53 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sjn Properties, LLC. v. Fulton County Board of Assessorsgreen2 sentences2022Cf. SJN Properties, LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 796 (1) ( 770 SE2d 832 ) (2015) (“OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) authorizes a party against whom a summary judgment motion has been filed to serve affidavits in opposition to the motion at any time ‘prior to the day of hearing.’”). 2022Cf. SJN Properties, LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 796 (1) ( 770 SE2d 832 ) (2015) (“OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) authorizes a party against whom a summary judgment motion has been filed to serve affidavits in opposition to the motion at any time ‘prior to the day of hearing.’”). | 3 | 3 |
SOUTHEAST REDUCING COMPANY, INC. v. Wassermangreen2 sentences1998Compare Southeast Reducing Co. v. Wasserman, 213 Ga.App. 763, 764 , 445 S.E.2d 859 (1994); Dixon v. McClain, 204 Ga.App. 531 , 420 S.E.2d 66 (1992). 1998Compare Southeast Reducing Co. v. Wasserman, 213 Ga.App. 763, 764 , 445 S.E.2d 859 (1994); Dixon v. McClain, 204 Ga.App. 531 , 420 S.E.2d 66 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Leagan v. Levinegreen2 sentences1982“The trial court, in its discretion, can consider an affidavit filed on the day of the hearing. [Cits.]” Leagan v. Levine, 158 Ga. App. 293, 294 ( 279 SE2d 741 ) (1981). 1982“The trial court, in its discretion, can consider an affidavit filed on the day of the hearing. [Cits.]” Leagan v. Levine, 158 Ga. App. 293, 294 ( 279 SE2d 741 ) (1981). | 2 | 2 |
Applegarth Supply Co. v. Schaffergreen2 sentences1981Jones, supra. This procedure insures that the party against whom summary judgment is sought will be provided with “a full and final opportunity to meet and attempt to controvert the assertions against him.” Applegarth Supply Co. v. Schaffer, 130 Ga. App. 353, 357 ( 203 SE2d 277 ) (1973). 1981Jones, supra. This procedure insures that the party against whom summary judgment is sought will be provided with “a full and final opportunity to meet and attempt to controvert the assertions against him.” Applegarth Supply Co. v. Schaffer, 130 Ga. App. 353, 357 ( 203 SE2d 277 ) (1973). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2015Further, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides that “[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Brown v. Williams, 259 Ga. 6, 7 (4) ( 375 SE2d 835 ) (1989). 2015Further, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides that “[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Brown v. Williams, 259 Ga. 6, 7 (4) ( 375 SE2d 835 ) (1989). | 1 | 3 |
In the Interest of R. N.green2 sentences2003Although the mother testified that she had learned from her mistakes and that she loved and wanted to care for the children, "[t]he decision as to a child's future must rest on more than positive promises which are contrary to negative past fact." (Citation and *877 punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of R.N., 224 Ga.App. 202, 205 (2), 480 S.E.2d 243 (1997). 3. 2003Although the mother testified that she had learned from her mistakes and that she loved and wanted to care for the children, "[t]he decision as to a child's future must rest on more than positive promises which are contrary to negative past fact." (Citation and *877 punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of R.N., 224 Ga.App. 202, 205 (2), 480 S.E.2d 243 (1997). 3. | 1 | 2 |
Dunlap v. Citizens & Southern DeKalb Bankgreen2 sentences2026See OCGA § 10-6-58 (“Notice to the agent of any matter connected with his agency shall be notice to the principal.”); Dunlap v. C & S DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 897 (6) ( 216 SE2d 651 ) (1975) (“The rule imputing an agent’s knowledge to his principal is applicable to the attorney-client relationship.”). 2026See OCGA § 10-6-58 (“Notice to the agent of any matter connected with his agency shall be notice to the principal.”); Dunlap v. C & S DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 897 (6) ( 216 SE2d 651 ) (1975) (“The rule imputing an agent’s knowledge to his principal is applicable to the attorney-client relationship.”). | 1 | 1 |
Oseni v. Hambrickgreen2 sentences2026The notice shows that it was “filed in court” on the day of the hearing, and its certificate of service states that it was hand delivered to Russell’s trial counsel,5 Shara’s counsel, and the GAL, which indicates that hand-delivery occurred in court. 4 Shara also alleged that Russell had violated paragraphs B and D of the decree, but the contempt ruling was not based on violations of those paragraphs. 5 Russell was represented by new counsel at the contempt hearing. 7 “[N]otice to an attorney is notice to the client employing him, and . . . knowledge of an attorney is knowledge of his client, 2026The notice shows that it was “filed in court” on the day of the hearing, and its certificate of service states that it was hand delivered to Russell’s trial counsel,5 Shara’s counsel, and the GAL, which indicates that hand-delivery occurred in court. 4 Shara also alleged that Russell had violated paragraphs B and D of the decree, but the contempt ruling was not based on violations of those paragraphs. 5 Russell was represented by new counsel at the contempt hearing. 7 “[N]otice to an attorney is notice to the client employing him, and . . . knowledge of an attorney is knowledge of his client, | 1 | 1 |
Davenport v. Stategreen2 sentences2023In evaluating Day’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for 24 See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 397-99 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020) (providing numerous “good reasons” to abandon the Supreme Court’s practice of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support all murder convictions (except for death penalty cases) when that issu 2023In evaluating Day’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for 24 See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 397-99 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020) (providing numerous “good reasons” to abandon the Supreme Court’s practice of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support all murder convictions (except for death penalty cases) when that issu | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2023In evaluating Day’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for 24 See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 397-99 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020) (providing numerous “good reasons” to abandon the Supreme Court’s practice of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support all murder convictions (except for death penalty cases) when that issu 2023In evaluating Day’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for 24 See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 397-99 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020) (providing numerous “good reasons” to abandon the Supreme Court’s practice of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support all murder convictions (except for death penalty cases) when that issu | 1 | 1 |
Flowers v. Stategreen2 sentences2023In evaluating Day’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for 24 See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 397-99 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020) (providing numerous “good reasons” to abandon the Supreme Court’s practice of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support all murder convictions (except for death penalty cases) when that issu 2023In evaluating Day’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires him to show that his trial counsel’s performance was “deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for 24 See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 397-99 (4) (b) ( 846 SE2d 83 ) (2020) (providing numerous “good reasons” to abandon the Supreme Court’s practice of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support all murder convictions (except for death penalty cases) when that issu | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Rollinsgreen2 sentences2023As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial court was not obligated to consider the second woman’s affidavit, which was filed without prior approval after the hearing on the City’s motion and which the trial court expressly declared to be “untimely.” See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (“prior to the day of hearing,” a non-movant “may serve opposing affidavits”); Rose v. Rollins, 167 Ga. App. 469, 470-471 (1) ( 306 SE2d 724 ) (1983) (affirming the exclusion of an affidavit filed with a supplemental brief after a summary judgment hearing as “not timely” when the record supported that characterization). 2023As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial court was not obligated to consider the second woman’s affidavit, which was filed without prior approval after the hearing on the City’s motion and which the trial court expressly declared to be “untimely.” See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (“prior to the day of hearing,” a non-movant “may serve opposing affidavits”); Rose v. Rollins, 167 Ga. App. 469, 470-471 (1) ( 306 SE2d 724 ) (1983) (affirming the exclusion of an affidavit filed with a supplemental brief after a summary judgment hearing as “not timely” when the record supported that characterization). | 1 | 1 |
McIntosh v. McLendongreen2 sentences2020The present case is factually similar to and is controlled by McIntosh, 162 Ga. App. at 220 (1), where we affirmed the trial court’s consideration of affidavits filed by the plaintiff in support of his summary judgment motion that were submitted on the day of the hearing without a proper showing by the plaintiff to justify the late filing. 2020We pointed out that at the hearing, “the defendant was instructed that a ruling on the motion would be deferred in order to give him an opportunity to file opposing affidavits, and the court did not issue its ruling until two months later, during which 22 period the defendant made no response of any kind.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Hannagreen1 sentence2020See Ford, 293 Ga. App. at 868 (3), n.5. | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The trial court denied Cook’s motion for new trial in an order filed on the day of the hearing. “[A] defendant may be denied due process of law where there is an inordinate delay in the appellate process, including an excessive delay in the furnishing of a trial 6 transcript necessary for completion of an appellate record.” Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 250 (7) ( 319 SE2d 484 ) (1984). 2019The trial court denied Cook’s motion for new trial in an order filed on the day of the hearing. “[A] defendant may be denied due process of law where there is an inordinate delay in the appellate process, including an excessive delay in the furnishing of a trial 6 transcript necessary for completion of an appellate record.” Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 250 (7) ( 319 SE2d 484 ) (1984). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 749375green1 sentence2008While a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation does not generally extend to post-verdict procedures such as a motion for new trial, Backey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 265, 267 (4) ( 506 SE2d 435 ) (1998), he has a “broader due process right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” (Punctuation omitted.) United States v. Boyd, 131 F3d 951, 954 (11th Cir. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Backey v. Stategreen2 sentences2008While a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation does not generally extend to post-verdict procedures such as a motion for new trial, Backey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 265, 267 (4) ( 506 SE2d 435 ) (1998), he has a “broader due process right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” (Punctuation omitted.) United States v. Boyd, 131 F3d 951, 954 (11th Cir. 1997). 2008While a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation does not generally extend to post-verdict procedures such as a motion for new trial, Backey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 265, 267 (4) ( 506 SE2d 435 ) (1998), he has a “broader due process right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” (Punctuation omitted.) United States v. Boyd, 131 F3d 951, 954 (11th Cir. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Mumford v. Davisgreen2 sentences2005It is not the same action as [the] one it succeeds, in the sense that it is not a continuation of the concluded action, although it must be substantially the same both as to the cause of action and as to the essential parties.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Mumford v. Davis, 206 Ga. App. 148, 149 ( 424 SE2d 306 ) (1992) (admissions in previous action pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-36 not available in renewed action). 2005It is not the same action as [the] one it succeeds, in the sense that it is not a continuation of the concluded action, although it must be substantially the same both as to the cause of action and as to the essential parties.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Mumford v. Davis, 206 Ga. App. 148, 149 ( 424 SE2d 306 ) (1992) (admissions in previous action pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-36 not available in renewed action). | 1 | 1 |
| Banks v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Stategreen2 sentences2003E.g., Banks v. State, 235 Ga. App. at 702 (1); Evans v. State, 230 Ga. App. 728, 730 ( 497 SE2d 248 ) (1998) (physical precedent only). 2003E.g., Banks v. State, 235 Ga. App. at 702 (1); Evans v. State, 230 Ga. App. 728, 730 ( 497 SE2d 248 ) (1998) (physical precedent only). | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of J. J.green | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of K. J.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re NFRgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitley v. Patrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Trippigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cashin v. Markwaltergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stone Mountain Properties, Ltd. v. Helmergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beller & Gould v. Lisenbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zampatti v. TRADEBANK INTERN. FRANCHISINGgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Day v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sikes v. Sikesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Buisogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ashley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grier v. Brogdongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Spruellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomason v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. FOOD ASSOCIATES, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wyse v. Potamkin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sabel v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gross v. PYROFAX GAS CORPORATION
green
2 sentences1985OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” In accordance with this code section, it has been held that “[t]he party opposing a motion for summary judgment has until the day prior to the hearing to serve opposing affidavits, unless the trial court in its discretion permits them to be served at a later date [OCGA § 9-11-6 (d)].” Gross v. Pyrofax Gas Corp., 151 Ga. App. 130 ( 259 SE2d 137 ) (1979). 1985OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” In accordance with this code section, it has been held that “[t]he party opposing a motion for summary judgment has until the day prior to the hearing to serve opposing affidavits, unless the trial court in its discretion permits them to be served at a later date [OCGA § 9-11-6 (d)].” Gross v. Pyrofax Gas Corp., 151 Ga. App. 130 ( 259 SE2d 137 ) (1979). | 3 | 1984–1985 |
Sigafoose v. Cobb.
green
2 sentences2020Thus, contrary to Day’s claim, there was evidence in the record to support an award of fees under OCGA § 19-9-3 (g).10 See Sigafoose v. Cobb, 345 Ga. App. 783 , 789 (2) ( 815 SE2d 136 ) (2018) (affirming OCGA § 19-9-3 (g) fee award where “[party’s] request for fees was supported by the submission of his attorney’s billing records for the case”); compare Spirnak v. Meadows, 355 Ga. App. 857 , 871 (7) (b) ( 844 SE2d 482 ) (2020) (fee award not authorized under OCGA § 19-9-3 (g) because “there is no evidence in the record about the attorneys’ hourly rate or the number of hours expended”). (b) Day 2020Thus, contrary to Day’s claim, there was evidence in the record to support an award of fees under OCGA § 19-9-3 (g).7 See Sigafoose v. Cobb, 345 Ga. App. 783 , 789 (2) ( 815 SE2d 136 ) (2018) (affirming OCGA § 19-9-3 (g) fee award where “[party’s] request for fees was supported by the submission of his attorney’s billing records for the case”); compare Spirnak v. Meadows, 355 Ga. App. 857 , 871 (7) (b) ( 844 SE2d 482 ) (2020) (fee award not authorized under OCGA § 19-9-3 (g) because “there is no evidence in the record about the attorneys’ hourly rate or the number of hours expended”). (b) Day | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Woods v. Hall
green
2 sentences2015OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) authorizes a party against whom a summary judgment motion has been filed to serve affidavits in opposition to the motion at any time “prior to the day of hearing.” See also OCGA § 9-11-6 (d) (governing motions generally, providing that “[ojpposing affidavits may be served not later than one day before the hearing”); Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93 (1) ( 726 SE2d 596 ) (2012) (vacating grant of summary judgment, finding that trial court erred in striking as untimely plaintiff’s opposing affidavit, filed three days prior to hearing). 2015OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) authorizes a party against whom a summary judgment motion has been filed to serve affidavits in opposition to the motion at any time “prior to the day of hearing.” See also OCGA § 9-11-6 (d) (governing motions generally, providing that “[ojpposing affidavits may be served not later than one day before the hearing”); Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93 (1) ( 726 SE2d 596 ) (2012) (vacating grant of summary judgment, finding that trial court erred in striking as untimely plaintiff’s opposing affidavit, filed three days prior to hearing). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Dixon v. McClain
green
2 sentences1998Compare Southeast Reducing Co. v. Wasserman, 213 Ga.App. 763, 764 , 445 S.E.2d 859 (1994); Dixon v. McClain, 204 Ga.App. 531 , 420 S.E.2d 66 (1992). 1998Compare Southeast Reducing Co. v. Wasserman, 213 Ga.App. 763, 764 , 445 S.E.2d 859 (1994); Dixon v. McClain, 204 Ga.App. 531 , 420 S.E.2d 66 (1992). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Martin v. Newman
green
2 sentences1985Gross v. Pyrofax Gas Corp., 151 Ga. App. 130 ( 259 SE2d 137 ) (1979), and its progeny, Martin v. Newman, 162 Ga. App. 725 (2) ( 293 SE2d 18 ) (1982), are inapplicable since each is expressly based upon the decision in Liberty Forest Prods., Inc. v. Interstate Paper Corp., 138 Ga. App. 153 ( 225 SE2d 731 ) (1976), in which this court expressly relied upon the parties’ agreement that the response could be filed on the day of the hearing. 2. 1985Gross v. Pyrofax Gas Corp., 151 Ga. App. 130 ( 259 SE2d 137 ) (1979), and its progeny, Martin v. Newman, 162 Ga. App. 725 (2) ( 293 SE2d 18 ) (1982), are inapplicable since each is expressly based upon the decision in Liberty Forest Prods., Inc. v. Interstate Paper Corp., 138 Ga. App. 153 ( 225 SE2d 731 ) (1976), in which this court expressly relied upon the parties’ agreement that the response could be filed on the day of the hearing. 2. | 2 | 1984–1985 |
Vann v. Bice
neutral
2 sentences1978Smith, for appellee. *492 The statute is unambiguous in its mandate: "The affidavit shall be served with the motion.” This court has held that: "The purpose of the statute [Code Ann. § 81A-106 (d)] is to prevent a party from being suprised the day of the hearing by an affidavit that he would not be in a position to answer.” Vann v. Bice, 127 Ga. App. 579 ( 194 SE2d 259 ). 1978Smith, for appellee. *492 The statute is unambiguous in its mandate: "The affidavit shall be served with the motion.” This court has held that: "The purpose of the statute [Code Ann. § 81A-106 (d)] is to prevent a party from being suprised the day of the hearing by an affidavit that he would not be in a position to answer.” Vann v. Bice, 127 Ga. App. 579 ( 194 SE2d 259 ). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Teal v. State
green
2 sentences2019In its order, the trial court found that while Day, as a probationer, has the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, at the time of the search, Day "should not have reasonably expected the level of privacy that she would have at home." Instead, according to the trial court, Day was at a state probation office, "a place where a person and society would reasonably expect to be subjected to a search." And "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures." (Emphasis in original.) "The Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] proscribes all 2019In its order, the trial court found that while Day, as a probationer, has the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, at the time of the search, Day "should not have reasonably expected the level of privacy that she would have at home." Instead, according to the trial court, Day was at a state probation office, "a place where a person and society would reasonably expect to be subjected to a search." And "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures." (Emphasis in original.) "The Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] proscribes all | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Mcmorris v. Alioto
green
1 sentence2019In its order, the trial court found that while Day, as a probationer, has the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, at the time of the search, Day "should not have reasonably expected the level of privacy that she would have at home." Instead, according to the trial court, Day was at a state probation office, "a place where a person and society would reasonably expect to be subjected to a search." And "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures." (Emphasis in original.) "The Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] proscribes all | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2019The similarity of a defendant’s interests in a speedy trial and a speedy appeal are such that the balancing test adopted for speedy trial violations in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), should be applied to situations in which a defendant claims that a delay in the appellate process is violative of due process of law. 2019The similarity of a defendant’s interests in a speedy trial and a speedy appeal are such that the balancing test adopted for speedy trial violations in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), should be applied to situations in which a defendant claims that a delay in the appellate process is violative of due process of law. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Levin v. the State
green
2 sentences2018The trial court denied the plea in bar, and sentenced Levin to 20 years in confinement for the aggravated battery conviction. *342 Levin v. State , 334 Ga. App. 71 , 71-72, 778 S.E.2d 238 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 2 Levin appealed the trial court's denial of his plea in bar (double jeopardy) on the aggravated battery conviction and the order imposing the new sentence on that charge. 2018The trial court denied the plea in bar, and sentenced Levin to 20 years in confinement for the aggravated battery conviction. *342 Levin v. State , 334 Ga. App. 71 , 71-72, 778 S.E.2d 238 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 2 Levin appealed the trial court's denial of his plea in bar (double jeopardy) on the aggravated battery conviction and the order imposing the new sentence on that charge. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ndlovu v. Pham
green
2 sentences2013To require [a defendant] to treat a [reply] brief filed in support of a [plaintiff’s] motion [for spoliation sanctions] as a brand new motion [for summary judgment] would lead to tremendous inefficiencies, and in any event, would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement that “an application to the court for an order shall be by motion,” OCGA § 9-11-7 (b) (1), a requirement that suggests . . . that motions and other papers filed with a court are different in kind. 11 Ndlovu v. Pham, 314 Ga. App. 337 , 343 n. 9 ( 723 SE2d 729 ) (2012). 2013To require [a defendant] to treat a [reply] brief filed in support of a [plaintiff’s] motion [for spoliation sanctions] as a brand new motion [for summary judgment] would lead to tremendous inefficiencies, and in any event, would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement that “an application to the court for an order shall be by motion,” OCGA § 9-11-7 (b) (1), a requirement that suggests . . . that motions and other papers filed with a court are different in kind. 11 Ndlovu v. Pham, 314 Ga. App. 337 , 343 n. 9 ( 723 SE2d 729 ) (2012). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In the Interest of J. M. D. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re Lsd green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re Aml green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In Interest of DCNK green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re Kds green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Lee v. Green Land Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Day v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Yost v. Torok green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Brown v. Rowe green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Knight v. Bryant-Durham Electric Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Liberty Forest Products, Inc. v. Interstate Paper Corp. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| T & W Farm Supply, Inc. v. McCall neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Wall v. Citizens & Southern Bank green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Bulloch County Bank v. Dodd green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Johnson v. Frazier green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Brown v. Richards green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Whitaker v. Whitaker green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Humphries v. Morris green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Cole v. Illinois Sewing Machine Co. neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Ragan v. Ragan neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.