day hearing in Massachusetts

2016Penrod, an eyewitness identification expert, as well as a motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-595 (1993), and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994), to establish the scientific validity of Penrod’s opinion. 14 The judge denied both motions on the day of the hearing on the motions, with minimal explanation. 15 At trial, Petras testified regarding his identification of the defendant from the photographic array.

2013See Commonwealth v. Babb, 389 Mass. 275, 283 (1983) (strict enforcement of the statute does not require a dismissal of the charges when a delay in delivery of the citation to the offender is justified and the twin goals of preventing the manipulation of tickets and providing notice to the offender are not frustrated).

2000Pointing to the undoubted right of one facing probation revocation to have a “reasonable opportunity to prepare” for the hearing, and in particular a reasonable opportunity for counsel to aid him in his defense, Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 418 Mass. 352, 358-360, 365 (1994), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 50 (1976), Morse asserts that his due process rights were violated by being given no more than four days’ notice of the hearing on the alleged violations and being assigned counsel only on the day of the hearing. 5 His argument founders on the fact that, while mentioning

2000Pointing to the undoubted right of one facing probation revocation to have a “reasonable opportunity to prepare” for the hearing, and in particular a reasonable opportunity for counsel to aid him in his defense, Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 418 Mass. 352, 358-360, 365 (1994), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 50 (1976), Morse asserts that his due process rights were violated by being given no more than four days’ notice of the hearing on the alleged violations and being assigned counsel only on the day of the hearing. 5 His argument founders on the fact that, while mentioning

2000Pointing to the undoubted right of one facing probation revocation to have a “reasonable opportunity to prepare” for the hearing, and in particular a reasonable opportunity for counsel to aid him in his defense, Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 418 Mass. 352, 358-360, 365 (1994), quoting from Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 371 Mass. 46, 50 (1976), Morse asserts that his due process rights were violated by being given no more than four days’ notice of the hearing on the alleged violations and being assigned counsel only on the day of the hearing. 5 His argument founders on the fact that, while mentioning

2000Morse has failed to argue, let alone demonstrate, any such abuse on this record, and we discern none. “[I]t was a simple case to prepare and try . . . [and] the record does not support [his] contention that the denial of his motion for [a] continuance prejudiced his case.” Ibid.

1997As the defendant points out, Rule 56(c) directs that affidavits in opposition to summary judgment be served “prior to the day of the hearing.” See Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. at 711.

1989See Baird v. Baird, 311 Mass. 329, 331-333 (1942). 5 Moreover, on the day of the hearing the wife filed a separate complaint for alimony which the husband concedes should “cure the technically improper complaint for modification . . . .” Therefore, the judge had before him an initial request for alimony, one to be considered in accordance with G.

1988See United States v. 125.07 Acres of Land, More or Less, 707 F.2d at 14 , and authorities cited.

1983As the Supreme Judicial Court said in another context: “We hold it unacceptable that one party should *137 place such information before a judge intending that he rely on it in a contested matter without furnishing a copy of it to the other parties.” Olsson v. Waite, 373 Mass. 517, 533 (1977).

1980Germain, 381 Mass. 256, 261-265 (1980). 20 The judge continued the case for a day so that defense counsel could, if he wanted, “poke around at headquarters” to see what other officers might remember. 21 Defense counsel also stated to the trial judge that had he known of Cundriffs statement earlier he might have moved for a severance.

1976It did not appear that White’s conversant had been a witness to the robberies or the shooting, that he was a police informer (see Commonwealh v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268, 275-278 [1975]), or that either he or his identity was in any way important to the conduct of Day’s defense.