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5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Melvin Andrade v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See Atkins, 290 A.3d at 485 (In a plain error posture, we reserve reversal “to particularly egregious situations,” leaving us to determine if a failure to cure allegedly improper comments “was ‘so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.’” (quoting Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1257 and Andrade 29 v. United States, 88 A.3d 134, 140 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Ball v. United States, 26 A.3d 764, 772 (D.C. 2011)). 1. | 1 | 1 |
Ball v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See Atkins, 290 A.3d at 485 (In a plain error posture, we reserve reversal “to particularly egregious situations,” leaving us to determine if a failure to cure allegedly improper comments “was ‘so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.’” (quoting Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1257 and Andrade 29 v. United States, 88 A.3d 134, 140 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Ball v. United States, 26 A.3d 764, 772 (D.C. 2011)). 1. | 1 | 1 |
Portillo v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See Atkins, 290 A.3d at 485 (In a plain error posture, we reserve reversal “to particularly egregious situations,” leaving us to determine if a failure to cure allegedly improper comments “was ‘so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.’” (quoting Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1257 and Andrade 29 v. United States, 88 A.3d 134, 140 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Ball v. United States, 26 A.3d 764, 772 (D.C. 2011)). 1. | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007Najafi, supra, 886 A.2d at 107 (citing Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 79 (D.C.1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Estrada v. Potomac Electric Power Co.green2 sentences1990In sum, the trial court should look at the determinative factors for choice-of-law questions in the District of Columbia: “which jurisdiction has the most substantial interest in having its law applied.” Estrada, supra, “488 A.2d at 1365. 1 Reversed and remanded. 1 . 1990In sum, the trial court should look at the determinative factors for choice-of-law questions in the District of Columbia: “which jurisdiction has the most substantial interest in having its law applied.” Estrada, supra, “488 A.2d at 1365. 1 Reversed and remanded. 1 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Powell v. United States
green
1 sentence2023The determinative factors for assessing whether there has been substantial prejudice include “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown
green
2 sentences2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp 2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews
green
2 sentences2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp 2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp | 1 | 2006–2006 |
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy
green
2 sentences2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp 2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission
green
2 sentences2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp 2006For example, where a state statute imposes an outright ban on competition by reserving all business for an in-state firm or firms and explicitly barring interstate commerce, see Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-93 , 114 S.Ct. 1677 ; Polar Ice Cream, 375 U.S. at 376-77 , 84 S.Ct. 378 , or targets out-of-state firms for special burdens from which in-state firms are exempt, see West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 , 114 S.Ct. 2205 ; Wash. State Apple, 432 U.S. at 350-51 , 97 S.Ct. 2434 , the problem is more blatant: the out-of-state firms are subjected to overt discrimination or an outright ban on comp | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1998As the Supreme Court of Maine has explained, “[a] prosecutor has an obligation to caution his or her witnesses against testifying as to specific facts that the prosecutor knows are inadmissible.” Edwards, supra, 412 A.2d at 987 n. 3. 1998As the Supreme Court of Maine has explained, “[a] prosecutor has an obligation to caution his or her witnesses against testifying as to specific facts that the prosecutor knows are inadmissible.” Edwards, supra, 412 A.2d at 987 n. 3. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Guesfeird v. State
green
1 sentence1998But “[although ... a solicited reference certainly is more egregious, it is only one factor and is not the determinative test.” Guesfeird, supra, 480 A.2d at 804 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.