial petition must show a substantial compliance with the provisions of paragraph 1, supra, before the court may take jurisdiction, and in this connection say that the initial petition “must in this case have had the signatures of owners of at least five per cent of non-irrigated lands and five per qpnt of the municipalities involved.” This is counsel’s construction of the conjunctions “and/or.” With this contention we do not agree for it is a complete elimination of the conjunction “or.” We do not approve of the conjunctions thus used (Bo 1953Counsel for relator in their brief contend that the initial petition must show a substantial compliance with the provisions of paragraph 1, supra, before the court may take jurisdiction, and in this connection say that the initial petition “must in this case have had the signatures of owners of at least five per cent of non-irrigated lands and five per qpnt of the municipalities involved.” This is counsel’s construction of the conjunctions “and/or.” With this contention we do not agree for it is a complete elimination of the conjunction “or.” We do not approve of the conjunctions thus used (Bo | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Duniway v. Hadley
green
1 sentence1953Counsel for relator in their brief contend that the initial petition must show a substantial compliance with the provisions of paragraph 1, supra, before the court may take jurisdiction, and in this connection say that the initial petition “must in this case have had the signatures of owners of at least five per cent of non-irrigated lands and five per qpnt of the municipalities involved.” This is counsel’s construction of the conjunctions “and/or.” With this contention we do not agree for it is a complete elimination of the conjunction “or.” We do not approve of the conjunctions thus used (Bo | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.