day hearing in Nebraska

2021Supp. 2020), after a motion for summary judgment has been filed, “[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve oppos- ing affidavits.” 84 In opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment scheduled for a hearing on Monday, October 7, 2019, the Special Administrators served six 83 See Munstermann, supra note 31 . 84 See Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722 , 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004). - 563 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports RODRIGUEZ v. LASTING HOPE RECOVERY CTR.

2021Supp. 2020), after a motion for summary judgment has been filed, “[t]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve oppos- ing affidavits.” 84 In opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment scheduled for a hearing on Monday, October 7, 2019, the Special Administrators served six 83 See Munstermann, supra note 31 . 84 See Woodhouse Ford v. Laflan, 268 Neb. 722 , 687 N.W.2d 672 (2004). - 563 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports RODRIGUEZ v. LASTING HOPE RECOVERY CTR.

2024HAAS Cite as 317 Neb. 919 not taken prescribed medications on the day of the hearing at issue.

2021Cite as 308 Neb. 538 affidavits on Sunday, October 6.

2021By stating that he had discussed the conflict with Malone and Malone’s family, Malone claims that 60 Cotton, supra note 48 . 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759 , 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). 64 Cotton, supra note 48 . - 952 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MALONE Cite as 308 Neb. 929 his attorney “misrepresented” their conversations. 65 Malone claims that he “was stunned in court by the revelation” from his attorney. 66 Although Malone may now claim that he was stunned by his attorney’s revelation, the transcript from his hearing indicates otherwise.

2021By stating that he had discussed the conflict with Malone and Malone’s family, Malone claims that 60 Cotton, supra note 48 . 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759 , 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). 64 Cotton, supra note 48 . - 952 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MALONE Cite as 308 Neb. 929 his attorney “misrepresented” their conversations. 65 Malone claims that he “was stunned in court by the revelation” from his attorney. 66 Although Malone may now claim that he was stunned by his attorney’s revelation, the transcript from his hearing indicates otherwise.

2021By stating that he had discussed the conflict with Malone and Malone’s family, Malone claims that 60 Cotton, supra note 48 . 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759 , 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). 64 Cotton, supra note 48 . - 952 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MALONE Cite as 308 Neb. 929 his attorney “misrepresented” their conversations. 65 Malone claims that he “was stunned in court by the revelation” from his attorney. 66 Although Malone may now claim that he was stunned by his attorney’s revelation, the transcript from his hearing indicates otherwise.

2020After the parties presented evidence and argument, the county court orally overruled Torres’ motion for absolute - 763 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 28 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. TORRES Cite as 28 Neb.

2018Nebraska has a statutory rule for computing time,33 and we have held this rule governs time calculations of the 6-month time period under the STCA.34 As such, the 6-month period is computed by excluding the day the claim was filed, and including the last day of the period unless it falls on a 30 Id. at 272, 646 N.W.2d at 621 . 31 Id.; Sharkey, supra note 17 . 32 See, Hullinger, supra note 4 ; Coleman, supra note 5 . 33 See Neb.

2004Medley v. Davis, supra; Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771 , 478 N.W.2d 548 (1992); Center Bank v. Mid-Continent Meats, Inc., 194 Neb. 665 , 234 N.W.2d 902 (1975). *728 The district court correctly utilized the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 25-1332 when it sustained the Laflans’ objection to the affidavit.

2004Medley v. Davis, supra; Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771 , 478 N.W.2d 548 (1992); Center Bank v. Mid-Continent Meats, Inc., 194 Neb. 665 , 234 N.W.2d 902 (1975). *728 The district court correctly utilized the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 25-1332 when it sustained the Laflans’ objection to the affidavit.

2004Medley v. Davis, supra; Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771 , 478 N.W.2d 548 (1992); Center Bank v. Mid-Continent Meats, Inc., 194 Neb. 665 , 234 N.W.2d 902 (1975). *728 The district court correctly utilized the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 25-1332 when it sustained the Laflans’ objection to the affidavit.

2004Medley v. Davis, supra; Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771 , 478 N.W.2d 548 (1992); Center Bank v. Mid-Continent Meats, Inc., 194 Neb. 665 , 234 N.W.2d 902 (1975). *728 The district court correctly utilized the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 25-1332 when it sustained the Laflans’ objection to the affidavit.

2001Under the common law of Tennessee, a “year and a day rule” provided that no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his or her victim had died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of that act. 532 U.S. at 453 .

2001Under the common law of Tennessee, a "year and a day rule" provided that no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his or her victim had died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of that act. 532 U.S. at ___ , 121 S.Ct. at 1696 .

1985From these authorities we conclude that it is the time that the compensation award was entered and not the hearing date that controls the application of the Smith rule, even though this language in Smith appears at 655, 358 N.W.2d at 215 : “The question then becomes, Was this a substantive or procedural change so as to make the critical effective date the day of the accident or the day of the hearing?” We interpret this reference to a “hearing” to mean judgment, since it is followed by this citation from Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303 , 187 N.W. 919 (1922): “ ‘[T]he attorney’s fe

1985From these authorities we conclude that it is the time that the compensation award was entered and not the hearing date that controls the application of the Smith rule, even though this language in Smith appears at 655, 358 N.W.2d at 215 : “The question then becomes, Was this a substantive or procedural change so as to make the critical effective date the day of the accident or the day of the hearing?” We interpret this reference to a “hearing” to mean judgment, since it is followed by this citation from Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303 , 187 N.W. 919 (1922): “ ‘[T]he attorney’s fe

1985From these authorities we conclude that it is the time that the compensation award was entered and not the hearing date that controls the application of the Smith rule, even though this language in Smith appears at 655, 358 N.W.2d at 215 : “The question then becomes, Was this a substantive or procedural change so as to make the critical effective date the day of the accident or the day of the hearing?” We interpret this reference to a “hearing” to mean judgment, since it is followed by this citation from Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303 , 187 N.W. 919 (1922): “ ‘[T]he attorney’s fe

1985From these authorities we conclude that it is the time that the compensation award was entered and not the hearing date that controls the application of the Smith rule, even though this language in Smith appears at 655, 358 N.W.2d at 215 : “The question then becomes, Was this a substantive or procedural change so as to make the critical effective date the day of the accident or the day of the hearing?” We interpret this reference to a “hearing” to mean judgment, since it is followed by this citation from Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303 , 187 N.W. 919 (1922): “ ‘[T]he attorney’s fe

1959As to whether or not it should be sent back to the county court for trial, the court said: “A judgment of the district court upon such an appeal, remanding the cause to the county court with direction to ‘permit the filing of the claim and to set a day for hearing, and to proceed to hear and pass upon the same,’ is not the proper judgment, but a hearing in the district court on such claim should be had in the same manner as though the appeal had been from an order disallowing the claim upon hearing before the county court.” In Egan v. Bunner, 155 Neb. 611 , 52 N. W. 2d 820 , this court said: “

1959As to whether or not it should be sent back to the county court for trial, the court said: “A judgment of the district court upon such an appeal, remanding the cause to the county court with direction to ‘permit the filing of the claim and to set a day for hearing, and to proceed to hear and pass upon the same,’ is not the proper judgment, but a hearing in the district court on such claim should be had in the same manner as though the appeal had been from an order disallowing the claim upon hearing before the county court.” In Egan v. Bunner, 155 Neb. 611 , 52 N. W. 2d 820 , this court said: “

1948The appellees also contend that the same ordinance has been approved by the Supreme Court of this state, citing Erwin v. City of Omaha, 118 Neb. 331 , 224 N. W. 692 , where an ordinance imposing a tax of $15 a day for the privilege of operating a “rolling store” on the streets of the city was held to be a reasonable regulation, and the tax was held constitutional.

1948The appellees also contend that the same ordinance has been approved by the Supreme Court of this state, citing Erwin v. City of Omaha, 118 Neb. 331 , 224 N. W. 692 , where an ordinance imposing a tax of $15 a day for the privilege of operating a “rolling store” on the streets of the city was held to be a reasonable regulation, and the tax was held constitutional.

1914In Heidemann v. Noxon, 83 Neb. 175 , it was held in paragraph 2 of ¡the syllabus: “The examining magistrate does not lose jurisdiction of the case by granting a continuance of the hearing on the request of the defendant.” In the opinion {p. 177) this court say: “It is further insisted that the justice had no authority to continue the case and take a ¡recognizance from the defendant for his appearance on the day for which the hearing was set, and that the hearing had in the absence of the defendant was illegal.” In discussing this the court say: “Relating to the second point, it will be borne i

1914It would be a singular rule which allows a defendant to take advantage of the order of a court made on his own request and apparently for his own benefit.” In Heidemann v. Noxon, supra, it was held that the justice, by continuing the case, did not lose jurisdiction of it.

1904The district court heard the matter upon appeal and rendered the following judgment or order: “It is therefore considered and ordered by the court, that the order of the county court be reversed, and the county court ordered to permit the filing of the claims and to set a day for hearing, and to proceed to hear and pass upon the claims.” Contention was made by the defendant in error, in this court, that the order in question was not a final order or judgment which could be reviewed upon error, and a ruling was made adverse to such contention by an opinion found in 69 Neb. 38 .

1886Under the rule laid down in State, ex rel., v. Reynolds, 18 Neb., 431 , it was clearly the duty of the board to appoint a day for hearing the case, and the decision of the district court in awarding the writ was correct.