determinative inquiry in Ohio

1996Id. at 11-12 , 99 S.Ct. at 2617-2618 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 330-331 .

1996Id. at 11-12 , 99 S.Ct. at 2617-2618 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 330-331 .

1992Third, the regulatory scheme in VFW Post failed constitutional muster because it did not provide sufficiently limited restrictions as to the time, place and scope of the search. “ ‘The determinative factors to be considered are whether the industry affected is so closely regulated as to provide notice of the prospect of governmental intrusion and whether the statutory scheme enacted “provides an adequate substitute for a warrant in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application.” * * (Emphasis added.) VFW Post 3562, supra, at 313 , 525 N.E.2d at 776 , citing Bionic Auto Parts & Sales

1992Third, the regulatory scheme in VFW Post failed constitutional muster because it did not provide sufficiently limited restrictions as to the time, place and scope of the search. “ ‘The determinative factors to be considered are whether the industry affected is so closely regulated as to provide notice of the prospect of governmental intrusion and whether the statutory scheme enacted “provides an adequate substitute for a warrant in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application.” * * (Emphasis added.) VFW Post 3562, supra, at 313 , 525 N.E.2d at 776 , citing Bionic Auto Parts & Sales

1992The VFW Post 3562 case goes on to explain that “ ‘ * * * [i]n light of the safeguards placed on the inspection, an administrative warrant requirement would add only marginally if at all to the licensee’s right of privacy. [United States v.] Biswell [(1972)], supra, 406 U.S. [311] at 316 [ 92 S.Ct. 1593, at 1596 , 32 L.Ed.2d 87, at 92 ]; Camara [v. Municipal Court (1967) ], supra, 387 U.S. [523] at 539 [ 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 941 ].’ Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, supra, at 1080.” VFW Post 3562, supra, 37 Ohio St.3d at 314 , 525 N.E.2d at 777 .

1988Ed. 2d 87 , 92 S. Ct. 1593 , to In Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner (C.A. 7, 1983), 721 F. 2d 1072, 1078-1079 , the United States Court of Appeals, in reviewing an Illinois statute and an administrative rule promulgated thereunder authorizing warrantless searches of automobile parts dealers, scrap processors, and parts rebuilders, stated the following: “The determinative factors to be considered are whether the industry affected is so closely regulated as to provide notice of the prospect of governmental intrusion and whether the statutory scheme enacted ‘provides an adequate substitu

2005Also, "Telxon's Fourth Assignment of Error," infra at ¶¶ 120-125, addresses the misappropriation claim. 6 Three juror affidavits included assertions that: "The deliberations included reference to and discussion about dollar amounts set forth in [SMI's economic expert's] report"; and "The other jurors commented on the fact that they did not have [Telxon's expert's] report and had [SMI's expert's] report." 7 See "Telxon's Third Assignment of Error," infra at ¶¶ 92-119, for a detailed discussion of the damages awards in this case. 8 See "Telxon's Third Assignment of Error," infra at ¶¶ 92-119, fo

2004Espousing the proposition that “ ‘[n]o one has an absolute right to practice law, and the State may impose reasonable conditions and limitations upon those who wish to exercise that privilege,’ ” the majority of the court of appeals framed the determinative inquiry under Section 5, Article I in terms of whether DR 2-107(B) “is reasonable and, therefore, appellant should be bound by it.” Shimko v. Lobe (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 336, 347 , 706 N.E.2d 354 , quoting Kelley Drye & Warren v. Murray Industries, Inc. (D.N.J.1985), 623 F.Supp. 522, 527 .

2004The appellate court believed, however, that it needed a “factual basis to assess the reasonableness of this rule” and, in accordance with that belief, remanded the cause to the trial court “for a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the rule in * * * eliminating appellant’s right to a jury trial.” Id. at 347-348, 706 N.E.2d 354 . {¶ 7} On February 20, 1998, Shimko’s cross-appeal to this court was dismissed for failure of prosecution. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1450 , 690 N.E.2d 545 .

2004The appellate court believed, however, that it needed a “factual basis to assess the reasonableness of this rule” and, in accordance with that belief, remanded the cause to the trial court “for a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the rule in * * * eliminating appellant’s right to a jury trial.” Id. at 347-348, 706 N.E.2d 354 . {¶ 7} On February 20, 1998, Shimko’s cross-appeal to this court was dismissed for failure of prosecution. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1450 , 690 N.E.2d 545 .

2004Espousing the proposition that “ ‘[n]o one has an absolute right to practice law, and the State may impose reasonable conditions and limitations upon those who wish to exercise that privilege,’ ” the majority of the court of appeals framed the determinative inquiry under Section 5, Article I in terms of whether DR 2-107(B) “is reasonable and, therefore, appellant should be bound by it.” Shimko v. Lobe (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 336, 347 , 706 N.E.2d 354 , quoting Kelley Drye & Warren v. Murray Industries, Inc. (D.N.J.1985), 623 F.Supp. 522, 527 .

2004Espousing the proposition that “ ‘[n]o one has an absolute right to practice law, and the State may impose reasonable conditions and limitations upon those who wish to exercise that privilege,’ ” the majority of the court of appeals framed the determinative inquiry under Section 5, Article I in terms of whether DR 2-107(B) “is reasonable and, therefore, appellant should be bound by it.” Shimko v. Lobe (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 336, 347 , 706 N.E.2d 354 , quoting Kelley Drye & Warren v. Murray Industries, Inc. (D.N.J.1985), 623 F.Supp. 522, 527 .

2003Thus, under a particular set of circumstances it may be properly found that the statute begins to run when the claimant is informed of a specific diagnosis.” Id. at 239, 680 N.E.2d 1207 . {¶ 47} The Lewis analysis is applicable to cases involving R.C. 4123.85 as well.

2002Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 574 , has held that the determinative test is not whether the act was "alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities," but only whether the act was alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities ." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, under Rogers and Whaley, Tieri's complaint need not state that Crise acted in good faith. {¶ 21} In Rogers , the court noted the following: p

2001The majority today holds that “R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) requires a political subdivision to provide a legal defense for an employee whenever the underlying complaint (or subsequent pleadings) either alleges or reasonably implies that the employee was acting not manifestly (i.e., plainly and obviously) outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.” As does the majority today, the majority in Rogers held that the determinative test is not whether the act was “alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment

2001The majority today holds that “R.C. 2744.07(A)(1) requires a political subdivision to provide a legal defense for an employee whenever the underlying complaint (or subsequent pleadings) either alleges or reasonably implies that the employee was acting not manifestly (i.e., plainly and obviously) outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.” As does the majority today, the majority in Rogers held that the determinative test is not whether the act was “alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment

1998In Conkel v. Conkel (1987), 31 Ohio App.3d 169 , 172 , the court stated that "[t]he denial of visitation should only be done when egregious conduct by the noncustodial parent results in harm to the child." The determinative factors in this case are appellant's continuing incarceration, the age of the child, six and one-half years old, and appellant's prior conduct, i.e. , abducting his daughter.

1992The VFW Post 3562 case goes on to explain that “ ‘ * * * [i]n light of the safeguards placed on the inspection, an administrative warrant requirement would add only marginally if at all to the licensee’s right of privacy. [United States v.] Biswell [(1972)], supra, 406 U.S. [311] at 316 [ 92 S.Ct. 1593, at 1596 , 32 L.Ed.2d 87, at 92 ]; Camara [v. Municipal Court (1967) ], supra, 387 U.S. [523] at 539 [ 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 941 ].’ Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, supra, at 1080.” VFW Post 3562, supra, 37 Ohio St.3d at 314 , 525 N.E.2d at 777 .

1992The VFW Post 3562 case goes on to explain that “ ‘ * * * [i]n light of the safeguards placed on the inspection, an administrative warrant requirement would add only marginally if at all to the licensee’s right of privacy. [United States v.] Biswell [(1972)], supra, 406 U.S. [311] at 316 [ 92 S.Ct. 1593, at 1596 , 32 L.Ed.2d 87, at 92 ]; Camara [v. Municipal Court (1967) ], supra, 387 U.S. [523] at 539 [ 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 941 ].’ Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, supra, at 1080.” VFW Post 3562, supra, 37 Ohio St.3d at 314 , 525 N.E.2d at 777 .

1992Third, the regulatory scheme in VFW Post failed constitutional muster because it did not provide sufficiently limited restrictions as to the time, place and scope of the search. “ ‘The determinative factors to be considered are whether the industry affected is so closely regulated as to provide notice of the prospect of governmental intrusion and whether the statutory scheme enacted “provides an adequate substitute for a warrant in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application.” * * (Emphasis added.) VFW Post 3562, supra, at 313 , 525 N.E.2d at 776 , citing Bionic Auto Parts & Sales

1992The VFW Post 3562 case goes on to explain that “ ‘ * * * [i]n light of the safeguards placed on the inspection, an administrative warrant requirement would add only marginally if at all to the licensee’s right of privacy. [United States v.] Biswell [(1972)], supra, 406 U.S. [311] at 316 [ 92 S.Ct. 1593, at 1596 , 32 L.Ed.2d 87, at 92 ]; Camara [v. Municipal Court (1967) ], supra, 387 U.S. [523] at 539 [ 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 941 ].’ Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, supra, at 1080.” VFW Post 3562, supra, 37 Ohio St.3d at 314 , 525 N.E.2d at 777 .

1981Rebhun v. Executive Equipment Corp. (1977), 90 Misc. 2d 576 , 394 N.Y.

1937See In Re: Majoribanks (1923) 2 Ch. 307; Lamb v Lehman, supra; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v Adams et, 219 Mass. 175 .

1937See In Re: Majoribanks (1923) 2 Ch. 307; Lamb v Lehman, supra; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v Adams et, 219 Mass. 175 .