determinative inquiry in Connecticut

2005The requirements of clarity and definiteness are the determinative factors in deciding whether the statements are indeed expressions of commitment as opposed to expressions of intention, hope, desire or opinion.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96, 104-106 , 837 A.2d 736 (2003). “[T]he question of whether statements are promissory should be considered as a question of fact, and factual conclusions will be reversed only when there is insufficient evidence to support them.” Torosyan v. Boehringer I

2005The requirements of clarity and definiteness are the determinative factors in deciding whether the statements are indeed expressions of commitment as opposed to expressions of intention, hope, desire or opinion.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96, 104-106 , 837 A.2d 736 (2003). “[T]he question of whether statements are promissory should be considered as a question of fact, and factual conclusions will be reversed only when there is insufficient evidence to support them.” Torosyan v. Boehringer I

2019Finally, whether a representation rises to the level of a promise is generally a question of fact, to be determined in light of the circumstances under which the representation was made.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Cen- dant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96 , 104–106, 837 A.2d 736 (2003). ‘‘[A] promisor is not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason to expect any reliance at all.’’ D’Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 213 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987).

2019Finally, whether a representation rises to the level of a promise is generally a question of fact, to be determined in light of the circumstances under which the representation was made.’’ (Citations omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Cen- dant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96 , 104–106, 837 A.2d 736 (2003). ‘‘[A] promisor is not liable to a promisee who has relied on a promise if, judged by an objective standard, he had no reason to expect any reliance at all.’’ D’Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 213 , 520 A.2d 217 (1987).

2011Id., [188].

1993Id., 726-27 .

2001The defendant relies heavily on State v. Shriver , 207 Conn. 456 (1988) to support his position.

2001The defendant relies heavily on State v. Shriver , 207 Conn. 456 (1988) to support his position.

2001"The issue whether an insurer is obligated to defend its insured does not turn upon the question whether the insurer will be obligated to indemnify its insured, [but, rather] the determinative inquiry is whether the facts stated in the complaint set forth a cause of action within the coverage of the policy." Defendant Bates' Exhibit D, page 5, citing of Missionaries of Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 155 Conn. 104 , 114 (1967).

2001"The issue whether an insurer is obligated to defend its insured does not turn upon the question whether the insurer will be obligated to indemnify its insured, [but, rather] the determinative inquiry is whether the facts stated in the complaint set forth a cause of action within the coverage of the policy." Defendant Bates' Exhibit D, page 5, citing of Missionaries of Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 155 Conn. 104 , 114 (1967).

1996Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U.S. 564 , [ 14 S. Ct. 928 (1894)].” Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Cambell, 95 Conn. 399, 405 , 111 A. 864 (1920).

1996Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U.S. 564 , [ 14 S. Ct. 928 (1894)].” Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Cambell, 95 Conn. 399, 405 , 111 A. 864 (1920).

2025Finally, whether a representation rises to the level of a promise is generally a question of fact, to be determined in light of the circumstances under which the representation was made.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) T & M Building Co. v. Hastings, 194 Conn. App. 532 , 553–54, 221 A.3d 857 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 926 , 224 A.3d 162 (2020).

2020I find the Appellate Court’s decision in Gianetti v. Connecticut Newspapers Publishing Co., 136 Conn. App. 67, 73 , 44 A.3d 191 , cert. denied, 307 Conn. 923 , 55 A.3d 567 (2012), particularly helpful in ascertaining the meaning of ‘‘ ‘personal delivery.’ ’’ In analyzing § 52- 593a, the Appellate Court explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough the plaintiff is permitted to mail the process to the marshal, the determinative standard is when the mar- shal receives the process, not when it is mailed.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.

2020I find the Appellate Court’s decision in Gianetti v. Connecticut Newspapers Publishing Co., 136 Conn. App. 67, 73 , 44 A.3d 191 , cert. denied, 307 Conn. 923 , 55 A.3d 567 (2012), particularly helpful in ascertaining the meaning of ‘‘ ‘personal delivery.’ ’’ In analyzing § 52- 593a, the Appellate Court explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough the plaintiff is permitted to mail the process to the marshal, the determinative standard is when the mar- shal receives the process, not when it is mailed.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.

2006See, e.g., State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 61 (“appropriate question is whether the statements were made before reasoned reflection had taken place” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Mei v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 159 Conn. 307, 315 , 268 A.2d 639 (1970) (“ultimate question is whether the utterance was spontaneous and unreflective and made under such circumstances as to indicate absence of opportunity for contrivance and misrepresentation”); Rockhill v. White Line Bus Co., 109 Conn. 706, 708 , 145 A. 504 (1929) (“decisive question [is] whether the utterance was made under circumsta

2006See, e.g., State v. Kelly, supra, 256 Conn. 61 (“appropriate question is whether the statements were made before reasoned reflection had taken place” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Mei v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 159 Conn. 307, 315 , 268 A.2d 639 (1970) (“ultimate question is whether the utterance was spontaneous and unreflective and made under such circumstances as to indicate absence of opportunity for contrivance and misrepresentation”); Rockhill v. White Line Bus Co., 109 Conn. 706, 708 , 145 A. 504 (1929) (“decisive question [is] whether the utterance was made under circumsta

2005The requirements of clarity and definiteness are the determinative factors in deciding whether the statements are indeed expressions of commitment as opposed to expressions of intention, hope, desire or opinion.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96, 104-106 , 837 A.2d 736 (2003). “[T]he question of whether statements are promissory should be considered as a question of fact, and factual conclusions will be reversed only when there is insufficient evidence to support them.” Torosyan v. Boehringer I

2005The requirements of clarity and definiteness are the determinative factors in deciding whether the statements are indeed expressions of commitment as opposed to expressions of intention, hope, desire or opinion.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Cendant Mobility Services Corp., 267 Conn. 96, 104-106 , 837 A.2d 736 (2003). “[T]he question of whether statements are promissory should be considered as a question of fact, and factual conclusions will be reversed only when there is insufficient evidence to support them.” Torosyan v. Boehringer I

2002Id., 628 .

2002"The determinative factors to be considered are whether the industry affected is so closely regulated as to provide notice of the prospect of governmental intrusion and whether the statutory scheme enacted provides an adequate substitute for a warrant in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner , 721 F.2d 1072 , 1078 (7th Cir. 1983).

2001In determining the severability of the contract, the court looks to whether the contract's parts and its consideration are common to each other or independent of one another. . . . ([S]ingleness or apportionability of the consideration rendered is a principal test in judging severability.) CT Page 4331 (Brackets in original; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Venture Partners, Ltd v. Synapse Technologies, Inc., 42 Conn. App. 109 , 118 , 679 A.2d 372 (1996).

2001In determining the severability of the contract, the court looks to whether the contract's parts and its consideration are common to each other or independent of one another. . . . ([S]ingleness or apportionability of the consideration rendered is a principal test in judging severability.) CT Page 4331 (Brackets in original; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Venture Partners, Ltd v. Synapse Technologies, Inc., 42 Conn. App. 109 , 118 , 679 A.2d 372 (1996).

1996Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U.S. 564 , [ 14 S. Ct. 928 (1894)].” Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Cambell, 95 Conn. 399, 405 , 111 A. 864 (1920).

1996Loud v. Pomona Land & Water Co., 153 U.S. 564 , [ 14 S. Ct. 928 (1894)].” Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Cambell, 95 Conn. 399, 405 , 111 A. 864 (1920).

1993Furthermore, “[t]he fact that a judge receives no personal benefit, financial or otherwise, from his improper handling of a case does not preclude his conduct from being prejudicial to the administration of justice. 11 The determinative factors aside from the conduct itself, are the results of the conduct and the impact it might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.” In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 154 , 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied sub nom.

1993Furthermore, “[t]he fact that a judge receives no personal benefit, financial or otherwise, from his improper handling of a case does not preclude his conduct from being prejudicial to the administration of justice. 11 The determinative factors aside from the conduct itself, are the results of the conduct and the impact it might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.” In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 154 , 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978), cert. denied sub nom.

1993Peoples v. Judicial Standards Commission of North Carolina, 442 U.S. 929 , 99 S. Ct. 2859 , 61 L.

1993Peoples v. Judicial Standards Commission of North Carolina, 442 U.S. 929 , 99 S. Ct. 2859 , 61 L.

1993Peoples v. Judicial Standards Commission of North Carolina, 442 U.S. 929 , 99 S. Ct. 2859 , 61 L.

1991Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 544 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989).

1991Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 544 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989).

1991A claim that a verdict is excessive raises a question of law; Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 358 , 407 A.2d 982 (1978); and on appeal the determinative inquiry is whether the verdict so shocks the conscience as to compel a reviewing court’s conclusion that it was due to partiality, prejudice or mistake.

1991A claim that a verdict is excessive raises a question of law; Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 358 , 407 A.2d 982 (1978); and on appeal the determinative inquiry is whether the verdict so shocks the conscience as to compel a reviewing court’s conclusion that it was due to partiality, prejudice or mistake.

1988Cogswell v. Second National Bank, [ 76 Conn. 252, 262 , 56 A. 574 (1903)].

1988Cogswell v. Second National Bank, [ 76 Conn. 252, 262 , 56 A. 574 (1903)].

1988A receiver of a corporation will be appointed by a court of equity “as a measure ancillary to the enforcement of some recognized equitable right.” Barber v. International Co. of Mexico, 73 Conn. 587, 593 , 48 A. 758 (1901). “ ‘The determinative inquiry is whether, considering all the circumstances, the affairs of the corporation should continue to be managed and wound up by those in control of it or, instead, it appears that those in control are so using their power that the property of the corporation should be taken over and administered under the direction of the court. . . .

1988A receiver of a corporation will be appointed by a court of equity “as a measure ancillary to the enforcement of some recognized equitable right.” Barber v. International Co. of Mexico, 73 Conn. 587, 593 , 48 A. 758 (1901). “ ‘The determinative inquiry is whether, considering all the circumstances, the affairs of the corporation should continue to be managed and wound up by those in control of it or, instead, it appears that those in control are so using their power that the property of the corporation should be taken over and administered under the direction of the court. . . .

1972The applicable legal principles were enunciated by Judge Cardozo in Matter of Marks v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 .

1972The applicable legal principles were enunciated by Judge Cardozo in Matter of Marks v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90 , 167 N.E. 181 .

1940The application for a receiver is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court, to be exercised with due regard to the relevant statutes and rules, and such exercise is not to be disturbed lightly nor unless abuse of discretion or other material error appears.” Chatfield Co. v. Coffey Laundries, Inc., 111 Conn. 497, 501 , 150 Atl. 511 .

1940The application for a receiver is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court, to be exercised with due regard to the relevant statutes and rules, and such exercise is not to be disturbed lightly nor unless abuse of discretion or other material error appears.” Chatfield Co. v. Coffey Laundries, Inc., 111 Conn. 497, 501 , 150 Atl. 511 .