determinative inquiry in New York

1985It is well settled that whether a defendant was in police custody and therefore not free to go is not determined by the individual defendant’s subjective beliefs; rather, the determinative test is “what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant’s position” (People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 , cert denied 400 US 851 ; see, Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 219-220 ).

1985This court has noted that: "It is well settled that whether a defendant was in police custody and was therefore not free to go is not determined by the individual defendant’s subjective beliefs; rather, the determinative test is 'what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant’s position’ (People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 , cert den 400 US 851 ; see Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213, 219-220 ).

2013In determining whether a bond resolution complies with or exceeds the debt limit, the determinative inquiry into the amount of indebtedness incurred focuses on “the time the bonds are to be actually issued” (Matter of Hill v Board of Educ., Glenville, 286 App Div 332, 335-338 [1955], affd 309 NY 945 [1955]).

2013In determining whether a bond resolution complies with or exceeds the debt limit, the determinative inquiry into the amount of indebtedness incurred focuses on “the time the bonds are to be actually issued” (Matter of Hill v Board of Educ., Glenville, 286 App Div 332, 335-338 [1955], affd 309 NY 945 [1955]).

2012Federal preemption “may be either express or implied, and ‘is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose’ ” (id., quoting Jones v Rath Packing Co., 430 US 519, 525 [1977]).

2012Federal preemption “may be either express or implied, and ‘is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose’ ” (id., quoting Jones v Rath Packing Co., 430 US 519, 525 [1977]).

2012In determining whether a federal law preempts a state law cause of action, the determinative inquiry is “Congress’ intent in enacting the federal statute at issue” (Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 US 85, 95 [1983]).

2012In determining whether a federal law preempts a state law cause of action, the determinative inquiry is “Congress’ intent in enacting the federal statute at issue” (Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 US 85, 95 [1983]).

1991On the issue of police custody, defendant’s subjective beliefs are not relevant; the determinative test is whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have felt free to leave (People v Harris, 48 NY2d 208, 215 ; People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 , cert denied 400 US 851 ).

1990It is well settled that issues concerning police custody are not determined by the individual defendant’s subjective beliefs; rather, the determinative test is "whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have felt free to leave” (People v Harris, 48 NY2d 208, 215 ; see, People v Yukl, supra, at 589; People v Hopkins, 86 AD2d 937, 938 , affd 58 NY2d 1079 ).

2015Furthermore, where the incident involves a slip and fall, the determinative inquiry is “whether the condition that caused the slip could have been ‘reasonably anticipated’ ” (Matter of Sammon v DiNapoli, 97 AD3d 952, 953 [2012], quoting Matter of Murphy v New York State Comptroller, 92 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2012]; see Matter of Dicioccio v DiNapoli, 124 AD3d at 1171 ).

2015Furthermore, where the incident involves a slip and fall, the determinative inquiry is “whether the condition that caused the slip could have been ‘reasonably anticipated’ ” (Matter of Sammon v DiNapoli, 97 AD3d 952, 953 [2012], quoting Matter of Murphy v New York State Comptroller, 92 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2012]; see Matter of Dicioccio v DiNapoli, 124 AD3d at 1171 ).

2015Furthermore, where the incident involves a slip and fall, the determinative inquiry is “whether the condition that caused the slip could have been ‘reasonably anticipated’ ” (Matter of Sammon v DiNapoli, 97 AD3d 952, 953 [2012], quoting Matter of Murphy v New York State Comptroller, 92 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2012]; see Matter of Dicioccio v DiNapoli, 124 AD3d at 1171 ).

2005“The determinative inquiry with respect to the applicability of the statutory grant of immunity here concerns the role of defendant in relation to the public’s use of the park” (Myers v State of New York, 11 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2004]).

2004Defendant submitted uncontested proof that the park was undeveloped and its role at the park in relation to the public’s use was limited to providing a parking lot and performing occasional maintenance such as clearing garbage and debris (see Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 187-188 [1983]).

2004The determinative inquiry with respect to the applicability of the statutory grant of immunity here concerns the role of defendant in relation to the public’s use of the park (see Blair v Newstead Snowseekers, 2 AD3d 1286, 1288 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 704 [2004]; Stento v State of New York, 245 AD2d 771, 772 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 802 [1998]; Wilkins v State of New York, 165 AD2d 514, 517 [1991]).

2004The determinative inquiry with respect to the applicability of the statutory grant of immunity here concerns the role of defendant in relation to the public’s use of the park (see Blair v Newstead Snowseekers, 2 AD3d 1286, 1288 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 704 [2004]; Stento v State of New York, 245 AD2d 771, 772 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 802 [1998]; Wilkins v State of New York, 165 AD2d 514, 517 [1991]).

2004The determinative inquiry with respect to the applicability of the statutory grant of immunity here concerns the role of defendant in relation to the public’s use of the park (see Blair v Newstead Snowseekers, 2 AD3d 1286, 1288 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 704 [2004]; Stento v State of New York, 245 AD2d 771, 772 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 802 [1998]; Wilkins v State of New York, 165 AD2d 514, 517 [1991]).

2003Auth. v New York State Dept. of Labor, 88 NY2d 225, 229 [1996] [although specifying a numerical formula for calculating the penalty, the guidelines were applied as a “policy” to “vest inspectors with significant discretion, and allow for flexibility in the imposition of penalties, all with the view of imposing the appropriate sanction for the individual offense and offender in the particular case (and enabling inspectors to) use their professional judgment to adjust the penalty scale based on consideration of mitigating and contributing factors”]; Matter of Dejesus v Roberts, 296 AD2d 307, 310

2003Auth. v New York State Dept. of Labor, 88 NY2d 225, 229 [1996] [although specifying a numerical formula for calculating the penalty, the guidelines were applied as a “policy” to “vest inspectors with significant discretion, and allow for flexibility in the imposition of penalties, all with the view of imposing the appropriate sanction for the individual offense and offender in the particular case (and enabling inspectors to) use their professional judgment to adjust the penalty scale based on consideration of mitigating and contributing factors”]; Matter of Dejesus v Roberts, 296 AD2d 307, 310

2001Corp. v City of Saratoga Springs, 270 AD2d 771, 773 [3d Dept 2000].) The determinative inquiry is when the agency has committed itself to a definite course of future action.

2000The determinative inquiry is when the agency has committed itself to “a definite course of future action” (M atter of Price v County of Westchester, 225 AD2d 217, 220 ; see, Matter of Young v Board of Trustees, 89 NY2d 846, 848-849 ; Matter of Wing v Coyne, supra, at 217).

2000The determinative inquiry is when the agency has committed itself to “a definite course of future action” (M atter of Price v County of Westchester, 225 AD2d 217, 220 ; see, Matter of Young v Board of Trustees, 89 NY2d 846, 848-849 ; Matter of Wing v Coyne, supra, at 217).

1998(People v Ross, 169 Misc 2d 308, 311-312 [Sup Ct, NY County 1996].) “Due process requires that the offender be given notice of the proposed classification, the basis for the Board’s determination and an opportunity to present evidence at the determinative hearing”.