8 Oregon opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carolyn Crockett v. The Long Island Railroadgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Wright, 574 F3d at 621 (concluding that the proper analysis turns on “the totality of circumstances at the time of the injury”); Deans, 152 F3d at 329 (“[T]o determine whether a train is ‘in use’ * * *, the primary factors we consider are where the train was located at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured party.”); McGrath, 136 F3d at 842 (stating that “the determinative factors” are the “location of the locomotive at the time of the injury and the activity of the injured party”); Crockett, 65 F3d at 277-78 (considering the totality of circumstances, including th | 1 | 1 |
McGrath v. Consolidated Rail Corp.green1 sentence2017See, e.g., Wright, 574 F3d at 621 (concluding that the proper analysis turns on “the totality of circumstances at the time of the injury”); Deans, 152 F3d at 329 (“[T]o determine whether a train is ‘in use’ * * *, the primary factors we consider are where the train was located at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured party.”); McGrath, 136 F3d at 842 (stating that “the determinative factors” are the “location of the locomotive at the time of the injury and the activity of the injured party”); Crockett, 65 F3d at 277-78 (considering the totality of circumstances, including th | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Arkansas & Missouri Railroadgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Wright, 574 F3d at 621 (concluding that the proper analysis turns on “the totality of circumstances at the time of the injury”); Deans, 152 F3d at 329 (“[T]o determine whether a train is ‘in use’ * * *, the primary factors we consider are where the train was located at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured party.”); McGrath, 136 F3d at 842 (stating that “the determinative factors” are the “location of the locomotive at the time of the injury and the activity of the injured party”); Crockett, 65 F3d at 277-78 (considering the totality of circumstances, including th | 1 | 1 |
Dennis Deans v. Csx Transportation, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Wright, 574 F3d at 621 (concluding that the proper analysis turns on “the totality of circumstances at the time of the injury”); Deans, 152 F3d at 329 (“[T]o determine whether a train is ‘in use’ * * *, the primary factors we consider are where the train was located at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured party.”); McGrath, 136 F3d at 842 (stating that “the determinative factors” are the “location of the locomotive at the time of the injury and the activity of the injured party”); Crockett, 65 F3d at 277-78 (considering the totality of circumstances, including th | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Companygreen2 sentences2017Co., 2016 IL App (3d) 150464 , ¶ 20, 59 NE3d 820, 827 (2016) (“[C]ourts are to apply a totality-of-the-circumstances, multifactor analysis in determining whether a particular locomotive was ‘in use’ at the time of an injury.”). 2017Co., 2016 IL App (3d) 150464 , ¶ 20, 59 NE3d 820, 827 (2016) (“[C]ourts are to apply a totality-of-the-circumstances, multifactor analysis in determining whether a particular locomotive was ‘in use’ at the time of an injury.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Deaton v. State Accident Insurance Fund
green
2 sentences1975The burden of proving odd-lot status rests upon the claimant.’ 13 Or App at 304-05 .” 20 Or App at 157-58 . 1975The burden of proving odd-lot status rests upon the claimant.” 13 Or App at 304-05 . | 2 | 1975–1975 |
State v. MacHuca
green
1 sentence2014In that case, a defendant was involved in a car accident and taken to an emergency room in the hospital. 347 Or at 646 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Ashbaugh
green
2 sentences2012On the other hand, the state predictably responds that Taylor’s actions during the parts of the encounter on which defendant relies were insufficient to effect a seizure under the test articulated in State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297, 316 , 244 P3d 360 (2010). 2012On the other hand, the state predictably responds that Taylor’s actions during the parts of the encounter on which defendant relies were insufficient to effect a seizure under the test articulated in State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or 297, 316 , 244 P3d 360 (2010). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
North Clackamas School District No. 12 v. Oregon School Boards Ass'n Property & Casualty Trust
green
2 sentences2005No. 12 v. OSBA, 164 Or App 339, 344 , 991 P2d 1089 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000); see also Totten, 288 Or at 770-71 (“The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation.”). 4 Thus, the determinative inquiry here: From the perspective of the “ordinary purchaser of insurance,” what did plaintiff and Guthrie Motors intend when they entered into their insurance contract? 2005No. 12 v. OSBA, 164 Or App 339, 344 , 991 P2d 1089 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 361 (2000); see also Totten, 288 Or at 770-71 (“The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation.”). 4 Thus, the determinative inquiry here: From the perspective of the “ordinary purchaser of insurance,” what did plaintiff and Guthrie Motors intend when they entered into their insurance contract? | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Standard
green
2 sentences1992Later cases incorporated into that rule the “prejudice” standard of ORS 135.715 (formerly ORS 132.590), which provides: “No accusatory instrument is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of a defect or imperfection in a matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.” Now the determinative test for whether an indictment that includes a disputed allegation remains valid is “whether or not the inclusion of these allegations is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that 1992Later cases incorporated into that rule the “prejudice” standard of ORS 135.715 (formerly ORS 132.590), which provides: “No accusatory instrument is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of a defect or imperfection in a matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.” Now the determinative test for whether an indictment that includes a disputed allegation remains valid is “whether or not the inclusion of these allegations is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Edwards
neutral
2 sentences1992Accord: State v. Edwards, 243 Or 440, 442 , 412 P2d 526 (1966); State v. Johnson, 19 Or App 355, 358 , 527 P2d 740 (1974), rev den (1975). 1992Accord: State v. Edwards, 243 Or 440, 442 , 412 P2d 526 (1966); State v. Johnson, 19 Or App 355, 358 , 527 P2d 740 (1974), rev den (1975). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences1992Accord: State v. Edwards, 243 Or 440, 442 , 412 P2d 526 (1966); State v. Johnson, 19 Or App 355, 358 , 527 P2d 740 (1974), rev den (1975). 1992Accord: State v. Edwards, 243 Or 440, 442 , 412 P2d 526 (1966); State v. Johnson, 19 Or App 355, 358 , 527 P2d 740 (1974), rev den (1975). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State of Oregon v. Wojahn
green
2 sentences1975State of Oregon v. Wojahn, 204 Or 84 , 282 P2d 675 (1955); State v. Samter, supra. The determinative standard by which we examine a statute for vagueness is: “A statute which creates a new crime must express itself with clarity so that those who are about *674 to engage in the conduct which it endeavors to prohibit may know by reading the statute that they will be subject to punishment if they proceed. 1975State of Oregon v. Wojahn, 204 Or 84 , 282 P2d 675 (1955); State v. Samter, supra. The determinative standard by which we examine a statute for vagueness is: “A statute which creates a new crime must express itself with clarity so that those who are about *674 to engage in the conduct which it endeavors to prohibit may know by reading the statute that they will be subject to punishment if they proceed. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
House v. State Accident Insurance Fund
neutral
1 sentence1975The burden of proving odd-lot status rests upon the claimant.’ 13 Or App at 304-05 .” 20 Or App at 157-58 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.