determinative test in California

2014(Cf. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 557, 565-566 [“The determinative test [for a medical expert witness] is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury”]; People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1142 [“it cannot be said as a matter of law that an individual is not qualified to give a medical opinion just because that person is not a licensed physician”].) Scher testified to the following: She worked for seven years for CONREP, during which time she acted as the primary clinician for persons with ment

1988The determinative test... is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury. [Citations.]” (Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 557, 565-566 [ 218 P.2d 66 ]; accord Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 37-39 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 ]; Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 645-647 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 522 P.2d 688 ]; Cline v. Lund (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 755, 765-767 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; Evid.

1979(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 , 8 A.L.R.2d 757 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 114 [ 127 P.2d 639 ].) The determinative test as to whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury.

1979(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 , 8 A.L.R.2d 757 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 114 [ 127 P.2d 639 ].) The determinative test as to whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury.

1979(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 , 8 A.L.R.2d 757 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 114 [ 127 P.2d 639 ].) The determinative test as to whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury.

1979(Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 753 [ 205 P.2d 3 , 8 A.L.R.2d 757 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 114 [ 127 P.2d 639 ].) The determinative test as to whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury.

1979(Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 492 [ 96 P.2d 142 ]; Hutter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 681 [ 3 P.2d 554 ]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50 Cal.App.2d 486, 491 [ 123 P.2d 544 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 115, 118 [ 127 P.2d 639 ]; 32 C.J.S. 261, § 537.)’ ” Neither section 720 nor Seneris requires that the witness be a medical doctor or otherwise possess the same professional degrees or certifications held by the attending surgeon.

1979(Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 492 [ 96 P.2d 142 ]; Hutter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 681 [ 3 P.2d 554 ]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50 Cal.App.2d 486, 491 [ 123 P.2d 544 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 115, 118 [ 127 P.2d 639 ]; 32 C.J.S. 261, § 537.)’ ” Neither section 720 nor Seneris requires that the witness be a medical doctor or otherwise possess the same professional degrees or certifications held by the attending surgeon.

1979(Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 492 [ 96 P.2d 142 ]; Hutter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 681 [ 3 P.2d 554 ]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50 Cal.App.2d 486, 491 [ 123 P.2d 544 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 115, 118 [ 127 P.2d 639 ]; 32 C.J.S. 261, § 537.)’ ” Neither section 720 nor Seneris requires that the witness be a medical doctor or otherwise possess the same professional degrees or certifications held by the attending surgeon.

1979(Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 492 [ 96 P.2d 142 ]; Hutter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 681 [ 3 P.2d 554 ]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50 Cal.App.2d 486, 491 [ 123 P.2d 544 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 115, 118 [ 127 P.2d 639 ]; 32 C.J.S. 261, § 537.)’ ” Neither section 720 nor Seneris requires that the witness be a medical doctor or otherwise possess the same professional degrees or certifications held by the attending surgeon.

1979(Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 492 [ 96 P.2d 142 ]; Hutter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 681 [ 3 P.2d 554 ]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50 Cal.App.2d 486, 491 [ 123 P.2d 544 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 115, 118 [ 127 P.2d 639 ]; 32 C.J.S. 261, § 537.)’ ” Neither section 720 nor Seneris requires that the witness be a medical doctor or otherwise possess the same professional degrees or certifications held by the attending surgeon.

1979(Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 492 [ 96 P.2d 142 ]; Hutter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 681 [ 3 P.2d 554 ]; Pierce v. Paterson, 50 Cal.App.2d 486, 491 [ 123 P.2d 544 ]; Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 115, 118 [ 127 P.2d 639 ]; 32 C.J.S. 261, § 537.)’ ” Neither section 720 nor Seneris requires that the witness be a medical doctor or otherwise possess the same professional degrees or certifications held by the attending surgeon.

2025Our Supreme Court has held with respect to grounds such as immoral conduct and dishonesty, “the determinative test [is] fitness to teach” because these terms “are so broad and vague that, standing alone, they could be constitutionally infirm.” (Board of Education v. Jack M., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 696 ; Fontana Unified School Dist. v. Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 208, 220, fn. 12 [Morrison analysis applies to attempt to discipline permanent employee on grounds of dishonesty].) The trier of fact must determine both “whether the charged conduct in fact occurred” and whether that conduct, measured aga

2015However, the Supreme Court has held “the determinative test [is] fitness to teach” because “the terms ‘immoral’ or ‘unprofessional conduct’ are so broad and vague that, standing alone, they could be constitutionally infirm.” (Jack M., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 696 .) The terms “stretch over so wide a range that they embrace an unlimited area of conduct.

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468 , 472–473.) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous….” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide. [Citations.]” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 , italics removed; see also Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at p. 59 ; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 ; People v. Lachuk (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 729, 731 ; People v. Frank (19

2014(Cf. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 557, 565-566 [“The determinative test [for a medical expert witness] is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury”]; People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1142 [“it cannot be said as a matter of law that an individual is not qualified to give a medical opinion just because that person is not a licensed physician”].) Scher testified to the following: She worked for seven years for CONREP, during which time she acted as the primary clinician for persons with ment

1988Code, § 720.) “Where a duly licensed and practicing physician has gained knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a specialty in which he is not directly engaged but as to which he has an opinion based on education, experience, observation or association with that specialty, his opinion is competent.” (Evans v. Ohanesian (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 121, 128 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 236 ]; see generally, 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) §§ 1846-1847, pp. 1801-1804.) “ ‘The unmistakable general trend in recent years has been toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of

1988The determinative test... is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury. [Citations.]” (Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 557, 565-566 [ 218 P.2d 66 ]; accord Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 37-39 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 ]; Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 645-647 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 522 P.2d 688 ]; Cline v. Lund (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 755, 765-767 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; Evid.

1988The determinative test... is whether the witness has disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury. [Citations.]” (Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 557, 565-566 [ 218 P.2d 66 ]; accord Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 37-39 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 762 , 694 P.2d 1134 ]; Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 645-647 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 522 P.2d 688 ]; Cline v. Lund (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 755, 765-767 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 629 ]; Evid.

1984These guidelines were based in large part on bulletin No. 67-5 (May 25, 1967) and release No. 5-C (Jan. 31, 1969) issued by the Commissioner of Corporations. [10] As restated in People v. Skelton, supra, 109 Cal. App.3d at page 724 : (9) "The determinative factors indicating a `public offering' include: (1) the number of offerees; (2) the relationship of the offerees to each other; (3) the relationship between the issuers and the offerees; (4) the size of the offerings; (5) the manner of the offerings; and (6) the character of the security offered. ( People v. Humphreys (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 69

1984These guidelines were based in large part on bulletin No. 67-5 (May 25, 1967) and release No. 5-C (Jan. 31, 1969) issued by the Commissioner of Corporations. [10] As restated in People v. Skelton, supra, 109 Cal. App.3d at page 724 : (9) "The determinative factors indicating a `public offering' include: (1) the number of offerees; (2) the relationship of the offerees to each other; (3) the relationship between the issuers and the offerees; (4) the size of the offerings; (5) the manner of the offerings; and (6) the character of the security offered. ( People v. Humphreys (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 69

2026We agree with the People. “[D]efendants must specify the precise grounds for a motion to suppress, including pointing out any inadequacies in the prosecution’s justifications for a warrantless search or seizure.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 135 .) “Defendants who do not give the prosecution sufficient notice of these inadequacies cannot raise the issue on appeal.” (Id. at p. 136.) “The determinative inquiry in all cases is whether the party opposing the motion had fair notice of the moving party’s argument and fair opportunity to present responsive evidence.” (Id. at p. 135.) Ho

2024The prosecution then has the burden of proving some justification for the warrantless search or seizure, after which, defendants can respond by pointing out any inadequacies in that justification. [Citation.] Defendants who do not give the prosecution sufficient notice of these inadequacies cannot raise the issue on appeal. ‘[T]he scope of issues upon review must be limited to those raised during argument.’ ” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136 , italics added.) “The determinative inquiry in all cases is whether the party opposing the motion had fair notice of the moving party’s arg

2017That inquiry is guided by principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe (1993) 508 U.S. 491 , 500-503, 113 S.Ct. 2202 , 124 L.Ed.2d 449 ( Fabe ).

2017That inquiry is guided by principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe (1993) 508 U.S. 491 , 500-503, 113 S.Ct. 2202 , 124 L.Ed.2d 449 ( Fabe ).

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468 , 472–473.) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous….” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide. [Citations.]” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 , italics removed; see also Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at p. 59 ; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 ; People v. Lachuk (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 729, 731 ; People v. Frank (19

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2015(People v. Hamberg (1890) 84 Cal. 468, 472-473 [ 24 P. 298 ].) “To do otherwise [is] erroneous. . . .” (Id. at p. 473.) Not surprisingly, California courts have long observed that “it undoubtedly is the law that where the issue of jeopardy is based on questions of fact, it is for the jury to decide [citations].” (People v. Hess (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 407, 426 [ 237 P.2d 568 ], italics omitted; see Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 509, fn. 1 ; People v. Bennett, supra, 114 Cal. at *341 p. 59; People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 316 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 ]; People v. Lac

2013(Id. at p. 698, fn. 3; West Valley-Mission Community College Dist. v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1775 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 ].) “In the context of a teacher, ‘ “evident unfitness for service” . . . means “clearly not fit, not adapted to or unsuitable for teaching, ordinarily by reason of temperamental defects or inadequacies.” Unlike “unprofessional conduct,” “evident unfitness for service” connotes a fixed character trait, presumably not remediable merely on receipt of notice that one’s conduct fails to meet the expectation of the employing school district.’ ” (San Diego Unified Scho

2013(Id. at p. 698, fn. 3; West Valley-Mission Community College Dist. v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1775 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 ].) “In the context of a teacher, ‘ “evident unfitness for service” . . . means “clearly not fit, not adapted to or unsuitable for teaching, ordinarily by reason of temperamental defects or inadequacies.” Unlike “unprofessional conduct,” “evident unfitness for service” connotes a fixed character trait, presumably not remediable merely on receipt of notice that one’s conduct fails to meet the expectation of the employing school district.’ ” (San Diego Unified Scho

2025Our Supreme Court has held with respect to grounds such as immoral conduct and dishonesty, “the determinative test [is] fitness to teach” because these terms “are so broad and vague that, standing alone, they could be constitutionally infirm.” (Board of Education v. Jack M., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 696 ; Fontana Unified School Dist. v. Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 208, 220, fn. 12 [Morrison analysis applies to attempt to discipline permanent employee on grounds of dishonesty].) The trier of fact must determine both “whether the charged conduct in fact occurred” and whether that conduct, measured aga

2022Section 266i, subdivision (a)(2) provides that a person is guilty of pandering if he or she “[b]y promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades, or encourages another person to become a prostitute.” Our Supreme Court has held that causing, inducing, persuading, or encouraging someone to “become a prostitute” under this statute includes not only “recruiting someone to enter the prostitution trade for the first time” but also behavior directed at “someone who is already an active prostitute.” (People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 973, 980-981 [this provis

2014The prosecution retains the burden of proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. [Citations.] But, if defendants detect a critical gap in the prosecution’s proof or a flaw in its legal analysis, they must object on that basis to admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal.” (Id. at p. 130.) “The determinative inquiry in all cases is whether the party opposing the motion had fair notice of the moving party’s argument and fair opportunity to present responsive evidence.” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 135 .) “A defendant’s moti