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17 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heaton v. Ferrellgreen2 sentences1967“An injury arises out of the employment if it is a natural and reasonable incident thereof” and is “the rational consequence of some hazard connected therewith.” The term “ ‘in the course of’ the employment refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury was received,” and, “generally speaking, the scope of the contract of employment furnishes the determinative test as to whether or not the accident is compensable as ‘arising out of and in the course of * * * employment.’ ” Hacker v. City of Potosi, Mo.App., 340 S.W.2d 166, 169-170 (1-4); Heaton v. Ferrell, Mo.App., 325 S.W 1961And, as recently stated in Heaton v. Ferrell, Mo.App., 325 S.W.2d 800 , 804: “However, it may be helpful in consideration of the instant case to bear in mind that, before an injury may be said to arise out of the employment, it must have been a rational consequence of some hazard connected with the employment; that, generally speaking, the scope of the contract of employment furnishes the determinative test as to whether or not the accident is compensable as 'arising out of and in the course of * * * employment’; and, that cases involving construction and application of the quoted phrase usual | 2 | 3 |
Hacker v. City of Potosigreen2 sentences1980Hacker v. City of Potosi, 340 S.W.2d 166, 169-170 (Mo.App.1960); Heaton v. Ferrell, 325 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Mo.App.1959). 1967“An injury arises out of the employment if it is a natural and reasonable incident thereof” and is “the rational consequence of some hazard connected therewith.” The term “ ‘in the course of’ the employment refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury was received,” and, “generally speaking, the scope of the contract of employment furnishes the determinative test as to whether or not the accident is compensable as ‘arising out of and in the course of * * * employment.’ ” Hacker v. City of Potosi, Mo.App., 340 S.W.2d 166, 169-170 (1-4); Heaton v. Ferrell, Mo.App., 325 S.W | 2 | 2 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.green2 sentences2016While Congress’ intent and purpose are the determinative factors, preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisi- ana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 (preemption analysis “starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by” federal statute). 2016While Congress’ intent and purpose are the determinative factors, preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisi- ana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 (preemption analysis “starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by” federal statute). | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2016While Congress’ intent and purpose are the determinative factors, preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisi- ana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 (preemption analysis “starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by” federal statute). 2016While Congress’ intent and purpose are the determinative factors, preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisi- ana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 (preemption analysis “starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by” federal statute). | 1 | 1 |
Garrett v. Industrial Commissiongreen1 sentence1982Garrett v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 600 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Mo.App.1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kempergreen2 sentences1980As stated in State v. Kemper, 535 S.W.2d 241, 251-252 (Mo.App. 1976), "unfortunately juvenile courts are frequently presented with cases where the entire gamut of the facilities of that institution have been made available to a child, without beneficial results. 1980As stated in State v. Kemper, 535 S.W.2d 241, 251-252 (Mo.App. 1976), “unfortunately juvenile courts are frequently presented with cases where the entire gamut of the facilities of that institution have been made available to a child, without beneficial results. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sylcox v. National Lead Co.
green
2 sentences1965In the words of that profound and clear-speaking jurist Bennick (Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.App. 543 , 38 S.W.2d 497, 499-500 ): “ * * * Generally speaking, it is the scope of the contract of employment which furnishes the determinative test of whether such an accident is one for compensation. 1965In the words of that profound and clear-speaking jurist Bennick (Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.App. 543 , 38 S.W.2d 497, 499-500 ): “ * * * Generally speaking, it is the scope of the contract of employment which furnishes the determinative test of whether such an accident is one for compensation. | 2 | 1958–1965 |
Pierce v. Platte-Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Pierce, 769 S.W.2d at 773 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
D.R. Sherry Construction, Ltd. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2012Sherry Const., 316 S.W.3d at 905 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2010Reliance on Hill’s “template” that a defendant must contend that “but for” counsel’s ineffective assistance the defendant would have insisted on going to trial as determinative of whether a defendant can establish prejudice completely ignores Strickland’s looser emphasis on whether a defendant can establish “an adverse effect on the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 2010Reliance on Hill’s “template” that a defendant must contend that “but for” counsel’s ineffective assistance the defendant would have insisted on going to trial as determinative of whether a defendant can establish prejudice completely ignores Strickland’s looser emphasis on whether a defendant can establish “an adverse effect on the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jackson v. Risby Pallet and Lumber Co.
green
1 sentence1991Jackson v. Risby Pallet and Lumber Co., 736 S.W.2d 575 (Mo.App.1987). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Keasling Ex Rel. Keasling v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1977As stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Ia. banc 1974), the purpose of that State’s guest statute is to protect “ ‘the good Samaritan’ from liability to free-riding passengers as distinguished from passenger liability when the owner or driver is receiving some definite and tangible benefit.” Id., at 690 . 1977As stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Ia. banc 1974), the purpose of that State’s guest statute is to protect “ ‘the good Samaritan’ from liability to free-riding passengers as distinguished from passenger liability when the owner or driver is receiving some definite and tangible benefit.” Id., at 690 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Liebman v. Colonial Baking Company
green
1 sentence1975However, it may be helpful in consideration of the instant case to bear in mind that, before an injury may be said to arise out of the employment, it must have been a rational consequence of some hazard connected with the employment; that, generally speaking, the scope of the contract of employment furnishes the determinative test as to whether or not the accident is compensable as ‘arising out of and in the course of * * * employment’; and that cases involving construction and application of the quoted phrase usually have turned upon the point whether, under the particular circumstances of ea | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Engler v. Engler
green
1 sentence1972In Engler v. Engler, Mo.App., 455 S.W.2d 36 , we held that allowances for counsel fees in proceedings of this nature are to be determined by reference to the financial circumstances of both parties with the determinative inquiry being whether the wife is possessed of sufficient means on her own to prosecute the suit. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Morgan v. Duncan
green
2 sentences1969However, it may be helpful in consideration of the instant case to bear in mind that, before an injury may be said to arise out of the employment, it must have been a rational consequence of some hazard connected with the employment; that, generally speaking, the scope of the contract of employment furnishes the determinative test as to whether or not the accident is compensable as ‘arising out of and in the course of * * * employment’ and, that cases involving construction and application of the quoted phrase usually have turned upon the point whether, under the particular circumstances of ea 1969However, it may be helpful in consideration of the instant case to bear in mind that, before an injury may be said to arise out of the employment, it must have been a rational consequence of some hazard connected with the employment; that, generally speaking, the scope of the contract of employment furnishes the determinative test as to whether or not the accident is compensable as ‘arising out of and in the course of * * * employment’ and, that cases involving construction and application of the quoted phrase usually have turned upon the point whether, under the particular circumstances of ea | 1 | 1969–1969 |
State Ex Rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hughes
green
2 sentences1965Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hughes, 349 Mo. 1142 , 164 S.W.2d 274 ), the Supreme Court stated that it was not concerned with whether the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals was the one it would have given, but the single and determinative inquiry was whether the language was subject to construction at all. 1965Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hughes, 349 Mo. 1142 , 164 S.W.2d 274 ), the Supreme Court stated that it was not concerned with whether the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals was the one it would have given, but the single and determinative inquiry was whether the language was subject to construction at all. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Sanderson v. Producers Commission Ass'n
green
2 sentences1958Sanderson v. Producers Commission Ass’n, 360 Mo. 571 , 229 S.W.2d 563, 566 , quoting Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.App. 543 , 38 S.W.2d 497 [1]; Garbo v. P. M. 1958Sanderson v. Producers Commission Ass’n, 360 Mo. 571 , 229 S.W.2d 563, 566 , quoting Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.App. 543 , 38 S.W.2d 497 [1]; Garbo v. P. M. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
State v. Hershon
green
2 sentences1943State v. Gibilterra, supra; State v. Pillow, 169 S.W.2d 414 ; State v. Hershon, 329 Mo. 469 , 45 S.W.2d 60 . 1943State v. Gibilterra, supra; State v. Pillow, 169 S.W.2d 414 ; State v. Hershon, 329 Mo. 469 , 45 S.W.2d 60 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.