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6 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gratrix v. Gratrixgreen1 sentence2020Jayda also contends that the court misapplied the best interests factors by failing to give proper weight to the length of time the daughter lived in “a stable, satisfactory environment[,] and the desirability of maintaining continuity” and by failing to consider 28 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002) (footnote omitted). 29 Id. (citing Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 80 (Alaska 1982)). -22- 7441 the impact of removing Jayda, whom the daughter had lived with since birth, from the daughter’s life.30 Cleveland counters that the superior court appropriately focused on the deter | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences2020Jayda also contends that the court misapplied the best interests factors by failing to give proper weight to the length of time the daughter lived in “a stable, satisfactory environment[,] and the desirability of maintaining continuity” and by failing to consider 28 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002) (footnote omitted). 29 Id. (citing Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 80 (Alaska 1982)). -22- 7441 the impact of removing Jayda, whom the daughter had lived with since birth, from the daughter’s life.30 Cleveland counters that the superior court appropriately focused on the deter 2020Jayda also contends that the court misapplied the best interests factors by failing to give proper weight to the length of time the daughter lived in “a stable, satisfactory environment[,] and the desirability of maintaining continuity” and by failing to consider 28 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002) (footnote omitted). 29 Id. (citing Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 80 (Alaska 1982)). -22- 7441 the impact of removing Jayda, whom the daughter had lived with since birth, from the daughter’s life.30 Cleveland counters that the superior court appropriately focused on the deter | 1 | 1 |
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Byayukgreen2 sentences1987In other words, rather than setting forth a determinative test, as the threshold criterion does, this criterion is used as a balancing factor. [[Image here]] We note that this criterion is generally designed to protect persons who innocently rely on judicial or legislative law rather than agencies which rely upon their own regulation.... [T]his factor is of minimal importance where the purpose and intended effect of the new rule of law clearly justifies a retroactive application. 684 P.2d at 119 (emphasis added). 20 . 1987Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 119 . 21 . | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Stategreen1 sentence1985Thus, in Phillips v. State, 625 P.2d 816, 817-18 (Alaska 1980), the Alaska Supreme Court, in upholding a third party’s consent to the search of the defendant’s home, emphasized that joint access to and control over the premises, not ownership, were the determinative factors. 7 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'Sheagreen1 sentence1979Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 318 A.2d at 715 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). [22] The following analysis draws on the analysis in State v. Paz, 572 P.2d at 1041-42 , of the "Factors to be Considered in the Objective Approach." The Paz decision lists three: whether the defendant could have left the scene of the interrogation voluntarily; whether the defendant was questioned as a suspect or a witness; and whether the defendant freely and voluntarily accompanied the police to the place of questioning. [23] This factor cannot by itself be the determinative test for custody. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2006Smith, 38 P.3d at 1159 . [9] Thus, the fact that the police arrest a suspect following an interview may shed light on otherwise ambiguous facets of the police officers' interaction with the suspect. 2006Smith, 38 P.3d at 1159 . 9 Thus, the fact that the police arrest a suspect following an interview may shed light on otherwise ambiguous facets of the police officers’ interaction with the suspect. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Lancaster
green
1 sentence1982Lancaster, 550 P.2d at 1260 n. 13. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Paz
green
1 sentence1979Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 318 A.2d at 715 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). [22] The following analysis draws on the analysis in State v. Paz, 572 P.2d at 1041-42 , of the "Factors to be Considered in the Objective Approach." The Paz decision lists three: whether the defendant could have left the scene of the interrogation voluntarily; whether the defendant was questioned as a suspect or a witness; and whether the defendant freely and voluntarily accompanied the police to the place of questioning. [23] This factor cannot by itself be the determinative test for custody. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.