determinative inquiry in Michigan

2018"The determinative inquiry in qualifying an expert is the nature and extent of knowledge and actual experience...." People v. Christel , 449 Mich. 578 , 592 n 25, 537 N.W.2d 194 (1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018"The determinative inquiry in qualifying an expert is the nature and extent of knowledge and actual experience...." People v. Christel , 449 Mich. 578 , 592 n 25, 537 N.W.2d 194 (1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

1996Sturgis, supra; People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 485 ; 355 NW2d 592 (1984); Ayers, supra. In this case, the aggravated-stalking statute provides: A criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addition to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising from the same conduct or for contempt of court arising from the same conduct. [MCL 750.4111(6); MSA 28.643(9)(6).] Thus, it is clear from this subsection that the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for both of defendant’s convictions of aggravated stalking and criminal contempt for vi

1996Sturgis, supra; People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 485 ; 355 NW2d 592 (1984); Ayers, supra. In this case, the aggravated-stalking statute provides: A criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addition to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising from the same conduct or for contempt of court arising from the same conduct. [MCL 750.4111(6); MSA 28.643(9)(6).] Thus, it is clear from this subsection that the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for both of defendant’s convictions of aggravated stalking and criminal contempt for vi

2021Id.

2020Id.

2020In so arguing, however, Yono disregards that M Crim JI 22.2 also defines “owner” as “any other person whose consent was necessary before the property could be taken.” As discussed in detail earlier in this opinion, “possession, and not title ownership, is the determinative requirement in larceny crimes.” March, 499 Mich at 409 . “ ‘[P]roperty of another’ is any property in which ‘another’ individual holds the right to possess as against the defendant at the time of the taking.” Id. at 414 .

2020In other words, the common-law meaning of “immediate presence” in the larceny-from-the-person context is consistent with the plain meaning of the word “immediate,” which means “having no object or space intervening, nearest or next.” [Id. at 688 (citation omitted).] The dispute in this case centers on whether the TITO ticket that Yono took constituted the “property of another.” Contrary to Yono’s argument on appeal, “possession, and not title ownership, is the determinative requirement in larceny crimes.” March, 499 Mich at 409 .

1996Sturgis, supra; Ayers, supra. The determinative inquiry is whether the Legislature intended to impose cumulative punishment for similar crimes.

1995Since the power to define crime and fix punishment is wholly legislative, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not a limitation on the Legislature, and the Legislature may specifically authorize penalties for what would otherwise be the "same offense.” Cumulative punishment of the same conduct does not necessarily run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause in either the federal or state system, id. at 400 ; the determinative inquiry is whether the Legislature intended to impose cumulative punishment for similar crimes.

1996Sturgis, supra; People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 485 ; 355 NW2d 592 (1984); Ayers, supra. In this case, the aggravated-stalking statute provides: A criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addition to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising from the same conduct or for contempt of court arising from the same conduct. [MCL 750.4111(6); MSA 28.643(9)(6).] Thus, it is clear from this subsection that the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for both of defendant’s convictions of aggravated stalking and criminal contempt for vi

1996Sturgis, supra; Ayers, supra. The determinative inquiry is whether the Legislature intended to impose cumulative punishment for similar crimes.

2026As Renny explained, the first sentence of MCL 691.1406 provides that a governmental agency owes a duty to repair and maintain public buildings under its control, and the second sentence of the statute “does not expand the duty beyond the repair and maintenance of a public building” to include “a duty to prevent ‘dangerous or defective condition[s]’ in public buildings . . . .” Renny, 478 Mich at 501 .

2023Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 , Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249 .

2023Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 , Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249 .

2022Ross, 481 Mich at 11 .

2018Id.

2016In Christenson, 412 Mich at 87 , we observed, “As with common-law larceny, larceny by conversion [MCL 750.362] is a crime against possession and not against title . . . .” This statement not only communicates that the law of larceny protects an individual’s possessory rights, but further supports the proposition that property is “of another” when someone other than the defendant has a right to possess that property as against the defendant, regardless of whether that person possesses title to it. 50 Am Jur 2d, Larceny, § 18, p 29 (citing Christenson in support of this specific rule); Tiffany,

2014It is a general proposition that liability for an injury due to defective premises ordinarily depends upon power to prevent the injury and therefore rests primarily upon him who has control and possession. [Citations omitted.] This Court subsequently affirmed that decision, holding that a co-owner of land cannot be held liable where he or she has not “exercise[d] her right to possession and control over the property” because “[w]hen one co-owner of land cedes possession and control of the premises to her co-owners, the law is satisfied to look to those co-owners actually in control for liabili

2014It is a general proposition that liability for an injury due to defective premises ordinarily depends upon power to prevent the injury and therefore rests primarily upon him who has control and possession. [Citations omitted.] This Court subsequently affirmed that decision, holding that a co-owner of land cannot be held liable where he or she has not “exercise[d] her right to possession and control over the property” because “[w]hen one co-owner of land cedes possession and control of the premises to her co-owners, the law is satisfied to look to those co-owners actually in control for liabili

2014Thus, the majority makes the fallacious assumption of a complete unity between the determinative factors of the pre-Miranda Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis (which was concerned solely with coercive police conduct that affected the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession) and the post -Miranda waiver analysis (which requires analysis of two distinct prongs, only one of which — i.e., voluntariness — is logically, or in any other respect, related to coercive police practices). [People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 52-53 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part).] Connelly does

2014Thus, the majority makes the fallacious assumption of a complete unity between the determinative factors of the pre-Miranda Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis (which was concerned solely with coercive police conduct that affected the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession) and the post -Miranda waiver analysis (which requires analysis of two distinct prongs, only one of which — i.e., voluntariness — is logically, or in any other respect, related to coercive police practices). [People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 52-53 ; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part).] Connelly does

1995The determinative inquiry in qualifying an expert is the "nature and extent of knowledge and actual experience...." Beckley, supra at 712 .

1995The determinative inquiry in qualifying an expert is the "nature and extent of knowledge and actual experience . . . .” Beckley, supra at 712 .

1994People v Ward, 206 Mich App 38, 42 ; 520 NW2d 363 (1994).

1994People v Ward, 206 Mich App 38, 42 ; 520 NW2d 363 (1994).

1993Old Orchard by the Bay Associates v Hamilton Mutual Ins Co, 434 Mich 244, 257 ; 454 NW2d 73 (1990).

1993Old Orchard by the Bay Associates v Hamilton Mutual Ins Co, 434 Mich 244, 257 ; 454 NW2d 73 (1990).

1978"It is a general proposition that liability for an injury due to defective premises ordinarily depends upon power to prevent the injury and therefore rests primarily upon him who has control and possession.” Dombrowski v Gorecki, 291 Mich 678, 681 ; 289 NW 293 (1939), citing Bannigan v Woodbury, 158 Mich 206 ; 122 NW 531 (1909).

1978"It is a general proposition that liability for an injury due to defective premises ordinarily depends upon power to prevent the injury and therefore rests primarily upon him who has control and possession.” Dombrowski v Gorecki, 291 Mich 678, 681 ; 289 NW 293 (1939), citing Bannigan v Woodbury, 158 Mich 206 ; 122 NW 531 (1909).

1978Leave to appeal was granted in these cases to resolve one of the most vexatious problems of interpretation presented by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of 1969: What are the determinative factors in ruling whether a worker qualifies for benefits statutorily provided for those suffering "total and permanent disability” from "incurable insanity or imbecility” within the context of MCL 418.361(2)(f); MSA 17.237(361)(2)(f). 1 In each case, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) applied the test set forth in Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, 32 Mich App 574 ; 189 NW2d 89 (1971): "

1978Leave to appeal was granted in these cases to resolve one of the most vexatious problems of interpretation presented by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of 1969: What are the determinative factors in ruling whether a worker qualifies for benefits statutorily provided for those suffering "total and permanent disability” from "incurable insanity or imbecility” within the context of MCL 418.361(2)(f); MSA 17.237(361)(2)(f). 1 In each case, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) applied the test set forth in Sprute v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, 32 Mich App 574 ; 189 NW2d 89 (1971): "

1978"It is a general proposition that liability for an injury due to defective premises ordinarily depends upon power to prevent the injury and therefore rests primarily upon him who has control and possession.” Dombrowski v Gorecki, 291 Mich 678, 681 ; 289 NW 293 (1939), citing Bannigan v Woodbury, 158 Mich 206 ; 122 NW 531 (1909).

1978"It is a general proposition that liability for an injury due to defective premises ordinarily depends upon power to prevent the injury and therefore rests primarily upon him who has control and possession.” Dombrowski v Gorecki, 291 Mich 678, 681 ; 289 NW 293 (1939), citing Bannigan v Woodbury, 158 Mich 206 ; 122 NW 531 (1909).

1967If honest differences of opinion between men of average intelligence might exist, the issue should not be resolved by the court alone.” The following question presented by the plaintiff in Kroll v. Katz, supra, p 368 , was held to be the determinative test in that case and is applicable to the case at hand. “ ‘Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is there any evidence of negligence to support the unanimous verdict of the jury?’ ” See, also, Cole v. Barber (1958), 353 Mich 427, 430 .

1967If honest differences of opinion between men of average intelligence might exist, the issue should not be resolved by the court alone.” The following question presented by the plaintiff in Kroll v. Katz, supra, p 368 , was held to be the determinative test in that case and is applicable to the case at hand. “ ‘Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is there any evidence of negligence to support the unanimous verdict of the jury?’ ” See, also, Cole v. Barber (1958), 353 Mich 427, 430 .